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President Bush's Move on Troop Cuts Viewed

PM0202170890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "Viewpoint" article: "Washington's New Move"]

[Text] It cannot be denied that our Western journalist colleagues have a laudable quality—they know how to extract from a political statement something new and concrete, while at the same time demonstrating a frank disdain for generalizations, however high the platform from which they emanate.

It was in this way that the foreign news agencies transmitted reports on U.S. President G. Bush's "State of the Union" message. They condensed his whole 35-minute speech into a few dozen lines, highlighting what they regard as most important—the proposal to reduce American and Soviet troops in central and East Europe to a level of 195,000 on each side. (The West's former proposal, put forward at the May NATO Council session, set a ceiling of 275,000 servicemen on each side to be stationed outside national territories in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals). The foreign agencies also noted Bush's words that there have been "striking changes" in the world which "herald the start of a new era in our planet's life."

On reading these reports I recalled Malta, the unofficial Soviet-American meeting at the highest level. At that time, during M.S. Gorbachev's thorough talks with G. Bush, much time was devoted to discussing questions connected with disarmament problems, but no concrete new decisions were made public. I recalled it, and I thought: The exchange of opinions, a better idea of each other's positions and intentions, are repaid, and help to bring about further progress along the path of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe and the world.

I think that in taking this step Bush heeded the voices of those people in the United States and West Europe who demand from Washington new steps toward Moscow, which has already put forward and is implementing bold initiatives in the disarmament sphere. I believe that a part was also played by the assessment of recent changes in the east of our continent, which are creating conditions that make NATO's usual arguments about the "threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe" look even more absurd than before.

The arithmetic of the proposed cuts, following the American scenario, looks like this: According to the foreign agencies' calculations, the United States will have to reduce its troop numbers in this part of the world by approximately 110,000, and the Soviet Union by more than 400,000. I do not know what the Soviet side's response will be, but I believe that the obvious lack of equivalence in the cuts should not hamper our progress along a carefully chosen path. A year ago we began unilaterally to reduce our armed forces by 500,000 men, together with a substantial reduction in conventional arms. Then we put forward the idea of a radical reduction, by 1996-1997, in the Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces, down to an identical level. We are withdrawing our troop contingents from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. And we are doing this not because we are making concessions to anyone, but on the basis of a general assessment of the situation on the continent and worldwide, because we have adopted a well-considered decision—to switch from the principle of superarming to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. It was these steps by the socialist countries that opened the way to progress in conventional arms reduction.

Encouraging prospects have also emerged in other areas of disarmament—in the sphere of strategic offensive arms, chemical weapons, and so forth. The Soviet Union consistently pursues a line of building a nonviolent, secure world, a line dictated by the new political thinking. Unfortunately, our Western partners clearly lack such consistency. Thus in the same speech, the American President did not fail to ensure that there was a fly in the ointment. His proposal on reducing the agreed level of conventional arms was accompanied by a statement that the United States will continue the program of modernization of the nuclear arsenal and the implementation of SDI.

Of course, Bush's proposal is a new move by Washington in the actively developing Soviet-American political collaboration. It promises to be productive this year. Let me remind you that U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker arrives in Moscow in a few days. And in June there should be an official Soviet-American meeting at the highest level. At this meeting, as was stated in Malta, major breakthroughs can be expected in the sphere of control of the most lethal types of arms. The world is leaving behind the era of the cold war. We are at the very beginning of this path, and it is difficult and long.

Senators Quiz Baker on Troop Cuts Proposal

PM0202171090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan report: "Disputes Flare Up"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Feb—In connection with President G. Bush's new proposal on reducing Soviet and American troops in Europe, Secretary of State Baker, Defense Secretary Cheney, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Powell spoke in the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees to explain the President's initiative.

The proposal on troop cuts, which had been kept strictly secret until the last moment—until G. Bush delivered the "State of the Union" message—met with a mixed reaction.

"I am worried that we may not be moving forward quickly enough," Senator J. Biden stated. "The whole world is obviously following an accelerated timetable now, and we too should accelerate our timetable," Senator P. Sarbanes seconded him. Criticizing the statement that Washington "will never accept" further reductions in its troops in Europe below the level of 195,000 men set by the President, Senators S. Nunn and A. Gore warned the White House of the possibility of an "absurd situation" in which the U.S. Army could remain on the continent in isolation "with no Soviet threat and no allies," who are increasingly persistently calling for disarmament.

Answering the senators' questions, Secretary of State Baker said that "the new troop reductions proposal is only part of a strategy that is being implemented in response to the enormous changes and the uncertainty of the situation in the USSR and East Europe." East and West, he said, have at last begun to shake off the legacy of the cold war. Tension in relations with the Soviet Union is lessening, while stabilizing efforts in the sphere of arms control are growing.

Arms Shipments to Third World Questioned

90WC0036A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5, 31 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Yuriy Kornilov: "How Much Do Weapons Cost?"]

[Text] Over the course of many years our country has consistently stood for restricting the international export of weapons, thereby ensuring a further reduction of international tensions. However, at a time when our diplomats are steadfastly defending this position in the United Nations Organization and in other international forums, the scale of the arms trade is taking its normal course.

At present, according to data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the volume of sales and shipments worldwide of basic conventional arms systems appreciably exceeds $30 billion, and about one-third of these deliveries is attributed to the USSR (compared with 20-25 percent attributed to the United States). Also, according to SIPRI data, while the shipment of American arms constituted only 5.9 percent of the total volume of U.S. exports, the corresponding index for our country is 17.5 percent. To further clarify the picture, we will also cite this data on foreign exports: If all states exporting arms for the period 1982-1986 delivered 12,898 tanks to "Third World countries," then the USSR's share was 4,345 vehicles; of 3,079 combat aircraft, 1,545 were Soviet; and of 1,750 helicopters, more than 900 bore the stamp "Made in the USSR." To whom do these arms go?

There is hardly any need in this context to talk about our shipments of arms to Warsaw Pact allies, especially since these shipments are not as large as is frequently believed. The lion's share of the exports we are talking about falls specifically to the "Third World." These exports do not contradict those international legal principles that are stipulated in the UN statute and the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), and the Declaration on Strengthening International Security (1970). These principles are met fully by such international acts of ours, for example, as arms assistance to Afghanistan, and, in the recent past, to Vietnam and Cuba, which were forced to repel external aggression.

However, these facts are more the exception rather than the rule. The main and, so to say, planned recipients of our arms over the course of a number of years were the Arab countries of the Near East, a number of African countries, India, and Iran. It seems that arms shipments to these countries should be viewed as specific trade-political actions, which are undertaken not only because of purely political factors, but also because of certain economic factors. If, for example, the USSR delivers arms to friendly India, which has a rightful concern about strengthening its own security, then India in turn considers it advantageous and expedient to acquire arms specifically from the USSR, and it pays for these arms with currency or commodities that our country needs. But do we always take into sufficient account specifically the economic side of a transaction?

Inasmuch as our press does not publish official data on this matter, let us look at what they write "over there." Recent SIPRI publications indicate that the debt of Syria, for example, for arms that our country has shipped to it is expressed in a tremendous sum—$12 billion. Egypt, which incidentally itself shipped arms worth $200 million to other countries in the 1982-1986 period, according to statements by foreign experts, still has not paid us a debt totalling approximately 4.5 billion [currency not specified]. Of course, I by no means insist that these figures be automatically accepted on faith, but they nonetheless suggest that in the cases indicated our generosity could hardly be called totally justified. And what real political dividends, not to mention economic benefits, did our country receive from the shipment of arms, let us say, to Angola (according to SIPRI data, during the period 1982-1986 it received Soviet arms worth almost $5 billion), to Mozambique (the volume of deliveries for the indicated period was $1.3 billion), and to Ethiopia ($3.8 billion)? This list can be continued.

It can be said: The question concerns years that have passed, and the specific costs and miscalculations in our foreign policy and in our foreign economic strategy of that period are already known. We will not argue. But how do things stand today, when our economists and people's deputies struggle intensely to find additional means to resolve at least the most acute and urgent socioeconomic problems?

"I think there is information about how economically beneficial weapons shipments are to us in the USSR

Ministry of Defense," I was told by an acquaintance who is an international economist and whom I decided to consult on this question.

"But you are interested in this problem professionally," I observed.

"Why do you not appeal to the ministry and analyze it along with the military-economic aspect of the question?"

He looked at me with amazement:

"Do you not know that this information, as before, is secret? And even if it was possible to get to it, this would not promise anything good for me: I would possess a state secret and would be deprived of the ability to go abroad, which is necessary to my work..."

The frankness is appealing. However, listening to my interlocutor, whose especially pragmatic position, to tell the truth, is understandable, I again and again thought: And why in fact are data on the shipment of our arms held in such secrecy? In Western countries such as the United States, the FRG, France, England, and Italy, which long ago entered the international arena as major arms exporters, why is the question of political and economic benefits from concluding pertinent contracts with other states not only not a secret but frequently the subject of lively and at times very sharp discussions in the press, in the headquarters of the political parties, and in parliament. But in our country any information on this score is to this day locked up in a steel safe, to which even USSR people's deputies do not have access, nor do economists or journalists? Perhaps the guards of the indestructible safes are in a position to answer.

"We do not have information on weapons deliveries," is the terse reply in the information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Well, since the healing ray of glasnost cannot yet penetrate every kind of uniformed bureaucratic obstacle, we will amuse ourselves with the fact that the large shipments of Soviet arms to "Third World" countries are in some way connected to our country's declarations of a policy to unblock regional conflicts, but that the data published in the West about the losses the USSR is incurring from this business is nothing but the malicious fabrications of imperialist propaganda. The scheme is not new; it is usual. But one thought is disturbing: What if suddenly the authors of the fabrications about our losses are in some way right?...

Shevardnadze Discusses Current World Issues

LD0302094390 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—"The Soviet Union believes that an 'open-skies' regime would be a large-scale confidence-building measure and would make actions of states in the military field more predictable." This was said by Eduard Shevardnadze in an interview with Canadian newspaper THE TORONTO STAR in connection with his forthcoming participation in the international "open skies" conference to be held in Canada in February.

Recalling that the Soviet Union was one of the first to support the initiative by U.S. President George Bush to work out an "open-skies" regime, the Soviet foreign minister said also that it was desirable and necessary to extend openness to embrace not only the skies, but also land, sea, oceans and outer space.

Answering a question about turning the Arctic into a "zone of peace", Shevardnadze reminded of a series of specific proposals to reduce the level of naval confrontation in the north, of unilateral Soviet steps to limit arms in the region.

Thus, in the framework of unilateral cuts in Soviet Armed Forces the strength of the Leningrad Military District and the Northern Fleet will be cut by about twenty thousand by the end of 1990.

The minister noted that unfortunately, so far Soviet proposals to bring down the level of military confrontation in the Arctic had not had a positive response from its Western partners.

The Soviet Union actively supports, he went on to say, the idea to create nuclear free zones in the north of Europe and have repeatedly stated our readiness to act as its guarantor. The Soviet Union has also begun to eliminate certain categories of nuclear arms in the Baltic Sea. We are also prepared to reach an agreement on a totally nuclear free status of the Baltic Sea.

Speaking about the creation of a "common European home," Eduard Shevardnadze said that both individual states and international organisations first of all must be open, prepared for dialogue and ready to establish and promote all kinds of contacts and relations.

He noted that given her considerable political weight, democratic traditions, Canada, which among other things, is the Soviet Union's northern neighbour, was called upon to play a prominent role in in building a sturdy "Arctic roof" of a peaceful "common European home."

Dwelling on questions conected with the activity of the Warsaw Pact during the 1990s, and the USSR's role in that alliance in the light of recent changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet foreign minister said that the evolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation [WTO] began long before these events that you mention—under the impact of new thinking, departure from confrontational approaches in foreign policy. According to Shevardnadze, essentially, this evolution is designed to transform the WTO from a military-political into a political-military alliance called upon not only to protect the national interests of its members and maintain stability on the European continent but also to make a weighty contribution toward further improvement of the international situation and ensure progress in disarmament.

Eduard Shevardnadze said that broader direct political contacts between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO could be fruitful in this context.

Answering a question about the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, he said that the Soviet side would be prepared to do so as the process of a Middle East settlement got under way as a practical matter.

The absence of diplomatic relations does not imply refusal to carry on political dialogue with Israel, primarily on the questions of a Middle East settlement, he went on to say. Furthermore, some aspects of bilateral relations make it essential to maintain contacts.

Speaking about the top priority to humanize relations between all the peoples of the Middle East, the minister said that in meetings with Israeli representatives the Soviet side was urging them to respond adequately to the willingness shown by the Palestinians and the Arabs, as a whole, to make compromises in the efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Eduard Shevardnadze expressed concern over the statements made by some Israeli leaders about their intention to retain the occupied Arab territories to resettle immigrants there, including those from the Soviet Union. He said that such wrongful actions, which create additional obstacles to a Middle East settlement, were inadmissible.

Emigration from the USSR is not the problem, the foreign minister went on to say. The problem is that some Israeli leaders still hope that sooner or later the world will accept their "right" to lord it over other people's lands. The situation may probably require close attention of the United Nations, of the Security Council, he said.

Answering a question about the conflict in the Caucasus, the Soviet foreign minister said that the conflict was ethnic in nature, not religious or conceptual.

He noted that the sending of Army units to Azerbaijan was dictated exclusively by humanitarian concerns: to put an end to outbreak of terrorism, avert a civil war between the two peoples and the bloodshed. They have no political, or "anti-Muslim" implications, the minister added.

Objectively, there are no reasons why the developments in the south of the Soviet Union should have a negative effect on our relations with the Islamic World. The attempts to portray these developments as religiously motivated would be politically improper and inconsistent with anyone's interests, Eduard Shevardnadze stressed.

'Observers Roundtable' on German Unity, Europe

LD0402175490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 4 Feb 90

["International Observers at Roundtable" program with IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Text] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. We present International Observers at the Roundtable. Taking part today are IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin.

There have been a great many international events this week, but I think we have good reason to begin our discussion with the German problem—not only because the week began, practically, with the visit to Moscow of Hans Modrow, chairman of GDR Council of Ministers, and ended with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meeting with Gregor Gysi, chairman of the SED-PDS, but above all because Hans Modrow has just recently propounded his program for German unity, a program that is arousing enormous interest and is, I think, worth saying something about.

[Bovin] Well, I think the German question, which we will now discuss, is part of the general range of problems that has arisen in connection with the radical revolutionary changes in central and Eastern Europe. I'd even venture to say that the center of world politics has now shifted to that particular region of central and Eastern Europe. The changes that are happening, and will happen, there are not just local; it's not that just a few things are changing a little bit here or there. I think that in a little while they will force us, to some extent, to alter some of our more general—even theoretical or philosophical—notions, say, of the course of social progress or of the possibilities of various movements as it were, whether they be backwards, or zig-zag, or what you will.

We are at a point where a turnaround is now occurring in history. We are witnessing it and yet it's still difficult for us to assess all this, because the one thing that can be said of what is happening now is that it doesn't fit into the framework of Marxism-Leninism that we all learned in our institutes or schools or where ever. Something new is happening. By the way, these new developments can be seen everywhere in that region, but the German question, if we take the political aspect of the matter—the political, perhaps not even the social—is the linchpin of this whole present swirling whirlwind of events. Therefore, it is indeed natural and appropriate to begin with this.

[Levin] The more so since we must be frank: For many of us the question of German unity has been unexpected, even to put it mildly, unpleasantly unexpected. The question at once arises—what will this united Germany be like; will it not become once again, as has happened more than once in history, a hotbed of military threat? This is something that we—and not we alone—are pretty sensitive about. It is now being debated literally in every country, it is being very widely discussed. In Denmark a public opinion poll has been held, which has shown that 51 percent of the respondents are against a unified German state, and only 26 percent think it's a good idea.

[Bovin] Perhaps we shouldn't speed up events too much here. After all, the situation so far is that for the moment, as I understand it, everyone admits that from the point of view of the march of history, so to speak, the unification of Germany in principle seems to be inevitable at some stage of development. We admit this point—it was admitted during Gorbachev's latest conversation, last time—and so does the West. But it certainly isn't a problem, shall we say, for the present day.

[Levin] Life develops so fast, Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, that you don't know what problem will arise tomorrow.

[Bovin] That's right of course. And here it is emphasized all the time, both by us, and by the West—and incidentally by Bush, by Thatcher, and by Mitterrand—that yes, yes, of course it's bound to happen in time. But only on one condition: That stability is preserved in central Europe and in Europe generally. Naturally, it must not undermine detente, it must not undermine the improvement of East-West relations. That's more or less how I see it.

[Shishlin] It seems to me correct to consider in general that the changes in Eastern Europe alter the whole political landscape today, and of course in themselves these changes affect above all the countries in which they are taking place: They affect the Soviet Union, and they affect the socialist part of the world. However, to the same degree, they introduce new elements and demand new dimensions both in the policies of the West European states—Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich has mentioned the positions of Thatcher, Bush, and Mitterrand—and this applies equally to the other capitals of Western Europe, and not only of the European states. At all events, it's perfectly clear to us that we can't go back to yesterday. What tomorrow will be like is of course hard to say. I would agree with what Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich has been saying, about the timing of the implementation of all these problems that are today on the agenda. For all the rapidity of the changes, the unification of Germany cannot be accomplished in a day. By the way, the head of the GDR Government actually advocates a certain rhythm- - a fairly restrained rhythm—for the process of uniting Germany.

[Bovin] By the way, I also think even in Bonn sensible people are in general, as it were, saying much the same.

[Levin] But there is some resemblance and some difference between Kohl's 10-point-plan and Modrow's plan, in which I have counted seven points. It's a matter of moving toward confederation, but there are also some fairly noticeable distinctions. Probably the main distinction between these two plans is that Modrow thinks the result should be a unified German state based on military neutrality. Bonn immediately said this is not a serious possibility, because it is not in keeping with the general European process. Well, it doesn't look like a convincing explanation, and it would be funny if Bonn did at once accept the Modrow plan and worry about its priority. But it seems to me that neutralization of the two German states as the decisive prerequisite of unification is an element that would certainly reassure all the other states and all Germany's neighbors—but in the framework of the general European process: When that process gets going, and probably not just in relations between the two German states.

[Shishlin] Well, Viktor Nikolayevich, I think all the events will develop on various planes, simply in different directions.

[Bovin] According to a different system of coordinates. What you're saying now is based on the present system of coordinates: Here you have socialist Eastern Europe, and here you have Western Europe.

[Shishlin] No, I'm speaking rather on the basis of military experience.

[Bovin] Well, Genscher is now proposing this compromise: That, yes, Germany will remain in NATO, but like France will withdraw from the military organization of NATO. And in view of the fact that we are now all saying that in time the relative importance of the military aspects will decline, both in the Warsaw Pact and NATO, possibly some such political compromise will work. As yet, it's a bit too early to talk about it of course.

[Shishlin] For clarity of argument, I would perhaps divide this whole problem into, well, several sections, you might say. The first is the purely German section. Here I think of course there will be strong pressure in favor of such rapid steps—at least in the economic sphere that is quite obvious, but in other spheres as well. We see in fact that the political forces of West Germany are today actively interfering in the GDR's political life. And there is no doubt that at the coming elections it will be necessary to take into account not just the mood of the GDR population, but also the political actvity of the West German political forces.

That's one area. The second is the general European one. Here of course we enter the new Europe—we are on the threshold of that new Europe. And then the old European institutions, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, will of course be transformed. Undoubtedly, that's the way of evolution. We're already talking about the need for the Warsaw Pact to have greater political significance than as a military alliance. And I think it could go further, develop further; because after all, these blocs were engendered by the postwar period. They were born and shaped in the years of the cold war. And if we're saying that the cold war is receding, that the cold war is coming to an end, then the era of confrontation between the two military-political groupings on European soil is ending too.

Of course a third means exists, which is worldwide. Insofar as we are really living in a mutually dependent and to some degree integrated world, of course international development as such will now bring much that is new, much that is unexpected, not necessarily smooth and calm, but quite dramatic.

[Levin] But in one way or another, it seems to me that what has happened is irreversible. No one is now able to turn back this page of history and to start reading the first chapter of history again.

[Shishlin] But let's try and put the question more sharply. Recently I spoke at a collective; the question was put like this: So then, we are losing our Europe, so to speak. We are losing that Europe which we liberated from fascism. This is the way the question was put, which by the way is elementarily in all our heads.

[Levin] Well, I would say that saying it is elementary, yes or no, is simply impossible. Yes, of course we are losing that model of links, mutual relations, union and cooperation, which existed and was derived from the administrative-command system, from the Stalinist model.

[Bovin] It is very important that we circulated our model, and that it was implanted there.

[Levin] Yes, we are losing this. But for that we are in an unknown world which is full, not only of alarm but also full of hopes, a world of renewal, a world of revolutionary renewal, a world of creative searching.

[Bovin] That's how I sometimes put this question to myself—well okay, at the moment Finland is our only Western neighbor. Well, its fine with Finland, and everything between us is good, and if there are to be two more Finlands there are three Austrias on the other side, then what's wrong with that? There will be no problems. Well that's one way of putting the question, but it's a little naive.

[Levin] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, in this connection I am turning to your thesis on the system of old coordinates. I recently read an article in one of our central newspapers which expressed its concern at the too rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of several East European states...

[Bovin, interrupting] Well so far we haven't exactly been rushing.

[Levin] But this is a matter of a possible threat in connection with the talks which have begun in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary about the withdrawal of our troops. It is well known that both the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments made it clear that all our troops should leave there by the end of this year. And so some military comrades ask the question—what's happening? NATO has got everyone in place, and we it seems have to destroy under pressure that structure, which is the only possible basis for talks. But this example, it seems to me, shows that on the contrary, on the contrary, nothing bad is going on. National security in my opinion really does not suffer at all, that is the security of our Soviet Union, as we can already see. The Belgians have taken the initiative upon themselves and have announced that they will gradually withdraw their troops from the FRG. And now we are strongly approaching Bush's announcement...

[Bovin, interrupting] Ah, I forgot about...

[Levin, interrupting] ...which disproves all these theses that it is necessary to reply to military opposition only with yet greater military opposition, and that this is the only way to peace.

[Bovin] Well, Bush. In general this is now such a rare situation when the development of events overtakes the pace of talks. Usually everything happens the other way round, but now development runs ahead and now Bush is forced to look at what is going on; at a recent meeting, by the way, he had a limit of 275,000 for both our troops and their troops. Now he has proposed that we and the Americans have 195,000 troops each in central Europe, plus he added 30,000 for himself—that is a base in Italy, Turkey, and some third country. So in general, 225,000 for the Americans and 195,000 for us. So the original figure which they are to discuss in Vienna has been reduced, and this, thank God, is good.

[Shishlin] I must add that as far as is possible to judge from reports, the U.S. military budget for this financial year has a certain minus in comparison with the previous year, and the United States—Washington, and the military departments as well—are working out projects for genuine cuts in U.S. military expenditure in the coming years. So that in the given case, unilateral steps in cutting weapons are ceasing to be our monopoly, and this is gratifying.

[Bovin] Then it is simply necessary to think about it, for there is no similar such position. But who now wants to wage war—let's simply put the question this way—who now wants to wage war, and what could cause a war in Europe now? What can happen? Of course, it is possible to abstractly dream up a scenario, but it presupposes the madness of one or other side, and if common sense rules on both sides, then in general the probability of war is extremely small. For this reason there is an even greater probability that we can finally and seriously cut conventional weapons as well, and I think that this year—well I hope—a treaty will be signed on strategic offensive weapons. This would be a breakthrough toward a calm and peaceful future.

[Shishlin] It seems to me we must remember that these changes in Eastern Europe in themselves—this is absolutely indisputable, it is going on right now—will bring about an increase in links between European states situtated in Western Europe and European states situated in the center and East Europe. These processes are going on. Of course, they are not so straightforward. In the political sphere it is becoming easier to make and increase contacts, but in the economic sphere there is work for years ahead, complicated work, a smoothing of economic relations and their equalization, which demands huge, massive internal efforts by those countries which have started along the path of renewal. And huge work is demanded from us, the Soviet Union.

[Bovin] Well, we also have to force our way forward into Europe; force our way forward not because we have a thousand rockets or 50,000 tanks, but because we will have a normally functioning industry, we will have competitive products which we can sell. This is how we have to win Europe, if you like, not with tanks and with rockets, but this is much more difficult, and the whole of perestroyka is aimed at this. Unfortunately, thus far this is going with difficulty, we all understand this, but this is the most important thing; there is no way for us to avoid it.

[Levin] I would like to return to the military aspect. In the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST on 31 January, a conversation was published with former U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger. I remember that in his time, we always regarded him as one of the hawks, and in general, with good reason. He always came forward with very tough programs...

[Shishlin, interrupting] Well, U.S. ministers are such that while still minister they are always hawks—take McNamara—but on leaving they become complete doves—there's Brown, and now Schlesinger.

[Levin] And Schlesinger has also become an overt dove.

[Bovin] And now it's Weinberger's turn. [Laughter]

[Levin] For some reason he's not rushing to change his colors. But I want to return to Schlesinger's words—how does he reason? He says that the United States must work out a plan of radical cuts in its forces in West Europe in view of the fact that political reforms in Eastern Europe have practically ended the military threat from the Warsaw Pact. Well, there you have it. In general this has its grounds. It's true that he goes further than President Bush; he considers that it is necessary to leave 75,000-100,000 U.S. troops in Europe, in parity with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this is very revealing reasoning, although I would like to hear, respected colleagues, your opinions. How do you evaluate the decision by the U.S. Administration to increase expenditure on the Strategic Defense Initiative within the framework of a reduced military budget.

[Bovin] Well, I think—taking a slightly broader view, again— that one should not labor under any illusions concerning the U.S. Administration. Despite Malta, despite all the fine things taking place, they have their own idea of U.S. interests, and, do what they will, they have these interests and you can't get rid of them. Take Panama—the most basic and simple example of Panama, if you please. Does it correspond to all the talk that took place between Bush and Gorbachev about the right of choice, and so on and so forth? No! There you are—it's their typical brazen style: They felt like it, so they took Panama. This is deepseated, it's not fortuitous; it's an expression of some sort of inner purpose which also exists in other things. Take the SDI. An enormous tradition, or rather inertia, has been built up. Quite large amounts of funds have been spent. And some sort of forces exist which are urging this. Generally speaking, this exists. It is a defensive weapon—this is what they'll tell you in reply: Excuse us, gentlemen, we are doing this as part of a defensive strategy. There is a formal justification for this, so to speak, on their part. So let's all take a calm line on this. You can't force the Americans to think like us about everything and do as we do. We have completely different systems, and there will be a lot of differences regarding other matters too. You have to seek compromise. They must concede some things and we must concede others. Otherwise we won't get anywhere.

[Shishlin] This is particularly true insofar as there are no grounds for saying that the Americans are now implementing this Strategic Defense Initiative in full measure. That is, yes, they are putting funds into it, but far from as extensively or in the same quanitity as was originally planned. The actual rate of implementation of the program has become slack, to put it mildly.

[Bovin] That's a fact!

[Shishlin] That does not mean that they will abandon it in the immediate and foreseeable future, but it seems to me that the actual program as a whole has one foot in the grave. Perhaps this is the result of scientific and technological difficulties. Naturally, the altered political atmosphere in the world is also having an effect. But for the time being, and here I would agree with Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, this is an icon they pray to in the United States, and there are circles that simply have an interested motive.

[Bovin] There are also some people who believe that it is defensive, that's a fact. By the way, I find something else more disconcerting. Take those Stealth bombers. They are typically offensive weapons. One simply can't get away with claiming that they are defensive. They are typically offensive weapons. Nevertheless, they are pursuing this program to its conclusion. Special hangars have to be purchased for them now, and they intend to purchase them, it seems.

[Levin] Also invisible ones?

[Bovin] I don't know. I want to say again that there must be no illusions. Where possible, they are pushing their line, in exactly the same way as we push ours. But the art of politics consists exactly in not going—as the Chinese used to say at one time, do you remember?

[Shishlin] [passage indistinct].

[Bovin] Yes, that's it. But it consists in seeking agreement where you can to ease the tensions, conceding on one issue and preparing the ground for another issue. That is the art of politics and I think, by the way, that we're generally getting the hang of it. But to believe that the Americans are going to change something or everything straight away is something I haven't believed in the past and don't believe now.

[Levin] By the way, I think it was extremely symptomatic and symbolic in the present circumstances that Bush made a telephone call to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev this week and that they had a conversation. Not much is known about it, but what is known is that Bush first told Mikhail Sergeyevich about his proposals for armed forces reductions, and then he announced them publicly. That also indicates a certain element of confidence in their relations, and that is encouraging.

[Bovin] Well, these are normal relations. By the way, they always used to reproach us that when we had certain proposals, why did we immediately start to proclaim them with great fanfare instead of discreetly telling them first? Perhaps we could do it differently somehow? They told us we turned everything into propaganda and that we should go in for diplomacy instead. Well, Bush has demonstrated this; he made the telephone call, and thank goodness for that—may everything continue like that.

[Levin] It seems to me that we are not setting practical politics against propaganda. Propaganda in the good sense should assist practical politics. But practical politics should be to the fore. I should like to return again to Eastern European affairs, since this week saw an event that was very much out of the ordinary—the extraordinary 14th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. It seems to me that the congress did not resolve all the issues that Bulgaria faces.

[Bovin] A very interesting process is also taking place here now—the process whereby the communists are losing their monopoly on political power. It is taking place in different ways in different countries. Where these reforms are coming mainly from the top—and Bulgaria is one such example—this process of drawing in other political forces is taking place at a reduced pace, and where the process is mainly coming from below—as happened in Czechoslovakia say, or as happened in the GDR—it is all taking place much more rapidly. In Bulgaria, I repeat, it is for the time being proceeding in gentle and slowed-down ways. For the moment, if you compare the platform of Bulgarian Communists with what the Czechoslovak, German, or Polish communists are saying, it is the most traditional. They are retaining the words Marxism-Leninism, as far as I know.

[Shishlin] No, without the Leninism.

[Bovin] Well, Marxism then, and socialism. Excuse me, but in the other programs, these concepts are beginning to be essentially diluted. I would describe what is happening as a process of social democratization in the communist parties of Eastern Europe. That is how it should be designated as a whole if one is not to hide one's head in the sand. That is what is happening. And here, so to speak, the Bulgarians are for the time being in the last carriage of this process. If you look at these countries, the others are ahead of them. This is a fact. If you examine what's happened, the Poles have already named themselves social democrats. The Germans...

[Levin, interrupting] From today it is to be the Party of Democratic Socialism.

[Bovin] It's not even a question of name. Even if you look at the substance, they are typical social-democratic programs. Our own theoreticans—not we journalists here—face the task of working out how this interesting process that is going on is to be understood and explained. Well, we shall have to wait for the moment for our experts to tell us all about it perhaps. But it is all very interesting. And now our Marxist-Leninist sages are telling us to read Kautsky and Bernstein, in other words those self-same leaders of revisionsm and opportunism and so on, as we used to describe them in the past. However, if you read their works, you find a huge number of interesting things, and they are no doubt things that work today, given that social democracy works in the West today.

[Shishlin] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, it is worth noting that even the socialist thought in Russia was richer than just the Bolshevist current.

[Bovin] Yes, of course. [Words indistinct] Plekhanov himself said so, and now it is interesting to read his works. There were masses of interesting things of all kinds there.

[Shishlin] Overall, if one reads, without exception, about the development of the socialist idea in, say, Russia, our country, it is very interesting and instructive reading.

[Bovin] We have simply cut ourselves off from parts of our culture and history, and now we are, so to speak, restoring them.

[Levin] Well, I think that our Marxist theorists have things to ponder, since such processes are unfolding not only in the East European countries; I recently read that the Italian Communist Party is thinking very seriously of how to continue, under what name, and on what theoretical platform.

[Bovin] I'll say! Because the crisis of the communist international movement is a fact. It is in a most deep crisis. It has lost mass support, except for the Italians and a couple of small (?states).

[Levin] Nevertheless, the Italians are raising this question.

[Bovin] Yes. But this is because they are looking ahead. They too will loose mass support if they repeat the close of the 19th Century or the beginning of the 20th. They are intelligent people; they don't want that.

[Shishlin] I'm glancing at the clock and I think our program is near its end. In connection with this subject we have touched on, it has crossed my mind that the brilliant French socialist Jean Jaures said that to keep up a tradition is not to preserve the ashes but to keep up the fire. I think that these revolutionary changes in themselves are indeed that new fire, the fire of theoretic thought and of practical actions, the fire of politics, which, yes, inevitably through losses and through hard trials can give new strength back to the socialist idea as such.

[Levin] One can't put it better, and at this point we come to the end. Thank you, esteemed comrades, for your attention. All the best to you.

Gerasimov on Stock Exchange, 'Gorbachev Factor'

LD0302183590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Feb 90

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Excerpt] [Gerasimov] Hello comrades. In the Western countries, there's an institution rather strange to us—the Stock Exchange—where shares are traded and if you like, speculation goes on, even if only from time to time. People play the Stock Exchange, because the Stock Exchange is like an antenna—very sensitive to what's happening in the world. It always has its ear to the ground. Here's the first example: In mid-January, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, because of pressure of work, postponed a meeting with the British politician Kinnock. On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, shares fell sharply—it was almost a panic. They were reassured when they learned that Comrade Gorbachev had not canceled his next meeting with the Japanese political figure Abe.

A second example: On Tuesday, a correspondent of the U.S. television company CNN put out a canard that Comrade Gorbachev was intending to resign as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—a totally unfounded rumor. Next morning, that same television company, CNN, reported further news that the rumor had shaken the world. Once again, the stock exchanges got the jitters. REUTER reported panic on the New York exchange; shares had fallen and the price of gold had leapt up. At moments of alarm everyone rushes for gold.

Third example: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed his opinion on the issue of reunification of the two German states, the FRG and the GDR. And the same news agency, REUTER, reported that Mr Gorbachev's comments have led to a sharp rise in prices on the Frankfurt exchange. That is how the reflex known in the West as the Gorbachev factor works. A correspondent of the British paper FINANCIAL TIMES even suggested—in jest of course—that we should use such rumors to play the stock exchange to our own advantage, as a way of earning hard currency: put gold onto the market, for example, at a moment when its price jumps under the influence of alarming reports from Moscow. That's a joke of course. But it shows what a mutually dependent world we live in. [passage omitted]

United States & Canada

Bush's Proposal for Troop Reductions Assessed

Welcomed by Gerasimov

LD0102164390 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Excerpt] A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, has said this country welcomes President Bush's proposal for cuts in American and Soviet troops in Europe to a level of 195,000 men on either side. In his interview for British television's channel four he stressed the fact that the Soviet Union favors the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries. The Soviet diplomat described Mr. Bush's proposal as a step in the right direction. [passage omitted]

U.S. Democrats Cited

LD0202075190 Moscow TASS in English 0725 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 2 TASS—Final arms and troop levels in Europe should be set at talks involving the United States, the Soviet Union and other interested countries, U.S. House of Representatives majority leader Richard Gephardt told a press conference on Capitol Hill on Thursday. Gephardt and other democratic congressmen commented on President Bush's State of the Union address and the forthcoming congressional agenda.

Bush's proposal to cut U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe is a step in the right direction, Gephardt said.

The proposal is assured of congressional support, he said.

During talks, the sides will negotiate the lowest possible troop levels, he said.

House Speaker Thomas Foley said it was necessary to study whether troop levels in Europe could be reduced below 195,000.

There is no doubt that the presence of troops in Europe is too costly. Troop levels will be discussed during the debate on the military budget, he said.

'Double Standard' Criticized

LD0202173290 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 2 Feb 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—The proposal by United States President George Bush on deeper cuts in Soviet and American troops stationed in Europe, outside their national territories deserves close consideration.

A step in the right direction, in principle it accords with the Soviet Union's stand, although it does not go as far as the Soviet side's proposals.

It is known that the Soviet Union favours the full withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from the territories of respective allied states.

The U.S. President's proposal will probably be thoroughly analysed in Moscow and a reply to it will be given promptly. However, there are certain aspects of Bush's new initiative that are disappointing.

Washington continues to apply a "double standard" to matters concerning East-West security.

In terms of troops stationed outside their national territories, the situations that have taken shape within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) differ substantially.

Within the WTO, only Soviet troops are stationed in the territories of allied countries, within NATO this applies to the troops of not only the United States but other countries as well.

Can one fail to take into account the military contingents from Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Canada, stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany and totalling 160,000 men?

I believe that this approach is not in line with relationships taking shape at the talks on limiting and reducing arms and armed forces, which are distinguished by the equality of the partnership.

It is utterly inexplicable why, while suggesting equal personnel levels of 195,000 men in the centre of Europe for Soviet and American troops, the U.S. President immediately made a provision that the United States could station another 30,000 servicemen on the territories of Britain, Italy, and Turkey.

The self-same "double standard" is apparent in the approach to cuts in Soviet and American troops. If the 30,000 servicemen are essential to the United States, why did not the president envisage in his proposal a "symmetrical" additional contingent of Soviet troops, say, on Polish territory?

The participants in the Vienna forum should take stock of all issues that still remain uncoordinated at the talks.

As a result, it may be possible to postpone the solution to some problems to subsequent stages of negotiations, in order to conclude a first phase agreement this year.

The need to expedite the Vienna talks is utterly clear. It is increasingly apparent that they lag behind the rapidly changing political situation on the continent.

Baker Briefs Senate Panel on Foreign Policy

LD0202061290 Moscow TASS in English 2357 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 2 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Thursday addressed the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee to specify the fundamentals of the U.S. foreign policy program for the 1990s, the brief provisions of which were given by President Bush in his State of the Union message on January 31.

"We seek to probe for points of mutual advantage with the Soviet Union, turning areas of conflict into areas of cooperation wherever possible," Bush told the committee. "In this way we will benefit ourselves as well as the reformers in Moscow." Baker intends to discuss this with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze next week during his trip to Moscow.

Baker noted that the United States is seeking to create new global relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of interaction in the settlement of regional conflicts through peaceful means and stressed that this is the way to lessen the burden of military spending.

According to Baker, the Bush administration will work to stop the spreading of dangerous technologies, chemical and biological weapons and the ballistic missile technology. He said that the United States calls for signing a multi-sided convention on chemical arms in Geneva, which would provide for the reduction of chemical arsenals to 500 tonnes eight years after the convention enters into force and the complete elimination after all states-producers of chemical weapons join the convention.

Touching upon regional conflicts, Baker noted that United States calls for a political settlement in Afghanistan but only on the basis of the Najibullah regime's passing power to a representative government. He did not say, however, how this government will be formed.

He claimed again that the Soviet behaviour as regards Cuba and Nicaragua remains the major obstacle on the way towards a complete and general improvement of its relations with the United States. He said that the United States intends to continue its efforts to settle the Middle East conflict, is adherent to the preservation of NATO and keeps its obligations in the sphere of security in South Korea.

U.S. Secretary of State Baker's Visit Awaited

Adamishin Reviews Agenda

LD0202151790 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—Within the framework of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin met U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Shifter today.

They discussed matters relating to human rights and other humanitarian issues and analysed the new agenda for Soviet-U.S. interactions in the humanitarian field. It was stated with satisfaction that the Soviet-American dialogue was gaining constructive momentum and creating new possibilities for resolving humanitarian problems raised by the sides.

Meeting With Gorbachev Slated

LD0402123690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The event to be discussed in this edition of Mayak Panorama is not something that happened today, but every day recently, the mass information media have shown a heightened interest in it. I have in mind the forthcoming visit of the U.S. secretary of state to Moscow. Tomorrow, Baker is to leave for his trip around Europe. At first he will visit Prague, and then on Tuesday night he is scheduled to arrive here. Thus the contacts which, one could say, have become regular at the level of heads of the USSR and the United States foreign policy departments will continue. I will ask my colleague, commentator Andrey Ptashnikov, to tell us about the atmosphere in which this visit will take place and about the questions that will be discussed during the talks with Comrade Shevardnadze.

[Ptashnikov] You know, it is considerably easier to answer the first question than the second one. After all, the official agenda of the day of talks has not been published or announced anywhere. Therefore, we can only speculate what problems will be discussed by the two ministers. [passage omitted]

Talking about the atmosphere in which the visit will take place, it is necessary to recognize that since the Malta meeting, many very important events have taken place. I have in mind, among other things, the U.S. armed invasion of Panama, which evidently did not increase their prestige on the international arena; the continuing radical changes in Eastern Europe; the tragic events in the Soviet Transcaucasian republics; and, finally, the new proposal recently put forward by the President of the United States to limit the number of Soviet and U.S. troops in central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 men on each side. Nor should one forget that in the past 2 months, work has been carried out at the two negotiating tables on strategic offensive weapons and on reducing conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe. I think I will not be wrong to say that these will be the major issues at the coming talks. In addition, problems of bilateral relations will no doubt be discussed, including trade and economic links and also the situation in various hot spots, as we call them, on the planet.

[Announcer] It is now known that during his stay in Moscow, Baker will not only have discussions with Comrade Shevardnadze, but will also be received by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

[Ptashnikov] Yes. This meeting is scheduled for Friday. On Saturday another very important event, in my view, will take place. The secretary of state will make a statement before the members of the USSR Supreme

Soviet Committee for International Affairs and then he will answer their questions. [passage omitted]

So, I think, one can expect a great deal from the forthcoming visit of James Baker to Moscow.

Appearance Before Panel Set

LD0202224190 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 2 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko:

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will appear before a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet during his visit to Moscow next week. State Department Spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler told this to a news conference today.

Baker leaves on the tour on Monday. On the way to Moscow he will stop over in Prague. He will meet Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and other officials on Tuesday and deliver a lecture in Charles University on Wednesday. He will arrive in the Soviet capital on the same day.

On Wednesday evening he will have a one-on-one meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the State Department spokeswoman said. Talks will open on Thursday and will be continued on Friday. Baker will meet Soviet President Gorbachev on the same day.

On Saturday the Secretary of State will testify before members of the Supreme Soviet's International Affairs Committee.

Glazunov Previews Discussions

LD0202155290 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Commentary by Viktor Glazunov]

[Text] The visit to Moscow next week by the U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, is the subject of a commentary from our political observer Viktor Glazunov.

I think I'm right in saying that there's tense anticipation in the world. What will be the result of another round of Soviet-American dialogue? The message from the United States makes it clear that James Baker will come to Moscow with a bag full of proposals. Speaking in the U.S. Senate Commission, Mr Baker himself called for establishing a new level of relations with the Soviet Union on the entire range of issues from support for the policy of perestroyka to a speedy positive completion of the talks on chemical weapons and on conventional and strategic armaments.

This is theory. Do the proposals from Mr Baker's bag match it? So far there has been a promising sign from Washington. President Bush has spoken out for reducing the American and Soviet troops in central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 men on each side. This proposal deserves attention and is a step in the right direction—a step along the path that should lead ultimately to withdrawal of all foreign troops from foreign territory, the way the USSR has suggested. I would like to hope that Mr Baker's bag also contains ideas and proposals that would make it possible to advance also in other areas of the Soviet-American dialogue in overcoming the barriers toward economic cooperation, in settling regional conflicts, and the main thing, in lowering military confrontation.

The two sides have been working hard for a long time, both at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and at the Geneva talks on nuclear weapons, with disputed issues present at both. Will these issues be solved during the Moscow negotiations? Unfortunately there are facts that cause concern: The intention of the U.S. Administration in increasing by 22 percent the spending on the SDI of the space weapons; the resolve to go ahead with the modernization of strategic offensive forces, with one proposal giving preference to sea- and air-based cruise missiles. The SDI and the cruise missiles are the stumbling block for drawing up a treaty to reduce by half the strategic offensive armaments.

Apparently a wide range of issues will be discussed with James Baker in Moscow. The two sides are likely to deal with the German issue, considering the fact that along with Britain and France, the USSR and the United States are responsible for Germany as a whole (?for) preventing any more threats from the German soil to the neighbors. But the world will judge about the results of Mr Baker's visit to Moscow first of all by what stimulus will be given to the process of cuts in conventional and nuclear arms. This will determine success of the next Soviet-American summit in the summer. The U.S. state secretary's visit to Moscow next week will be a stage in preparing the summit.

TASS Editor on Main Issues

LD0202221590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Sergey Pravdin, announcer] Hello, esteemed comrades! Our editorial mailbag contains many letters whose writers are interested in various aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations and, primarily, in the forthcoming meeting and talks in Moscow between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, our country's foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The talks in our capital will take place, as we know, on 8 and 9 February. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Lazarevich Baydashin, chief editor of the TASS main news editorial office for abroad, will answer your questions, esteemed comrades. Go ahead.

[Baydashin] Of course, the world's mass media are displaying significant interest in the forthcoming meeting in Moscow. Incidentally, the date on which it will be held has been moved back 2 days, comrades, by mutual agreement between both sides. Secretary of State Baker's visit to our country is of great importance for the very reason that it is the first since the Soviet-U.S.

summit in Malta early last December. During that Mediterranean meeting, as the journalists called it, it was decided, as we know, to hold an official round of talks between the leaders of the USSR and the United States in Washington this summer, or, more precisely, in June. It is expected that the agenda for Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze's meeting next week with James Baker will focus on matters connected with the official meeting between the leaders of the two countries.

[Pravdin] What, specifically, might those matters be?

[Baydashin] Principally, they are matters of a military and political nature. They are connected with the completion this year of work on a treaty on reducing by 50 percent Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons, as agreed in Malta. Incidentally, one highly important result of the Malta meeting was the political decision by the two sides to conclude the treaty on strategic offensive weapons in 1990—in other words, this very year. Commenting on this fact, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said in his recent interview with AP that this year could become a year of disarmament. Accords in such fields as reductions of conventional armed forces in Europe and the destruction of chemical weapons are perfectly feasible. Comrades, I would call those words of our minister prophetic. Delivering his first State of the Union address in Washington on Wednesday evening, U.S. President George Bush proposed a new reduction in the level of U.S. Soviet combat forces in Europe. As we know, there is also a similar proposal on our side. Thus, it is now up to us to implement them in the course of negotiations.

Besides that, the agenda for the talks between the heads of the two countries' foreign policy departments includes regional problems, interaction between the USSR and the United States in the humanitarian sphere, transnational issues, and bilateral cooperation. It is planned to discuss in detail specific matters connected with the development of Soviet-U.S. trade and economic relations, whose present level, of course, does not correspond—and not through our fault, moreover—to the level of political interstate relations between the two countries. The development of economic ties with the United States will promote our country's further integration into the world economic system—something which is one of the elements of the economic program of our perestroyka.

[Pravdin] As for the two countries' contribution towards settling regional conflicts, certain improvements have clearly taken shape. Nevertheless, differences also remain.

[Baydashin] You are right, Sergey Yevgeniyevich. There are improvements in this field, and they are perfectly concrete ones. This is a result of the positive changes that have occurred in Soviet-U.S. relations in the past year. Above all, the spirit of confrontation, which previously divided our countries into two hostile camps, has disappeared—forever, I hope. The two countries have achieved a certain mutual understanding, which has given us the opportunity to move on to interaction. These are, primarily, the settlement in southwestern Africa, with Namibia at last gaining its its long-awaited independence; obstacles to a settlement in long-suffering Cambodia are being actively cleared; contacts to solve the Near East problem are under way; and work is in progress on achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan. The year that has passed since the withdrawal of the last Soviet soldier from Afghanistan has convincingly shown that banking on military force has become obsolete.

The peace process in Central America, where the United States has not given up the policy of armed intervention in the affairs of the sovereign states of that region, is advancing with difficulty. I mean Washington's military action against Panama. Such disregard for international law prompted a resolute protest from our country.

In a word, comrades, discussion of regional issues—or, more precisely, discussion of what the two powers can do to extinguish the flame of regional conflicts and thus eliminate hot spots on our planet—will occupy an important position in the forthcoming meeting with Secretary of State Baker in Moscow.

[Pravdin] Vladimir Lazarevich, some of our listeners are interested in whether the present, very complex situation in the Transcaucasus might somehow have an influence on the state of Soviet-U.S. relations.

[Baydashin] Of course, recent events in Azerbaijan and Armenia have prompted a certain degree of anxiety in Washington, which has been expressed through official channels; but that is perfectly natural. After all, blood has been shed and there have been many victims, including peaceful civilians. However, understanding of the measures which we were compelled to take in connection with the sharp exacerbation of the situation in the two Transcaucasian republics has been heard, and very definitely. For instance, President Bush, speaking at a meeting with newspaper editors in the White House last week, said in particular that he wanted very much to see success for Soviet leader Gorbachev. I think, the President stressed, that he has acted very well in an extremely difficult situation. He, Bush went on, remains committed to peaceful changes, and I do not think anybody would censure him over the problems that he has encountered in Azerbaijan.

[Pravdin] As we know, the Soviet Union has recently been carrying out unilateral reductions of its armed forces in a number of countries in Eastern Europe. Have these steps met with a response in the West?

[Baydashin] Definitely, Sergey Yevgeniyevich. Our country and the Warsaw Pact organization as a whole have recently put forward a number of highly important initiatives in the political and military fields: the proposal to commence negotiations on reducing armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, the proclamation of the defensive character of our military doctrine, and major unilateral reductons of armed forces and weapons. These steps have undoubtedly played a perceptible part in warming the European climate. There are clear signs that even NATO has started thinking about the character of its military doctrine. This issue was the subject of discussion at the recent representative seminar in Vienna. The negotiations on conventional armed forces are progressing successfully, and some NATO countries are already tackling in practice the issue of reducing their armed forces. Thus, this process of demilitarization, which is important for the fate of the peoples of Europe, is continuing.

Without question, the United States, as the leading NATO country whose troops are also deployed on European soil, can and must also play an important part in this process. I do not rule out discussion of this issue during Secretary of State Baker's visit to Moscow either, comrades.

[Pravdin] Thank you.

Reports of Nicaraguan Arms Shipments Denounced

TASS Refutes U.S. 'Lies'

LD0202223990 Moscow TASS in English 2224 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—It would seem that Soviet-American detente and a general thaw in the international climate make it possible to dump unseemly tricks used by journalists during the cold war period.

At that time, reports often based not on facts but on concoctions and speculations were used to smear the other side. However, relapses of such confrontational approaches sometimes emerge even now.

The case in point is the articles published by THE WASHINGTON POST and THE WASHINGTON TIMES newspapers on Wednesday. Referring to unidentified sources, they alleged that the Soviet Union supplies or intends to supply weapons to Central America.

There are solid arguments refuting every allegation in the articles. But it will be a waste of time to argue about allegations based on lies.

It is common knowledge, confirmed by U.S. Administration officials, that the Soviet Union has not supplied weapons to Nicaragua and, consequently, to Central America for over a year and that its words are as true as its deeds.

It is indicative that these blatant canards about the Soviet policy in Central America were published on the eve of the Moscow visit by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and on the eve of the general elections in Nicaragua.

Some people evidently want to strike a discordant note in the increasingly constructive Soviet-American dialogue and to hamper the progress in a Central American settlement. The Soviet side hopes that this position does not reflect sentiments prevailing in American public opinion.

Claims To 'Poison' Relations

PM0502101790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Idle Fabrication"]

[Text] Detente in Soviet-U.S. relations and the general thaw in the international climate would seemingly make it possible to scrap the various unscrupulous methods previously employed by the disreputable political journalists of the "cold war" era, when reports, often based on idle fabrication and speculation rather than on accurate fact, were aimed merely at besmirching the other side.

However, recurrences of these confrontational approaches can regrettably be seen today too, TASS correspondents were told 2 February at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. After all, how else can we describe the articles by U.S. observers published the other day in THE WASHINGTON POST and THE WASHINGTON TIMES? They claim, citing anonymous sources, that the Soviet Union is shipping or planning to ship weapons to Central America.

Serious arguments could be cited to refute every suggestion contained in these articles. But is it worth getting into a discussion on specific issues if the U.S. journalists' claims are based on lies? After all, it is well known—and this is admitted by official U.S. Administration representatives—that the Soviet Union has not shipped weapons to Nicaragua (and consequently to Central America) for more than a year and that our actions match our words.

The issue is something else. Why was it deemed necessary to publish patent fabrications about Soviet policy in Central America on the eve of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker's visit to Moscow and in the run-up to the Nicaraguan general election? Clearly, somebody would very much like to add a few "drops of poison" to the increasingly constructive Soviet-U.S. dialogue and complicate the process of a Central American settlement. We believe that this position does not reflect the sentiments prevailing in U.S. public opinion, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Gorbachev, Bush Laud U.S.-USSR Scientific Ties

PM0202111190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Congratulations to Scientists"]

[Text] Washington, 1 Feb—M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and U.S. President G. Bush have sent congratulations to the presidents of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences on the 30th anniversary of cooperation between these two centers of academic thought.

The Soviet leader's message notes that "during these years scientific contacts between Soviet and U.S. scientists have made a great contribution to the development of science and to the improvement of mutual understanding between our countries' peoples." It expresses the hope that "cooperation between both academies' scientists will continue to strengthen in the interests of world scientific progress and the prosperity of the Soviet and U.S. peoples."

For his part, G. Bush stressed that the two countries' cooperation in the scientific sphere is the right way to international understanding and more lasting peace.

U.S. 'Disputes' Over Soviet Trade Discussed

LD0402125690 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 4 Feb 90

["Moscow Viewpoint" commentary: "V. Zorin on Disputes in the U.S. on Promoting Trade With the USSR"]

[Text] Next, our weekly commentary, Moscow Viewpoint, by Valentin Zorin.

Disputes on promoting trade with the Soviet Union are in progress in the United States. In this connection, writes Valentin Zorin, I'd like to refer to a statement by President Mikhail Gorbachev. In an interview for Soviet Television given on board a Soviet cruise ship upon conclusion of his meeting with President Bush off Malta, Gorbachev said that exchanges of views on economic ties had been a major result of their summit. In answer to my questions he said that interest displayed by the U.S. President in creating normal conditions for economic cooperation with the USSR testified to a serious and promising change in the American policy. Nevertheless, Mikhail Gorbachev added: Well, let's wait and see. We are realists, he said, and we'll make our judgment on the basis of practical deeds.

Two months have passed since. Unfortunately, concrete deeds on the part of the Americans are not in evidence yet. Barriers and restrictions on trade with the USSR, imposed in the years of the cold war and confrontation, continue to be in force. As a matter of fact, the current low level in trade relations between the United States and the USSR is an anomaly. Soviet-American ties in different areas have already been established. Even in the area of disarmament we have succeeded in reaching an agreement on signing the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces and started to eliminate nuclear missiles in both countries under the control of inspectors. However, economic contacts between them play no significant role yet. At any rate they are far from the potential opportunities the two countries have now.

I don't think it's altruism which guides American businessmen who insist on dismantling artificial trade barriers as soon as possible. They can't fail to see that despite growing competition in the world market America doesn't use the enormous opportunities lurking in trade with the USSR. The more so as West European and Japanese businessmen display increasingly brisk activity in establishing economic ties both with the Soviet Union and with East European countries. Trade is always a mutually beneficial undertaking. I recall hearing this from David Rockefeller several years ago. Trade is possible only when it is equally beneficial for the seller and for the buyer, he said, otherwise there can be no trade. And I think this relates to the Soviet-American trade, too. We make no secret of the fact that this country is interested in establishing as broad economic ties with America as possible. American businessmen also see benefits in such trade and that is why they call for lifting discriminatory restrictions and for having normal trade with the USSR.

According to reports from Washington, in the near future there'll be congressional debates on East-West trade. Maybe as a result of these talks a step will be made in the direction of establishing mutually beneficial peaceful cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Gerasimov Notes Article by 'Z' on Perestroyka

LD0302185790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Feb 90

["International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Excerpt] Events in the countries of Eastern Europe have given rise to hundreds of analytic articles in the press. This abundance or, shall we say profusion, comes in sharp contrast with our own publicists' interpretation, which tends to be a stage or two behind. One such article is worth mentioning because it has created a stir. It appeared in an American academic journal called DAEDALUS and is being quoted everywhere. The author has hidden behind the pseudonym Z, the last letter of the English alphabet. This deliberate anonymity has aroused extra interest.

He compares us with Columbus, the navigator who made a mistake and thought he was sailing to India. We, it seems, made a mistake and thought we were moving toward communism. In fact, thanks to Stalin, what we got was the administrative command system, which, in the years of stagnation,led to arteriosclerosis of all aspects of our life and the country came to resemble a gigantic Stalin mausoleum. That is the scathing way Z writes about us.

It is not because of this that the article has aroused such interest. When it comes to self-flagellation, today we are recordholders. It is the article's political recommendations that have attracted interest: It says the West should not support perestroyka. It is not this pretentious article itself that is curious, but rather the reactions to it. As the newspapers have been saying, it has aroused a burst of indignation, all because people wish perestroyka well. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze To Make Official Visit to Canada

LD0402032790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Comrade Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and foreign minister of the USSR, will participate in the opening of the "Open Skies" international conference, which is to be held in Ottawa on 12 and 13 February. After that, at the invitation of the Canadian Government, there will be an official visit by Comrade Shevardnadze to that country.

Northeast Asia

Yeltsin Interviewed on Japan Visit

LD0302000290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet member Boris Yeltsin by unidentified correspondent, in Moscow television studio; date not given—live or recorded; from the "View" program]

[Text] [Presenter] At the end of January, USSR Supreme Soviet member Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was in Japan by private invitation.

[Yeltsin] Certainly, the visit was fruitful and interesting.

[Correspondent] How was that expressed?

[Yeltsin] In the program, and in the talks and conversations, in the meetings with the prime minister and foreign minister.

[Correspondent] Who invited you there—was it some network of organizations?

[Yeltsin] Yes, it was a network of organizations that invited me. In general, the visit was unofficial, that is, the Supreme Soviet spent nothing on me, and to reciprocate, I brought a million syringes.

[Correspondent] How will they be distributed, because our program has reported that disposable equipment—perhaps even that which you brought—is somehow or other finding its way into the black market and isn't reaching the people who need it. Do you keep a check on that chain?

[Yeltsin] In the first place, I do keep a check. They have to be distributed in advance at the airport itself, and vehicles come with representatives of the hospitals or towns—three people from each—and they have to take delivery of each batch of syringes, several thousand, five or 10 or 30 thousand, and so on. They are distributed to points where the need is the greatest.

[Correspondent] Do you determine those points yourself?

[Yeltsin] I take advice from the Health Ministry, and as a rule it indicates those points. Well, sometimes there are simply letters or simply—especially from children's hospitals—such anguished letters and requests that it is impossible not to respond, and so of course we send them there too.

[Correspondent] That is what you might call the material part of the results of your visit to Japan. Could you tell us something about the nonmaterial part, as it were: what was discussed at the lectures and the meetings with the prime minister and foreign minister?

[Yeltsin] They weren't lectures, they were meetings—business meetings, meetings and conversations, mutual exchanges of view, suggestions; various proposals for joint programs which, if implemented, could help to advance our perestroyka; questions on the whole of what I would call not just the evolutionary development of economic ties, but of some sudden leap in this respect, because although we're neighboring major powers, Japan's goods exchange with the USSR is only one percent. That's simply absurd. That was discussed. We discussed the building of a big factory—we inspected one, (fanuk), that's where robots make robots. It's a miracle, and they make 50 percent of all the world's robots. A similar factory could be built, say, somehwere in the far east of our country.

[Correspondent] How realistic is this, on the Japanese side, I mean?

[Yeltsin] I think it's very realistic, because, I was surprised how easily they agreed to many matters. On the construction, say, of major motor roads. They're proposing to build them at their own expense, and then utilize them jointly. To build a big tourist complex in Vladivostok and other towns in Siberia at their own expense, and then run it jointly. Those are very interesting projects, very realistic. We wouldn't need to invest any of our own foreign currency. In compensation for that, they would supply us with extra consumer goods or foodstuffs.

[Correspondent] It's not very clear, though, how all this could be realized on the Soviet side.

[Yeltsin] Well, I'll have to stir up the Soviet side and its official representatives. I think that's realistic and we will be able to get agreement with Mr. Ryzhkov and others on the signing of such contracts. The United States, for instance, has an agreement with us to build a million apartments in our country. Just yesterday, the Americans were here. They're sending a group which is coming here with entirely concrete proposals on how it can be done. So this is, I think, not of course 100 percent, I don't expect that, but of the 10 or 12 very big projects we discussed, even if six, seven, or eight are realized, it would be very good.

Trial of South Korean Activists Criticized

SK2801231390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 25 Jan 90

[From the program "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] According to news reports from Seoul, a South Korean coed, Yim Su-kyong, and Father Mun Kyu-hyon are expected to be sentenced to 15 and 10 years of imprisonment, respectively.

Concerning this, station commentator (Igor Levezhen) writes as follows:

These two South Korean (?activists) made visits to the DPRK last summer without the Seoul authorities' permission. Yim Su-kyong went to Pyongyang to attend the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students, and Fr. Mun accompanied coed Yim Su-kyong when she returned home across the demarcation line that goes through Panmunjom. Fr. Mun entered the DPRK for specifically for the purpose of accompanying her.

As soon as they returned home, they were arrested. Their arrest caused a great wave of controversy among South Korean students. Students called on the authorities to repeal the National Security Law. According to the dictates of the National Security Law, people who go to the DPRK without permission from the authorities are to be imprisoned as in the past when [word indistinct] had been strictly enforced.

The authorities responded to the students' call with suppression. They launched a suppressive campaign against (?dissident) figures who are known to have complained about the current system. As a result, hundreds of people have been arrested. Still, many people are being forced to languish in the prisons.

Now, I would like to ask: Where has the line of democratizing South Korea declared by No Tae-u gone? And what should be thought about the numerous statements on such things as (?sports exchanges between the youth of the North and South) which a spokesman for the Seoul administration had broadly released to the press?

Such a double-dealing tactic of touting an increase in contacts on the one hand and throwing into prison those South Korean people who are determined to have such contacts as part of civilian diplomacy for [words indistinct] on the other can never be accepted.

[Sentence indistinct] The fact that two South Korean people, who [words indistinct] to their fellow countrymen living in the North, are about to be punished so harshly calls into question the sincerity of the Seoul Government's proposal for holding [words indistinct] talks with the DPRK.

Amnesty International, an international organization that keeps a watchful eye on many countries to see whether they respect human rights or not, would not deny the following statement it made not long ago: The case of [words indistinct] that occurred last week in South Korea and the continuing torture can work toward nullifying the progress made in the area of human rights over the past two years.

Chon's Testimony at National Assembly Viewed

SK3101014790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 29 Jan 90

[From the program "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] Seventy South Korean workers waged a sit-in in Seoul. They demand that former dictator Chon Tu-hwan, who explained his mistakes in a testimony at the National Assembly on 31 December last year, be punished. However, in his testimony, Chon Tu-hwan said that he did not play any role in the bloody terrorism and other crimes and [words indistinct]. For example, he even declared that he did not have a hand in the crackdown on Kwangju citizens who rose up in 1980.

Chon Tu-hwan's testimony at the National Assembly shows that he will remain absolutely safe as long as No Tae-u, his friend or comrade-in-arms, is in power. [Words indistinct], No Tae-u undertook three rounds of reshuffle in the ruling party under him. He also replaced 20 of his 22 cabinet ministers in order to show the people that he has severed his ties with the past. He abolished some suppressive laws; banned [words indistinct] of violators; released hundreds of political prisoners; and [words indistinct].

(?WOLGAN CHOSON) writes: No Tae-u could not have become president without Chon Tu-hwan's assistance.

[Passage indistinct] Other facts will [words indistinct] Chon Tu-hwan. [Words indistinct] U.S. involvement in the assassination of former President Pak Chong-hui in 1979 and the crackdown on the Kwangju uprising. A problem lies in the fact that South Korean soldiers [words indistinct] were under the control of the U.S. Forces Command [word indistinct]. [Passage indistinct].

Kim Yong-sam Announces Visit in March

SK0302003190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 1 Feb 90

[From the "Asian News" program]

[Text] Well-known ROK activist Kim Yong-sam has urged development of relations with the Soviet Union. [passage indistinct]

In a press conference in Seoul, Kim Yong-sam, who was the president of the now defunct Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] and who is now one of the (?founding leaders of a new ruling party) being organized, said that he would visit the Soviet Union in March.

He expressed his conviction that his upcoming visit would open a brighter prospect for ROK developing relations with the Soviet Union than that was provided by his last visit.

Some time ago, the RDP, the New Democratic Republican Party, and the ruling Democratic Justice Party decided to (?dissolve themselves) and to form a new political alliance.

The new political alliance will be called the Democratic Liberal Party.

Calls For Improved Ties

SK0502093390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From the "Asian News" program under the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Kim Yong-sam, one of the leaders of the ruling party newly organized by the three South Korean parties, called for developing over-all ties with the Soviet Union. Kim Yong-sam said that the ties with the Soviet Union will alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula and that he will positively support the political lines on improving such ties. Commenting on his scheduled visit to Moscow, Kim Yong-sam said that this visit will provide a good opportunity to develop ties with the Soviet Union.

Luncheon for Outgoing DPRK Ambassador

SK0502092790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From the "Asian News" program under the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] On 1 February, Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Rogachev arranged a luncheon for Kwon Hui-kyong, the outgoing DPRK ambassador to the Soviet Union.

History of Claims to Kuril Islands Discussed

PM3101144590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Golovnin: "Peter I Versus the Samurai"]

[Text] When I was working as a correspondent in Japan, I often had to speak to businessmen and housewives, pensioners and activists from various social organizations, and even to members of an extreme right-wing anticommunist grouping. It goes without saying that we discussed all kinds of problems, but there almost always came a moment when those present would ask the same question, some quite tactfully and others straight out: When will you return our islands which were unlawfully occupied at the end of World War II?

Of course, when any attempts are made by foreigners to establish their claims to a bit of Russian soil, we experience—almost as a reflex—a feeling of protest and a desire to defend our forefathers' conquests, which extended the boundaries of the homeland as far as the Pacific Ocean. But all the same, the fact remains that in a neighboring, highly developed country with which we would like to have the best relations, all significant political forces and social organizations and all organs of the press to some extent support official Tokyo's claims to part of the Soviet Kuril chain.

Tokyo's official line boils down to a demand to "return immediately and at the same time" a number of islands in the south of the Kuril chain: Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup, and a group of smaller islands which the Japanese call Habomai. For their part, extreme right-wing groupings stage practically constant demonstrations in front of passers-by in city streets with placards showing all the Kuril Islands and also the southern part of Sakhalin in the colors of Japanese territory. Communists and socialists also advocate the transfer of "all the Kuril Islands," although they supplement their appeals with active participation in the movement for friendship with the USSR.

There was a time in postwar relations between our countries when the notorious "territorial question" was not raised in Japan as frenetically as it is now. However, during the past few decades, the campaign has snowballed, involving more and more new participants. As a result, what has gradually emerged in the country is a powerful propaganda atmosphere which almost automatically turns anyone who doubts the justice of the demand to "return the northern territories" into a suspicious renegade who risks becoming the target of flagrant and dangerous attacks by chauvinist paramilitary formations connected with the mafia.

It must be admitted that the country's inhabitants are still accustomed to regard as axiomatic the assertion about "unlawful Soviet occupation of the northern territories," which Tokyo bolsters with a collection of long-prepared theses that are primarily of a "historical nature."

All right, let us also turn to history.

The 17th century was a time of a closing [vstrechnoye] movement by Russian and Japanese explorers, who were gradually exploring the lands of the Sea of Okhotsk and the northern part of the Sea of Japan. The facts show that the Russians were first in the Kuril Islands back in the first half of the 17th century, when the Japanese did not even include their present northern island of Hokkaido in the country's official territory, considering it to be a "land of shaggy barbarians." The Kuril Islands, at the edge of the world, were proclaimed part of the Russian empire from Peter's times, as the decrees of Peter the Great himself and his successors, for example, Catherine I and Catherine II, bear witness. However, at the same time, Samurai detachments were advancing from the south from the Japanese principality of Matsumae based on Hokkaido, which even then led to conflicts and the appearance of the first outlines of the future "enemy image."

Captain Nikolay Razanov, the romantic hero of the Russian exploration of Alaska and the Far East hymned in "'Yunon' and 'Avos'" [Soviet rock opera], is seen by the Japanese as a perfidious raider because he ordered Japanese settlements on the Kuril Islands to be burned.

The first Russian-Japanese agreement—the Shimoda Treaty—put an end to the period of spontaneous opening up of the Kuril Islands.

Under the Shimoda Treaty, the border divided the Kuril Islands in two. The southern part (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai) went to Japan, and the northern half of the chain was proclaimed to be under Russian sovereignty. At the same time, Sakhalin was deemed to be "under joint administration." This situation did not suit St. Petersburg, which finally came to the conclusion that Sakhalin was more important than the chain of rocks on the edge of Asia. As a result, Russia ceded all its rights to the Kuril Islands to Tokyo and received the whole of Sakhalin in return.

Tokyo greatly likes to make use of these two agreements. At the same time, it often forgets to mention the Portsmouth Treaty, which summed up the results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Under this document, Japan seized southern Sakhalin. But at the same time the Portsmouth Treaty nullified all previous agreements between the two countries. In other words, from an international legal point of view, both the Shimoda Treaty and the agreement on exchanging Sakhalin for the Kurils were just history after this.

The only documents that can be regarded as now determining the Kurils' status are: first, Japan's unequivocal recognition during the 1945 capitulation of the Yalta agreement and others between the antifascist coalition allies, which stipulated the transfer of these islands to the USSR; and, second, the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty between Japan, on the one hand, and the United States and a number of other countries, on the other, whereby Tokyo also renounced its rights to the Kurils. The Soviet Union's refusal to sign this document at that time was, in my opinion, a definite diplomatic mistake.

Tokyo now asserts that the Kuril Islands mentioned in the San Francisco peace treaty do not refer to Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai, which are apparently an "integral part" of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. When bilateral diplomatic relations were restored in 1956, the USSR admittedly promised to transfer Shikotan and Habomai to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty as a gesture of good-neighborliness. However, this episode in the history of our relations was erased by the subsequent development of events—primarily Tokyo's sharp tilt toward strengthening the military alliance with the United States, which bore a markedly anti-Soviet character throughout the postwar decades.

In an attempt to increase pressure on the USSR, successive conservative Japanese governments tried to internationalize their campaign of territorial claims and did their utmost to drag the United States and other Western countries into it. It has to be admitted that Washington effectively supported Tokyo's policy in this matter, although during U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle's last visit to Japan, he could not explain how this position squares with the commitments assumed by the American side under the Yalta agreements.

On the other hand, in relations with the Soviet Union, Tokyo is obstinately implementing the lamentable principle of the "indissolubility of politics and economics," which makes the development of long-term business contacts rigidly dependent on satisfaction of the claims to the "northern territories." Essentially, Japan is now the hostage of its own rigid position, which tolerates no compromise since the constant efforts to inflate the "territorial dispute" have blocked its relations with our country and deprived them of the necessary dynamism.

The Japanese public cannot fail to be alarmed by the situation in relations with the Soviet Union, a situation which places their country at risk of seriously "missing the bus" in a rapidly changing international situation. As a result of this concern, various scenarios for a way out of this situation have now appeared in Tokyo.

Professor Keisuke Hasununa, for example, writing in the newspaper ASAHI SHIMBUN, calls for the speediest conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR on the basis of fulfilling the old 1956 understanding on transferring Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, while placing Iturup and Kunashir under the UN Security Council's supervision with the real control belonging to the USSR. The press recalled the proposal put forward back in the 1970's by an adviser to the Japanese prime minister to conclude a peace treaty on the basis of returning Habomai and Shikotan and postponing a decision on the question of Iturup and Kunashir until the 21st century. Articles written by Haruki Wada, quite a well known historian in Japan who calls on Tokyo to embark on the path of reasonable compromise and concessions, also have caused a stir in the country. Many people in Japan believe that the way to resolve the issue is through the demilitarization of the Kuril Islands and the adjacent area.

Nevertheless, the country's conservative government categorically rejects even these very timid and frequently rather questionable attempts to take a fresh look at the deadlock. Official documents and speeches still record the former futile position, which can be summed up in the slogan "All or nothing," which, as is well known, is of little use in resolving international questions.

Furthermore, Tokyo has recently unexpectedly and in many ways desperately toughened its attitude toward the "northern territories" in a clear attempt to stop the emerging polarization [razmezhyvaniye] of opinions in the country on this problem in conditions of the intensifying thaw in the international situation. The government, for example, "recommended" that its compatriots refuse to make any visits to the Kuril Islands on USSR entry visas. This restriction is aimed primarily at newspaper and television journalists, since they have recently started to travel increasingly often to the Kuril Islands and dispatch reports from there showing that generations of Soviet people who consider the islands as their home live there.

Within the framework of the policy of "tightening the screws" the Japanese Foreign Ministry recently rejected a recommendation by the leadership of the country's most authoritative businessmen's association—the Federation of Economic Organizations—which called on Tokyo to take advantage of perestroyka and adopt measures to develop economic links with the USSR. Entrepreneurs were told that there can be no question of any changes in this direction "until the territorial question is resolved." Of course, we do not hide our interest in developing ties with our Far Eastern neighbor, but, naturally, not at the expense of national interests and national dignity. Especially as recent extensive work in the archives confirms the strength of the historical and legal basis of Soviet rights to the Kuril Islands. At least, according to available information, the latest sessions of the bilateral working group on the elaboration of a peace treaty have shown that the Japanese have little with which to counter the arguments of our Foreign Ministry, which maintains that recognition of the reality that has existed since World War II is the only reasonable basis for any solution.

There have recently been signs that even the Japanese leadership has started to look for ways to bring the positions closer together. The latest example of this is the visit to Moscow by a delegation of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party headed by one of its recognized leaders, Shintaro Abe, who, at a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, set out an eight-point program envisaging the deepening of links in various spheres. Tokyo is now greeting with increasing interest calls from Moscow for peaceful dialogue with a view to elaborating decisions acceptable to both sides.

Indeed, what relations between two countreis whose histories are interwoven in such a complex fashion need now is not a desire to "crush" one's partner with a devastating new argument or some yellowed document found in the archives, but common sense, a sense of reality, and precise consideration of the immediate and long-term future.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Reportage on CPV 60th Anniversary

CPSU Greeting

PM0502103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[CPSU Central Committee greetings message to Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee on 60th anniversary—date not given]

[Text] To the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Central Committee

Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee sends ardent fraternal greetings and cordial congratulations to the CPV Central Committee and all Vietnamese Communists on the memorable occasion of the CPV's 60th anniversary.

All friends of your country know well that the activity of Comrade Ho Chi Minh, whose birth centennial will occur this year, was highly important for its development. The Communist Party which he created and educated rallied the people in the struggle for national independence. It deserves the historical credit for Vietnam's freedom and unity.

At present the CPV is once again proving its right to be society's leading force. The process of broad reforms based on the contemporary concept of socialism accords with the interests of the people's masses, and the initial successes along the paths of renewal emphasize this most convincingly.

The CPSU supports Vietnam's constructive foreign policy course, its consistent struggle for the triumph of the principles of peace, security, good-neighborliness, and cooperation in Southeast Asia, and its contribution to the settlement of the Cambodia problem.

We are convinced that the Vietnamese people, under the leadership of their proven vanguard, the Communist Party, will successfully implement the program for building a prosperous, socialist Vietnam.

May the unbreakable unity of the CPSU and the CPV and the fraternal friendship between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples be consolidated!

[signed) The CPSU Central Committee

Moscow Meeting

BK0302073090 Hanoi VNA in English 0546 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 3—A mass meeting was jointly organized in Moscow on Feb. 1 by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Marx-Lenin Institute under the CPSU Central Committee, and the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society to mark the 60th founding anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

The meeting was attended by G. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and Nguyen Manh Cam, Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union.

On this occasion, the Soviet news agency TASS released a commentary highlighting the CPV and the Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause. The commentary says in part:

"Ho Chi Minh, the great patriot and founder of the Vietnamese Communist Party, saw in Marxist-Leninist teachings the sole way towards liberation from colonialism. Throughout its history, the party closely linked the socialist goal with the struggle for national independence."

TASS Report

PM0202105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "In Honor of the Anniversary"]

[Text] A 1 February public meeting in Moscow was devoted to the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV]. The speakers noted that the CPV has traveled a glorious and heroic path and has carried out its national and international duty with honor at all stages of the Vietnamese revolution. The creation and activities of the party are linked with the name of Ho Chi Minh, a fervent Communist and patriot, whose 100th anniversary is being celebrated this year.

It was said that under present-day conditions Vietnamese Communists have set their sights on resolutely renewing the life of the party and the country.

Taking part in the meeting were G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee, scientists, and CPSU veterans.

USSR-SRV Diplomatic Ties Celebrated

BK0302074090 Moscow International Service in Vietnamese 1000 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Representatives of the Moscow people held a meeting at the Hall of Friendship With Peoples of Other Countries on 30 January on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. It is reported by a Radio Moscow correspondent that this memorable, festive day is being widely celebrated in the Soviet Union. Centrally-run newspapers have published messages of greetings from the leading organs and the leaders of the two countries on this occasion. They have also carried commentaries and articles providing a more detailed introduction to the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Television has also screened a new documentary on current daily life in Vietnam. Also on this theme, a photo exhibition was held at the Hall of Friendship on activities of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Association. Those participating in the meeting had a preview of this exhibition, prior to the official opening of this grand event.

Comrade Rogachev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, delivered a speech, recalling in detail the growth of the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam over the past 40 years. Touching on the cooperation between the two countries in the present stage, Comrade Igor Rogachev emphatically said:

[Begin Igor Rogachev recording in Russian fading into Vietnamese translation] Large-scale efforts are now being made in Vietnam and the Soviet Union to carry out renovation and restructuring. In the period ahead, there will remain many complex and tough tasks. Now it is time to speed up our multifaceted cooperation. It is necessary to open a broad path for all new forms of this cooperation by establishing direct relations between labor collectives and building national defense enterprises.

It is noted with satisfaction that the effective cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is being developed in the world as part of efforts to consolidate peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. We appreciate the Vietnamese comrades for having actively supported the Soviet Union's foreign political lines. The Soviet people treasure their traditional friendship with fraternal Vietnam and are fully determined to continue consolidating the solidarity based on comradeship in the cause of creatively building socialism. [end recording]

Those present at the meeting gave warm applause to SRV Ambassador Nguyen Manh Cam when he took the podium. As Comrade Nguyen Manh Cam was one of the first cadres at the embassy when it was first set up in Moscow, he speaks Russian quite fluently. We hereby invite you, friends, to listen to a translation of his speech:

[Begin Nguyen Manh Cam recording in Russian fading into Vietnamese translation] Comrades: Looking back over the road we have traveled over the past 40 years, we note with satisfaction that during those years the relations between our two countries have developed successfully. The Soviet Union always stood by the side of Vietnam in the difficult war years, as well as in the years of creative peaceful construction. The Vietnamese people highly appreciate the very great assistance reserved for Vietnam by the Soviet people. I sincerely thank you all, Comrades, for having held this meeting today. I also sincerely thank you, Comrades, for having made sincere remarks about our people as well as about the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship. [end recording]

Cambodian Assembly Peace Initiative Discussed

BK0502054790 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The United Nations has every possibility of contributing to resolving the Cambodian problem. This was confirmed in resolutions adopted at the State of Cambodia's National Assembly session held in Phnom Penh. Cambodian National Assembly members charged Comrade Hun Sen with the task of dressing a detailed plan to implement the initiative on solving the Cambodian problem. Our commentator Comrade Oleg Alekseyev writes on this.

The initiative put forward a few days ago by Comrade Hun Sen, head of the State of Cambodia's Government, is in fact the materialization of the idea put forward by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, namely the inclusion of the United Nations in carrying out a number of supervisory duties in the transitional period. In principle, the comrade chairman of the State of Cambodia's Council of Ministers agreed with the contribution which has been accepted by the international community. At the same time, the comrade made some remarks based on realities in Cambodia. Comrade Hun Sen stressed that handing over all state administrative tasks to the United Nations in the transitional period is wrong. In Phnom Penh it is affirmed that for the time being, two governments existing in Cambodia should be maintained, namely the government of the State of Cambodia and that of Democratic Kampuchea; only these governments' tasks should be reduced. These two governments do not have the right to adopt any laws; they only have the right to carry out the daily tasks while the United Nations will ensure the supervision of a cease-fire and the end of foreign aid to warring parties. The United Nations can supervise the general elections which will determine the government the Cambodian people should have.

Special importance is attached to the Khmer Rouge issue. Phnom Penh does not recognize this group because it was responsible for genocidal acts in the mid-1970's. However, the Pol Pot group is part of the coalition government; this is a political fact. Concerning Phnom Penh's position on this major issue, Comrade Hun Sen said the head of the coalition government should be responsible for the composition of his government. This is Phnom Penh's stance.

Judging from the resolutions of the Cambodian National Assembly, Phnom Penh has provided an action program. This plan will be submitted for examination at the unofficial meeting of Cambodian parties and (? two) involved countries. This meeting will be held on 26 February in Jakarta.

Commentary Advocates Disarming Pol Pot Group

BK0202142990 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] According to many sources, the Khmer Rouge leaders are sending Cambodian refugees in their camps on Thai soil into Cambodia. Refugees are sent to Cambodia not only from camps under Khmer Rouge control but also from those under UN administration as well. The aim of this forced repatriation is to use refugees as cannon fodder in military operations against troops of the Government of the State of Cambodia.

In a recent interview, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk noted that Pol Pot is like Hitler. As long as he is alive, one cannot force him to stop firing on and killing people. The Pol Pot group's will is very clear. Refugees who have returned to Cambodia have again and again said life in the Pol Pot camps is very hard to endure. Pol Pot's men have barred Red Cross officials and Thai military officers from entering their camps. These camps are no different than prisons. Eyewitnesses say refugees are living in an atmosphere of fear and are under pressure not to protest or escape. Efforts to forcefully send refugees to live in battle zones run counter to the principle of voluntary repatriation which was discussed at the Paris international conference on Cambodia.

Concern has been expressed over the fate of thousands of Cambodian people. A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated that it is necessary to use a meeting of the international community to end the merciless will of the Pol Pot group. A good way to break the Pol Pot group is to disarm it. Earlier, the State of Cambodia and Vietnam put forward this proposal to concerned countries. However, this was abandoned. It would be a good thing if this issue was reexamined, while Thai authorities have expressed a readiness to assist in the disarming process.

Commentary Examines Prospects for Cambodian Peace

BK2701143890 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Oleg Schedrov commentary]

[Text] The meeting scheduled for February and in which all of the Cambodian parties and a number of countries in the region will participate is hopeful of success since there are indications that all of the Cambodian parties have agreed to discuss the UN's role in the process of a settlement of the Cambodian problem. The Cambodian parties have generally supported the peace plan put forth by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

A statement issued by Comrade Hun Sen at a press conference in Phnom Penh has shown Cambodia's concrete move toward a settlement. According to reports by various press agencies, Comrade Hun Sen—who previously refused to talk about the Pol Pot group, which was responsible for the massacre of over 3 million people in its heyday—has now agreed to provide an opportunity for the group to participate in a settlement of the problem. However, prevention of a return to power by the group remains a condition of vital importance for any solution to the problem, and as the group is the biggest faction in the opposition alliance, the question of its size should also be taken into consideration.

Comrade Hun Sen has made another concession by announcing that he is ready to hold talks with the coalition government of the opposition groups and that he has also agreed to the setting up of an interim parallel administration in the territory recently captured by the opposition groups. The opposition forces can control the region until general elections are held under UN supervision. In fact, this move is to legitimize the current situation and to promote the UN's role in monitoring a cease-fire.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, the proposal for setting up a parallel administration could also have a negative effect. The opposition groups could try to expand the territory under their control by military means. If so, a reconciliation among all the Cambodian parties would certainly proceed with difficulty or could even become more complicated because of the opposition's ambition.

However, the stepping down from the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea by Norodom Sihanouk—the outspoken leader within the opposition groups—will in no way hinder the growing tendency toward putting an end to the 11-year-old Cambodian conflict.

Near East & South Asia

Andreyev on Approval of Iran Five-Year Plan

NC0202221590 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today"]

[Text] As has been reported, the second Five-Year Plan for the country's social, economic, and cultural development has received final approval. The Iranian Government should now start to implement this plan. Our analyst Yuriy Andreyev writes:

It seems that politics is the reflection, in a nutshell, of economic demands. The political struggles that started in relation to the approval of Iran's second Five-Year Plan fully proves this point. This struggle was not accompanied by a propaganda commotion but it was very intensive.

From the very first days when studies on the the new Five-Year Plan began, two varying approaches on solving the country's economic problems clearly emerged. The government believes that the private sector and foreign investment can help considerably to overcome the crisis in the economy. Thus, the government proposed in the draft Five-Year Plan that a number of state production units manufacturing a total of 80 percent of the country's industrial products should be sold to the private sector. In addition, the extensive attraction of foreign capital was also foreseen.

From the political aspect, this policy meant deviating from some ideological principles and from the isolation that Iran has placed itself in, since this program envisaged the expansion of contacts with the outside world.

But the government's proposed economic plans met with the opposition of radical Islamic and political dignitaries. 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who had been forced to resign from his post as interior minister after 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's election as president, headed the opposition. The Islamic radicals claim that the new cabinet's economic plan means giving up the ideas of the Islamic Revolution and, primarily of the slogan of neither West nor East. Some of the mass media started a campaign against the idea of the government sector selling off industries to the private sector and to foreign companies. The Iranian press resorted to words such as mafia or octopus to describe these companies.

Government officials reacted immediately to these criticisms. Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, Iran's religious leader, condemned those who criticized the new Five-Year Plan for the country's economic growth. He stated that such attacks only help Iran's enemies and pointed out that the Islamic Republic needs the assistance of foreign countries to implement its economic plan.

The government used all its influence on the Majlis for the approval of the second Five-Year Plan. On 9 January, the Majlis ratified the draft of this plan after a month of deliberations. But the opponents of the government proved to be stronger than expected. At the end of January, the Council of Guardians, comprising 12 members, rejected this document, pointing out that some of the points in the second Five-Year Plan do not meet the interests of Islam.

This political event had an almost scandalous aspect because an indirect lack of confidence in the current cabinet was thus expressed.

The government displayed political restraint under these complicated conditions. It tried, on the one hand, to downplay the extent of defeat and make it seem less than it was, stating that the Council of Guardians had propounded about 20 amendments which were insignficant. Meanwhile, extraordinary steps were taken to alter the situation. On 29 January, 'Ali Khamene'i met with the leading political dignitaries, including members of the cabinet, Majlis deputies, armed forces commanders, and heads of provincial centers. After these deliberations, the Council of Guardians changed its former decision and approved the plan.

Thus, the government has now won. But the true value of this victory will be determined only in the future.

Official Interviewed Regarding Border With Iran

LD0202151290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Interview with Nikolay Nizotsev, representative of the newly created KGB Border Troops Information Center, by correspondent Sergey Omelchenko, date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Omelchenko] Nikolay (?Ivanovich), how would you describe the situation today on the Soviet-Iranian border?

[Nizovtsev] One can say that in the majority of the border rayons the situation has returned to normal. The sociopolitical situation in a number of them is being monitored by local party and soviet bodies. Measures are being taken for the further improvement of relations between the local population and border troops. Monitoring of the USSR state border has been intensified.

[Omelchenko] Organized crossing of the border is already in operation; you and I spoke about that yesterday. But how are things today?

[Nizovtsev] Over the past 24 hours over 500 people have been allowed to cross the border.

[Omelchenko] That is almost twice as many as yesterday?

[Nizovtsev] Yes, that is so. The Transcaucasus is at present attracting the mass media of foreign states. For example, there are attempts by foreign journalists to penetrate the border zone to cover events on the state border. Thus, in the rear of one of the units of the [name indistinct] unit, a border detail detained two BBC employees. They had an entry visa only for Tbilisi. But after arriving in Tbilisi they went to Kirovabad and from there they used a vehicle going that way to get to the border zone where they were detained by a border detail.

[Omelchenko] How do the local inhabitants and representatives of informal organizations regard the actions of the border troops to normalize the situation?

[Nizovtsev] The local party bodies are displaying an interest in having the border guarded again. At Pushkinskiy and Yardymlinskiy Rayon Party Committee plenums, the idea of aiding border troops was discussed. People are ready to restore posts and create additional details composed of local inhabitants. In Ilyichevskiy, (babekskiy) and Ordubadskiy Rayons of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic party bodies are supporting the readiness to help the border troops—but after the departure of the leaders and representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan.

[Omelchenko] Are representatives of the Peoples' Front actively engaged in actions to destabilize the situation?

[Nizovtsev] Well, naturally, the situation which remains the most acute is the situation in the Lenkoran area, where representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan continue to hold rallies and incite the population against the state of emergency, against the Army, the central leadership of the country, and the republic. They call on the people to take an active part in the election campaign and to try to achieve the liberation of Azerbaijan. That is the sort of what one can call antipopular slogans which are employed by representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan.

Foreign Ministry Experts Arrive in Tehran

LD0502093490 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Teheran February 5 TASS—A delegation of Soviet Foreign Ministry experts has arrived in Teheran.

They will hold talks to coordinate with the Iranian side a draft Soviet-Iranian inter-governmental agreement on a streamlined procedure for crossing the state border and a draft memorandum on terms for mutual trips by the two countries' citizens connected by family relationship and for private trips.

Salgirov Criticizes Iranian, Pakistani Ambitions

NC0202140990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Sergey Salgirov commentary]

[Excerpts] A Pakistani parliamentary delegation, headed by the speaker of the Pakistani National Assembly, has paid a visit to Iran. During his visit to Qom, Iran's religious center, the Pakistani guest lauded the Iranian fundamentalists for what he termed their wise stand on the incidents in the Soviet Union's Transcaucasus area.

I do not know what wisdom the Pakistani parliamentary representative found in the stand of the Iranian fundamentalists, since much of their reaction to the incidents in Transcaucasia was to incite those who are sowing the seeds of enmity and hostility among Azerbaijanis and Armenians and who are trying to exploit the democratic atmosphere created by the process of restructuring for their own spiteful political objectives.

Such reactions reflect the boundless aspirations of the Iranian fundamentalists to play a determining role in the fate of the Muslims, and not only those within their own national borders.

Some Pakistani politicians have similar ambitions. It is only sufficient to refer to those directed at neighboring Afghanistan. The idea of forming a confederation of Pakistan and Afghanistan headed by Islamabad can be considered a clear example of this. This idea was voiced among persons close to Ziaul Haq, the late Pakistani president. [passage omitted]

Iran's new leadership has adopted a more realistic approach toward Afghanistan and does not agree with the expansionist objectives of the Pakistani militaristic circles. They are not optimistic about such objectives. However, Iran's fundamentalists are using every possible pretext to increase their role in that country's political life and are exploiting the incidents in Transcaucasia to achieve this end.

Apparently this instills hope in the Pakistani ideologues that they can draw Iran into their anti-Afghan acts. Is this not why they resort to all kinds of flattery toward the Iranian fundamentalists?

Minesweeper's Clash With Iranian Ship Recalled

PM0102153790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Seagoing Minesweeper 'Turbinist' Has Returned From Persian Gulf, Having Covered 15,000 Miles"]

[Text] This is not the first time Captain 3d Rank M. Batuyev has escorted and protected ships in the Persian Gulf. He was awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d class, for the first voyage, which coincided, incidentally, with the greatest tension in that ocean "hot spot." The "Turbinist's" crew was the only one in the fleet to take "alive" and destroy a floating mine at that time.

"That voyage was noted for the complexity of the military-political situation, and the 'tanker war' was being waged," Mikhail Ivanovich recalled. "But the last one was in no way easier either. There were constant gales. So the sailors were probably even more tired than the first time."

[Correspondent] Were there any extreme situations? For it happened earlier that not only civilian but also military vessels and ships were subjected to attacks and shelling.

[Batuyev] As is known, the "tanker war" has died down. But its echoes can still be heard today. Here is an example. We were escorting the Baltic Fleet tanker "Olekma." The minesweeper was in front with the "Olekma" behind it. Suddenly an Iranian warship closed on the "Olekma"...

There is no denying that it was a complex situation. The piratical attacks by fast launches which shot point-blank at defenseless vessels and the unfriendly and sometimes provocative actions of certain foreign ships were still fresh in the sailors' memory. For what purpose was the Iranian ship seeking to close with the "Olekma" this time? Certainly not in order to pay its respects...

Very dangerous maneuvering by the two ships lasted more than four hours: The minesweeper used itself to cover the "Olekma." In the end the Iranian ship was forced to abandon its attempts.

Of course, this was a rare episode for the last voyage. The heat vexed the sailors most of all. The temperature sometimes reached 50 degrees in the shade. Plus increased humidity. Sometimes the equipment could not stand it and went out of commission. This happened when the minesweeper was on the point of making fast to another ship. At that moment a fault occurred in the steering engine. Warrant Officer S. Shaforostov, Petty Officer 2d Class V. Shmagin, and Seamen I. Maslov and S. Sorokaus displayed high professional qualities in an extreme situation. It took them just 15 minutes to get the steering engine working again—and this in a heat of 80 degrees, for there is no air conditioner in the tiller compartment.

The crew of the "Turbinist" is now engaged on ordinary combat training. Some of the seamen and petty officers have left on a short furlough. Officers and warrant officers have been enabled to see to family business, from which they have long been separated.

Mideast Envoy's Tunisian Visit Summarized

LD0302100690 Moscow TASS in English 0840 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Tunis February 3 TASS—Gennadiy Tarasov, assistant to the Soviet foreign minister and special envoy on Middle East affairs, stayed here from January 3 to February 2.

He had meetings with Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and other Palestinian leaders.

The development of the situation in the Middle East, prospects for headway towards peace in the region, and coordination of the two sides' efforts in getting the Middle East peace process going were discussed.

The Soviet envoy also met Chadli Klibi, secretary-general of the League of Arab States, and Habib ibn Yahia, Tunisian secretary of state for foreign affairs.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Arrives in Afghanistan

PM2601134190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Arrival of USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation"]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by A.A. Mokanu, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, has arrived in the Afghan capital on an official visit. The delegation was met at Kabul International Airport by M. Zeray, deputy chairman of the Wolasi Jirga—the lower chamber of the Afghan National Assembly; S.A.A. Shahrestani, deputy chairman of the Afghan Parliament Senate; and other officials. The welcoming party included B.N. Pastukhov, USSR ambassador plenipotentiary and extraordinary to Afghanistan.

This visit resumes contacts between the two countries' parliaments, the Soviet delegation head said in an interview with TASS correspondents. We have come here to familiarize ourselves with the country's life, describe the course of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, and exchange opinions with our friends in Kabul regarding the possible means of solving the Afghan problem. The delegation includes several USSR people's deputies who are former internationalist servicemen. It is significant that the visit is taking place on the threshold of an important date—the anniversary of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, A.A. Mokanu said in conclusion.

Today the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation laid wreaths at the monument at the cemetery of the heroes who died for the revolution and at the monument to the Soviet internationalist servicemen.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation had talks with H.A. Abawi, president of the Wolasi Jirga—the lower chamber of the Afghan National Assembly—and M. Habibi, chairman of the parliament's Senate.

On behalf of the Soviet people and parliament and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Soviet delegation head A.A. Mokanu conveyed to the Afghan people and the country's National Assembly wishes for the speediest cessation of the fratricidal war. He spoke about the policy of perestroyka being implemented in the USSR, its achievements, and also the Soviet parliament's activity in new conditions. In turn the delegation was briefed on the course of national reconciliation and the Afghan leadership's new initiative aimed at achieving peace in the republic. The sides confirmed the need to develop interparliamentary ties between the two countries.

In the course of the friendly conversation the question of the Soviet prisoners of war who are in opposition hands on Afghan territory was broached. The parliamentary leadership assured the delegation members that every effort will be made to release the Soviet soldiers and officers. The sides agreed that discussion of this question will continue.

Lukyanov Receives Jordanian Envoy's Credentials

PM2501155990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Presentation of Credentials"]

[Text] On 19 January, M.A. al-'Adwan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, presented his credentials in the Kremlin to A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

M.A. al-'Adwan stressed that the Jordanian leadership gives a high evaluation of the Soviet Union's constructive position in international relations and its principled policy aimed at reaching a just settlement in the Near East. The USSR's constant efforts to establish peace in this region and other hotspots, the ambassador said, are the focus of the Arab people's attention and meet with their approval and support. Jordan is following the changes in the Soviet Union with great attention and wishes it success in implementing perestroyka.

Accepting the credentials on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman, A.I. Lukyanov stressed that the new political thinking resulting from perestroyka is opening up possibilities for the cardinal improvement of international relations and makes it possible to unite the efforts of states in the resolution of the most complex problems, including the settlement of regional conflict situations by political means. The necessity of a worldwide activization of efforts aimed at reaching real progress in a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the preparation and convocation of an international conference on the Near East, the ensuring of a just and lasting peace there based on consideration of the legal and national rights of all peoples involved in the conflict, including the Palestinian people's rights to self-determination and the creation of their own independent state, were noted in this connection. The Soviet Union will collaborate actively with Jordan and other directly involved countries to reach such a settlement.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the state of Soviet-Jordanian relations and confirmed their readiness to improve them further.

After the credentials had been presented there was a friendly conversation between A.I. Lukyanov and M.A. al-'Adwan in which Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and E.L. Kuzmin, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat International Relations Department, participated.

Syria-Lebanon Summit Reported

PM2601113190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[M. Kozhevnikov dispatch: "Syria-Lebanon: President's First Trip"]

[Text] Damascus—Not a single day goes by without alarming news from Lebanon: Either fierce clashes between Shi'ite fighters from "Amal" and "Hizballah," yet another Israeli air raid on the country's southern regions, or another car bomb exploding somewhere in Beirut.

Many radio stations have only just reported an armed incident in Lebanon between Syrian troops and supporters of General M. 'Awn. A few hours later, SANA reported that I. al-Hirawi had left on an official visit to Syria.

This visit was expected in Damascus and had been thoroughly prepared. This is understandable. Syria is worried about the situation in Lebanon. It has repeatedly declared that it is vitally interested in the elimination of tension and the restoration of order in the neighboring Arab country. The Syrian troops in Lebanon, who play the role of a restraining factor, are meant to promote the solution of these tasks. Thus, Syrian leaders believe that their opinion is shared by the central Lebanese leadership personified by the legitimate government headed by S. al-Huss.

There is another point of view, however. It prevails in East Beirut, the traditional stronghold of rightwing Christian parties and organizations, where Lebanese Gen M. 'Awn, who was officially dismissed as commander of the country's Armed Forces, remains the "master." He is in fact boycotting all the recent attempts to settle the internal Lebanese crisis and makes categorical demands about the elimination of the Syrian military presence in the country. In the opinion of many political observers, this " 'Awn ultimatum" is the main cause of the explosive situation prevailing in Lebanon and its total unpredictability.

It was only to be expected that summit talks took pride in the visit's full program. According to SANA, relations between the two neighboring Arab countries and the currently prevailing situation in Lebanon were discussed during the meetings between H. al-Asad, president of the Syrian Arab Republic, and I. al-Hirawi, president of the Lebanese Republic.

H. al-Asad confirmed Syria's readiness to give Lebanon's legitimate authorities any assistance they might request for the purpose of restoring stability in the country and implementing the "Charter of National Accord" which was elaborated at the al-Ta'if conference. We wish fraternal Lebanon peace, progress, and prosperity, and we wish all its citizens may regain tranquility and accord, the Syrian Arab Republic president declared. He expressed the profound certainty that close coordination of actions between Syria and Lebanon will help to thwart any hostile attempts aimed at fanning the internal Lebanese conflict.

During the talks, the Lebanese head of state briefed the Syrian side on the measures which have been recently taken to normalize the situation in the country, to restore constitutional institutions, and to extend the sovereignty of central authorities throughout Lebanon's territory. I. al-Hirawi highly appraised the Syrian leadership's stance on the Lebanon problem. He especially emphasized that the development and strengthening of friendship and cooperation between Lebanon and Syria is in line with the interests not only of the two states' peoples but also of the entire Arab nation.

It is noteworthy that the visit to Syria was I. al-Hirawi's first trip abroad since his election as president of Lebanon two months ago. Prime Minister S. al-Huss and H. al-Husayni, speaker of Lebanon's parliament, accompanied him to Damascus and participated in the talks with Syrian leaders.

It is expected that I. al-Hirawi and the delegation he heads will soon visit Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco. It is well known that representatives of these states are on the Tripartite Committee on Lebanon which was set up at the Arab League's initiative to mediate in the settlement of the Lebanon crisis.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Cuban Troop Withdrawal Delay in Angola

LD0102163690 Moscow TASS in English 1209 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Havana February 1 TASS—In January Cuba withdrew 1,581 troops from Angola instead of 2,266 as planned, says a report by the Cuban Defence Ministry. The failure to withdraw Cuban troops according to the set schedule is attributed to a decision made by the Cuban and Angolan Governments to suspend the withdrawal, the document says.

The decision was made after National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] rebels attacked the village Vale de Anja and a water purification installation on January 21, where a small garrison of Cuban troops was stationed.

As a result, four Cuban soldiers were killed and five wounded.

The Cuban Defense Ministry report says that 31,138 troops have now returned home from Angola.

Somali Situation 'Dangerous, Grave'

EA2901082690 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Somalia has seen her third week without a government. President Mohamed Siad Barre dissolved the government on 9 January 1990. He blamed it for failing to solve the economic and social problems facing the country. It is believed that some of the dismissed ministers might be accused of grave misdeeds. Diplomatic sources say that all the former ministers have been ordered not to leave their houses, which may be translated into house arrest. Since 9 January, Siad Barre has held talks with several representatives of the opposition groups of the country. Those whom he met included Isma'il Jimaleh Osobleh, a human rights and freedom activist. Isma'il Jimaleh Osobleh was imprisoned in July of last year. He was later released and appointed a member of a committee to draft a new Somali Constitution. The president and opposition groups discussed the composition of the new cabinet of Somalia. The president took this action, because the situation of the country was very dangerous and grave.

The central government has no control over many parts of the Somali Democratic Republic. According to reporters, there is a shortage of everything in the capital, from basic food to banknotes. For that reason, Mohamed Siad Barre saw fit to look for a scapegoat and for someone upon whom to heap all the blame. Therefore, it appears that Siad Barre saw fit to blame the members of the former council of ministers for the dangerous situation Somalia finds itself in. Moreover, the welcoming and wooing of the opposition groups is an attempt by Siad Barre to improve his honor, which is at its lowest ebb ever.

Since a multiparty election is due sometime this year, Siad Barre is making every attempt to improve his image in the eyes of the Somali masses. Even so, from the prolonged government crisis and his reappointment of Mohamed Ali Samantar to form a new government, it appears that not everything is happening as Siad Barre would like, our commentator said.

Another worrying issue is the continuing indiscriminate arrests of civilians, under the pretext of the state of emergency [as heard] in the capital, Mogadishu. The foreigners in Mogadishu say that the situation in the town is very grave and tense. The roads in the capital are being manned by units of the special presidential guards.

Commentator Views Somali Government Shakeup

EA2701203790 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] As we have already reported, it was disclosed in Mogadishu that Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre, has decided to reappoint Minister Mohamed Ali Samantar as prime minister. He was given the responsibility of forming a new government soon. Our commentator Vladimir Borisov says that the president dismissed the former government of Somalia on 9 January. It was said that the dismissed government could not properly solve the political, economic, and cultural problems facing the country. This statement and another one which said that not only were the ministers dismissed, but they were also placed under house arrest, caused the commentators to make jokes as they analyzed the matter.

The crisis in the administrative system is not one that descended from the sky. It was caused by the suicidal attack that was launched on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in the 1970s. The Mohamed Siad Barre government, which was defeated in the suicidal attempt, has not yet succeeded in pooling its resources to formulate the right political system. In the last decade, many tribally based political organizations, which are waging war against the Mogadishu regime, have been established in different regions of the country. The war has thrown the whole of the Somali nation into chaos. For this reason, it is far from responsible to accuse every minister of the government of an inability to settle the very difficult situation prevalent in the country.

The quick game of reshuffling Somali ministers started long ago.

The present government crisis is being interpreted in the light of the events of the last few months in the country. In the middle of last year, Mohamed Siad Barre disclosed that the constitution is being reviewed and the article which guarantees the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [SRSP] to be the only legal political organization and the right to rule Somalia will be scrapped. It was also proposed that the tribally based opposition, which is waging war and is led by the Somali National Movement, the SNM, the biggest opposition force in the north, should form their own political organizations, which could contest the multiparty elections for the new parliament. It is expected that these elections will take place at the end of this year.

But I think, said the commentator, that the government has [word indistinct] on ways of calling on the opposition to participate in the peace talks and proceed to peaceful methods of political struggle. This is because the opposition, which has gained confidence in victories it has scored in the war, could not respond to the proposals of the Somali regime. For this reason, Mohamed Siad Barre, who is an experienced politician who has ruled the country for over 20 years, has taken another step which could open a way, as the president thought, toward starting the internal national dialogue. This was the step that could save the regime from the ministers that soiled its honor.

It is not surprising that Mohamed Ali Samantar has been named prime minister since he does not come from any of the strongest tribes in Somalia. He is highly respected by the people. But the question is, will the new government open the way for a new system of politics?

Statement on Expected Release of Nelson Mandela

LD0202235590 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—Follows a full text of an official statement of a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman issued tonight.

"Good news came from South Africa. President Frederik de Klerk of South Africa announced in parliament the government's decision to release from prison soon Nelson Mandela, a prominent figure of the national liberation movement and leader of the African National Congress, to lift a ban on the activities of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and other organisations opposing apartheid, to ease censorship of the press and to impose moratorium on the execution of death sentences.

"The Soviet Union regards these decisions of the South African Government as an important and long-expected step in the right direction. It is necessary that they should be followed by practical actions, that other measures should be taken, specifically, on the lifting of the state of emergency in the country and the creation of a favourable atmosphere for political talk and the dismantling of the apartheid system and the creation of a democratic state.

"Such development of events will be met with a positive response and full support in the Soviet Union."

U.S. Charge of Spying in Liberia Rejected

PM0202115190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Unfriendly Action"]

[Text] The U.S. State Department has taken unfriendly action against the Soviet Union, stressing in a corresponding memorandum to the Sierra Leonean Government that the USSR is supposedly using naval vessels to gather electronic intelligence on Liberia (where strategic U.S. installations are allegedly located) from the Sierra

Leonean economic zone, as well as collecting intelligence using land-based means supposedly located on Sierra Leonean territory.

It was reported at the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center that these allegations constitute deliberate disinformation. No gathering of intelligence on U.S. installations on Liberian territory is being carried out using naval vessels. There are no Soviet radio or electronic [radiotekhnicheskiy] intelligence-gathering systems on Sierra Leonean territory and there are no plans to site any there.

East Europe

Reportage on SED-PDS Chairman Gysi's Visit

'Substantive' Talk With Gorbachev

LD0202200690 Moscow TASS in English 1953 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism (SUPG-PDS), described his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as a "very substantive and detailed talk."

He spoke at a news conference here today after his one-day working visit to the Soviet Union.

Gysi said that the sides discussed the German policy, Europe's future and disarmament. But the main point of discussion was the establishment of closer inter-party relations.

Replying to journalists' questions, Gysi noted that the unification of the two German states should proceed along confederation lines within the European process, taking into account the interests of the four great powers and within the European process of unification.

"Otherwise, it could be a road to destabilisation," he stressed.

Gysi said that one should not forget about the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty while creating a contractual community.

Journalists asked many questions about the domestic situation in the German Democratic Republic. The SUPG-PDS chairman pointed to strong feelings of social uncertainty among people.

In his opinion, this promotes right-wing extremist sentiments among a small part of population. He expressed hope that joint actions by all democratic forces in the Republic would help find solutions which would prevent right-wing radicalism from taking root.

Speaking of a possible outcome of the elections to the republican parliament, Gysi stressed that his party would "accept any result of the elections."

The SUPG-PDS chairman said that he invited Gorbachev to visit the GDR. "We have not discussed the specific date for the visit," he said.

'Official Statement' on Meeting

LD0202195790 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—Following is the full text of an official statement on the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Gregor Gysi:

"On February 2, Mikhail Gorbachev met chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism (SUPG-PDS) Gregor Gysi, who arrived in the Soviet Union on an brief working visit at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

"Their conversation covered an extensive range of questions relating to the processes of democratic transformations in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the renewal of both parties and developments in the European region.

"Gregor Gysi briefed the Soviet leader on radical changes in the content and methods of work of the SUPG-PDS, the party's desire to help maintain the country's stability, the disruption of which would call in question the vital interests of strengthening peace in Europe, and, above all, the interests of Germans themselves.

"The Soviet Communist Party," Gorbachev said, "is in solidarity with the like-minded people in the German Democratic Republic. Getting rid of the burden of the past and aware of its responsibility for the fate of the country and the people, the SUPG-PDS is capable of making a big constructive contribution to the much-needed consolidation of all progressive and democratic forces in the German Democratic Republic."

"Gorbachev noted the courage and spiritual power of the comrades who bravely counteracted the persecution campaign directed against the mass of honest party members, who work befittingly for the good of society, in an atmosphere which stimuates anti-communist hysteria, neo-Nazi and pro-fascist groups, on which external right radical forces seek to bank to strengthen their own positions, are increasingly brazen in their activity in the German Democratic Republic.

"The two leaders were unanimous in their understanding of the importance of democratic changes in the German Democratic Republic, and of the country's unconditional right to decide by itself questions relating to its future development. They described as inadmissible any outside intervention in the internal political life of the Republic, which cannot be regarded as anything but attempts to undermine a sovereign state which is acting as a most important guarantor of stability in Europe at the present turning point in its development."

"In the Soviet Union," Mikhail Gorbachev noted, "The striving of German people in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for rapprochement and interaction is viewed with understanding. This is a natural fact. It was discussed at a recent meeting with Hans Modrow." Gorbachev said he would like to stress once again that forcing passions and simplified approaches to the problem could be pernicious.

"We are confident," the Soviet leader said, "that within the framework of the European process, the construction of a common European home, the issue of the German national unity may find its resolution, too. Whether this will happen under the conditions of a European confederation, the idea of which was proposed by President Francois Mitterrand, or in some other form—this is for history to decide. We hope a high sense of responsibility will be displayed in the two German states during the search for ways and forms of possible reunification, which would not be at variance with the interests of all European nations, the interests of peace in the world. The stance of the SUPG-PDS towards these problems, as far as we know, is expressed with sufficient clarity in the statement by the Presidium of its board of February 1, 1990.

"Under the conditions of the active development of German problems all countries, all parties and movements, whose interests are involved in this, people in the streets and people in the offices—all should act circumspectly and most sensibly. Otherwise Europe which has just embarked on the path of mutual trust and cocreation, may be placed in jeopardy."

The conversation, with the participation of A. Yakovlev, V. Falin, R. Fedorov, H.J. Wellerding and G. Koenig, was held in an atmosphere of comradeship, frankness and mutual understanding.

2 Feb Exchange With Yakovlev

LD0202235690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1708 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Feb (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today met Gregor Gysi, the chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party for Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS]. A thorough exchange of opinions on a wide range of international problems took place. Issues concerning inter-party links between the CPSU and the SED-PDS, taking into account the renewal processes which are occurring, were discussed. Mutual interest was expressed in extending interrelations at all levels. The importance of constant mutual consultations, of the exchange of experience, and of deeper cooperation on issues of the theory and interpretation of contemporary social problems was noted.

Remarks at News Conference

PM0302001590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS reports under general headline: "Conversation at CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, hosted a dinner 2 February in honor of G. Gysi, which was attended by H.J. Willerding, G. Koenig, V.M. Falin, R.P. Fedorov, and other officials.

G. Gysi laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

Speaking at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, G. Gysi evaluated his conversation with M.S. Gorbachev as very substantive and detailed.

The atmosphere at the conversation was distinguished by a definite warmth, calmness [spokoystviye], and a degree of mutual understanding and trust. We spoke openly of all problems in the USSR and the GDR, in the CPSU and in our party, the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] noted.

Replying to journalists' questions, Gysi said that the process of the unification of the two German states will proceed along the path of confederation within the framework of the pan-European process, taking into account the interests of the four great powers. A contractual association with recognition of sovereignty and independence will be formed at the initial stage. This process, in his opinion, will promote stabilization in Europe by developing within the framework of the pan-European unification process. Any other way, the SED-PDS leader emphasized, would be the path of destabilization.

When solving the German question, he noted, it is necessary to find the correct continuity of actions so as to ensure that this process does not harm the interests of Germans and other European peoples.

Appraising the prospects of domestic political development in the GDR, and the likely outcome of elections to the republic's People's Chamber in particular, Gysi emphasized that his party would accept any result produced by the elections.

2 Feb Departure

LD0202200290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1938 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Feb (TASS)—Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party for Democratic Socialism, left the Soviet capital today. He had been in the USSR on a working visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Pressures in GDR for Reunification Discussed

LD3101210590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 31 Jan 90

[From "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Excerpt] Hello there, comrades. Let me start with reports from Eastern Europe. Political life there is literally on the boil, and every day brings something new and important. This is also shown by today's cables, which I would like to tell you about.

First, events in the GDR—and I mean events: There are many of them there. In a number of towns in the GDR mass demonstrations are continuing. The participants in the majority of them are demanding German unity and the dissolution of the SED-PDS [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party for Democratic Socialism]. This party, or rather its predecessor, the SED, lost authority among the masses, as is well known. Evidently equating its activities with the activities of the renovated SED-PDS, however, many people are demanding that the latter be eliminated from public life, and what is more are putting the party on a par with the former state security bodies. The demonstrators cannot hear, or perhaps do not want to hear, statements by a whole series of politicians both in the GDR and FRG to the effect that the immediate creation of a single Germany would, above all, not be economically advantageous to either side.

A demonstration held in Cottbus at the call of the New Forum had a more considered character. During the demonstration, one of the spokesmen for the organization declared that reunification is possible, but only with the approval of neighbors East and West, and naturally it could not be a means for getting over the economic crisis in the GDR. [passage omitted]

Papers Cite Modrow Proposals for United Germany

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Feb

PM0202150990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 3

[Dispatch by "our correspondent" S. Maslov: "United, Neutral? Hans Modrow Has Set Out Concept of United Germany"]

[Text] Berlin—Endless disputes by Eastern and Western historians over who is to blame for the postwar division of Germany—or more accurately, who is more to blame?—seem to have finally lost their topicality. It is becoming obvious that it is time to draw a line once and for all under the entire period of world and, above all, European development described as the postwar period. Historians cannot do this; this is a job for peoples and politicians. The line is only now emerging—only a dotted line now, but it began to appear far more clearly as of yesterday, at the moment when Hans Modrow, head of the GDR Government, laid out his concept for German unity at a Berlin press conference. It follows from what he said that the unification of the two German states should not only put an end to the division of the German nation but also help overcome Europe's division into hostile camps.

In this connection it is appropriate to recall that the premier, like, moreover, some realistic FRG politicians, has deliberately avoided using the concept of "reunification." It is not merely a question of terminology but one of principle. Recently, during his visit to Moscow, H. Modrow stressed that anyone who speaks of "reunification" envisages restoring Germany within its 1937 borders. This goal is of course unacceptable for the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. It is no coincidence that, before setting out his concept, he clearly indicated that unification must not become a process during which the Germans will be exclusively occupied with themselves or one another. Recognition of responsibility, caution, and understanding of what is feasible and acceptable to Europe are necessary during this process, H. Modrow indicated, in order to ensure that a threat to the life and prosperity of its neighbors never again emanates from Germany. In his opinion, H. Modrow indicated a definitive solution is only possible provided that citizens have free self-determination, in cooperation with the four victorious powers, as well as in accordance with their neighbors' interests. A united Germany must be a new factor for stability, trust, and peace on the continent. Military neutrality for both German states should be a highly important precondition for creating such a state.

What concrete steps may be taken toward unification? H. Modrow set out his ideas in an extremely laconic fashion. The practical implementation of his previous idea of a treaty-governed community, which permits confederative elements—an economic, currency, and transport union—within its framework, should be the first stage. The next step might be the creation of a federation. It would, in turn, represent a transitional stage en route to creating a unified state in the form of a German federation or a German union. H. Modrow proposed Berlin as the seat of a united German government.

At a press conference, the head of the GDR Government was asked whether his concept had been coordinated with the Socialist Unity Party-Party of Democratic Socialism or with other parties. H. Modrow replied that he had submitted his own proposals for the public's verdict.

IZVESTIYA 3 Feb

PM0202163590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Lapskiy: "GDR-FRG: Unification Blueprint"]

[Text] Berlin—Hans Modrow has presented his blueprint for the unification of Germany at the international press center in Berlin. Europe has entered a new stage of its development, the head of the GDR Government said. The time has come to draw a line under World War II and conclude a German peace treaty.

A definitive solution of the German question can been achieved only by means of free self-determination by Germans in both German states, in cooperation with the four victorious powers, and bearing in mind the interests of all European states. It must promote an all-European process which will rid our continent once and for all of the threat of war.

With a view to this, the prime minister said, I propose a responsible national dialogue. Its objective must be to outline specific steps leading to a united Germany, which must become a new factor of stability, confidence, and peace in Europe.

These steps could comprise the conclusion of a treaty on cooperation and good-neighborliness in the form of a treaty-based community, which would incorporate substantial confederative elements such as an economic, monetary, and transport union and also ensure the coordination of the two states' legal norms. Further, the creation of a confederation of the GDR and the FRG with common management organs and institutions such as for instance a parliamentary commission, a land chamber, and common executive organs in various spheres. This could be followed by the transfer of the two states' sovereign rights to confederative organs of power. And finally, the creation of a single German state in the form of a German federation or a German union through the holding of elections in both parts of the confederation and the creation of a single parliament, which would adopt a joint constitution and confirm a single government with its seat in Berlin.

In Hans Modrow's opinion, the following are necessary preconditions for development in this direction: Each of the German states must take care to bring the steps toward a united Germany, and also the necessary reforms and changes, in line with its commitments to other countries or groups of countries. These preconditions include the GDR's transfer to an administrative division based on lands; the preservation of stability and the observance of the rights and laws within each country; and strict implementation of the earlier GDR-FRG treaties, which provide for noninterference in each other's internal affairs. They also include respect for the interests and rights of the four powers and the interest of all the peoples of Europe in peace, sovereignty, and stable borders. The four powers are invited to declare their intention to settle, after the creation of a single German state, all questions which have arisen after World War II and during the postwar period, including the presence of foreign troops on German territory and membership of military alliances. The establishment of GDR and FRG military neutrality along the path toward a federation is envisaged.

In Hans Modrow's view, this process must take place on the basis of agreements between the two countries' parliaments and governments. They must declare their will to pursue democratic, nonviolent forms of resolving political contraditions and to create the necessary guarantees to this end, including the holding of referendums.

Hans Modrow appealed to GDR and FRG citizens, all European peoples and states, and the world public to support his blueprint.

PRAVDA 3 Feb

PM0202170390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Dispatch by correspondents Sergey Baygarov and May Podklyuchnikov under rubric "Correspondents Comment": "Not To Miss Opportunity"]

[Text] Berlin, 2 Feb—Proceeding from the premise that new international conditions are now taking shape for the unification of the two German states, the GDR Government has advanced the concept "For Germany—a Single Fatherland." H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, familiarized the world public with it yesterday.

Many people considered the GDR proposal sensational. In actual fact, however, anyone who keeps an attentive eye on the course of world events will have assessed the situation at once: Perfectly mature ideas suggested by real life have been opportunely advanced.

The renewal on which the GDR has embarked has put an end to the obsolete, stereotypical ideas about how relations can take shape between the two German states. During the long years of the "cold war," after the West turned down in the early fifties the proposal for free elections in the GDR and the FRG with a view to their unification and refused at the end of the same decade to consider seriously the idea of their confederation, the notion gradually took shape in the world that Germans in the East and West were destined to live apart for a long time.

The new political thinking and the fresh and bold approach to resolving many inveterate international problems have enabled international politics to be jolted out of their well-worn rut. The time has come to take a new look at the "German question" too—as one of the political knots on our continent distinguished by particular complexity.

This complexity is accounted for by the fact that the two German states not only have different social systems but also belong to opposing military-political blocs and are linked with their members by numerous political, military, and economic ties—ties which cannot be broken in a single hour without causing chaos and upsetting the stability that has been achieved with such difficulty on the European continent.

The GDR's proposals take into account the complexity of the "German question." They state that the time has come to draw a line under World War II and to conclude a peace treaty. The ultimate solution of the "German question" is a matter not only for the Germans themselves. It can be achieved only under conditions of cooperation with the four powers—the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France—which together achieved victory over the Hitlerite state and which bear responsibility for Germany as a whole under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The unification of the two states must fit within the framework of the all-European process.

How does the GDR Government picture the path to unification? It must begin with a national dialogue. In the GDR's opinion, specific steps could appear like this. First, the conclusion of a treaty on cooperation and good-neighborliness and the creation of a "treaty community" already containing all substantial confederative elements. Such as, for example, an economic, currency, and transport union. It is also necessary to equalize legal norms. Then the formation of a confederation of the GDR and the FRG with common organs and institutions, such as a parliamentary committee, land chambers, and joint executive organs in individual spheres.

The next step is the transfer of both states' sovereign rights to the confederation's organs of power. Then the formation of a unified German state in the form of a German federation or German union. It will be the result of elections in both parts of the confederation and the convening of a unified parliament which will adopt a common constitution and a decision to create a government with its capital in Berlin.

The proposals name the preconditions so that movement toward a unified Germany can become a reality.

The proposals drawn up by the GDR Government are imbued with understanding of the tremendous responsibility of Germans in both states to other countries and peoples.

The process of rapprochement which has begun between the two German states can probably no longer be halted. However, how successfully it proceeds depends on the considered and well thought-out nature of the actions and statements of figures both in the West and East and on the successes of the policy of advancing along the path of good-neighborliness and mutual understanding throughout our continent. This is because it is difficult to imagine a unified Germany in a Europe that is split.

Shevardnadze Outlines Policy on German Unity

LD0202220190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1739 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Feb (TASS)—The diplomatic corespondents of TASS, APN, PRAVDA, and IZVESTIYA asked USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to comment on the concept laid out by H. Modrow, head of the GDR Government, for discussing steps toward a united Germany.

The minister said the following:

When H. Modrow was in Moscow very recently, he expressed a number of ideas on drawing the two German states closer together and on constructing new relations of cooperation and partnership between them. These met with the understanding they deserved on the part of the Soviet leadership.

We now have an opportunity to acquaint ourselves with the more complete and detailed position of the GDR Government. I note that it is putting it forward as a basis for discussion. Moreover, H. Modrow has appealed directly to the states of Europe and to the world public to express an opinion of this concept.

We value this way of posing the question. It shows that the GDR understands that the problem of German unity does not affect the Germans alone. It must be solved in the context of preexisting European and, indeed, world realities, taking into account the interests of other countries and, of course, the lessons of tragic history.

I think that it goes without saying that in this instance the USSR has very weighty and legitimate interests and rights. They are backed up by 26 million people killed and tens of thousands of ruined towns and villages. We recall again and again that there is not a family in our country without its war victims. No one can condemn us for the fact that we sacredly preserve their memory. The issue raised in the statement by the head of the GDR Government is for us not only a political issue, but also a piercingly human one.

Therefore, in this process we are far from disinterested observers, and we will, of course, continue to conduct an active dialogue with the governments of the GDR and the FRG, the great powers which bear responsibility for German affairs, and all interested countries.

Acquaintance with the ideas expressed by H. Modrow has left us with the impression that the GDR Government's concept contains sensible farsighted notions and approaches. As a whole it proceeds from realistic premises. We could agree with many elements, but some, in our view, require further study. More specific clarifications also will be necessary; after all, as is said in such cases, the details can make all the difference.

In other words, there need to be serious exchanges of views and discussions of the details, which are extremely important in what is, without exaggeration, such a historic process.

I would like to stress right away that we have not had in the past, and do not have now, any problem with the principle of the self-determination of the two German states. That is the natural right of peoples—the right to a free choice and to an independent path of development.

Moreover, with both the GDR and the FRG we have in large measure dissimilar but on the whole good and diverse relations. We would not wish in any way to set ourselves at odds with the national aspirations of the

German people in the GDR and the FRG, people who are our close neighbors in Europe.

Nevertheless, we cannot be unaffected or unconcerned by the way the situation in Europe will develop in connection with the process of the rapprochement of the two German states. Above all in this context we cannot fail to recall the first precept of the UN Charter—"To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind"—or to be guided by it in our practical policies.

All peoples, particularly the peoples of the Soviet Union, should have the right to a guarantee that German territory should never again be the source of a threat of war. They will accept and support German unity, it seems to me, only if they are certain of this.

Here it seems appropriate to me to remark that the German problem has not only juridical, political, military, and economic dimensions. It directly and severely affects millions of peoples in all states.

Politics cannot sidestep this reality. The question arises, of course: Should politicians, statesmen, and the rising generations now know how people who have suffered the scorching effects of the war think about the movement toward German unity which is now taking place? I do not know how this can be done, but it seems to me that a method needs to be found of making known public opinion by as democratic and open a way as possible—say, through an all-European referendum with the participation of the United States and Canada, or, at least, by means of broad parliamentary discussions. It is important that not only politicians but also the people should decide the destiny and the future of Europe. After all, it is they who, as has been the case in history more than once, will have to pay for the politicians' mistakes.

I am certain that Germany and the entire world do not simply need to resolve the German question, but also to find a final reconciliation with a painful past. The people will have to say in the end that a line is being drawn under the past and that it is being drawn with their consent and under sufficient guarantees.

It is, however, dificult to expect this if the German question is debated against a background of neofascist attacks in the FRG and the GDR. They, more than anything else, undermine confidence and call into doubt arguments to the effect that the European peoples will no longer encounter a rebirth of fascism.

It is not the actual idea of German unity that encounters suspicion, you see, but the revival associated with this idea of the sinister phantoms of the past and notions of the possibility of a growth of militarism.

I think that it is extremely important that people with Nazi or pro-Nazi views should not get involved in the idea of a unified fatherland of Germans of the GDR and FRG. People with noble intentions and clean hands must advance and defend it. The attitude of all others toward the fatherland advocated by such people will be one of approval and of readiness to give it the required credit of trust.

We share the view of the head of the GDR Government to the effect that paving the way for German unity requires a special sense of responsibility and circumspection, and a comprehension of what is possible and acceptable for Europe. In the course of 40 years of separate existence, the GDR and FRG have grown far apart. Thus their drawing closer together again must of course be a gradual process, and it must pass through certain stages. The sequence of stages in this progression as outlined in the concept put forward by H. Modrow—treaty-based association with confederative elements, a confederation of the GDR and FRG, a federation or German union—evidently has a logic to it. It is important for this process to be predictable from start to finish, and to serve the strengthening of stability and security in Europe and not cause this to be shaken.

When I addressed the Political Committee of the European Parliament on 19 December last year, I was already outlining the questions which inevitably arise concerning the future of the German nation.

In connection with H. Modrow's plan I would like to designate those problems connected with German unity which continue to concern us and which require clarification.

Among European states the view is widespread that steps to bring the two German states closer together should be synchronized with the all-European process and implemented gradually and mainly in this context. At the present time, for instance, all-European talks on confidence-building measures are under way in Vienna. Is it now indeed necessary to become involved at these talks with the "German" aspect of confidence-building measures? Is what is at present happening with regard to the two German states not also manifesting with greater force the need to hold this very year a meeting of the top leaders of the CSCE member countries? It would in general be interesting to hear in more detail how the governments of the GDR and the FRG would correlate their movement to unity with the Helsinki process.

It is evident, too, that on the way to unity it will be necessary to find a solution to questions that arose as a result of World War II and postwar developments. How should this be achieved? Is it by the conclusion of a peace treaty? An answer to this question requires the most profound and comprehensive consideration, in particular taking into account that since the war both the Germans in each of the German states and the whole of Europe have traversed more than half a century. A great deal and the most important things have been decided—in the Helsinki Final Act and in bilateral treaties. Some things have not been decided, and certain landmarks need to be set out for the future. It needs to be done so that there is no reason to feel ashamed before posterity.

Without an undertaking by the Germans to unconditionally recognize and strictly observe the present borders in Europe, which have arisen as a result of the war, and not to make territorial claims against anyone, it is evidently difficult to expect that the idea of German unity will not meet with opposition on the part of many countries, for which this question is an important and sometimes a painful one. Yes, there are reassuring statements by FRG statesmen, but for the time being the well-known verdict by the Federal Constitutional Court, confirming the legality of the 1937 Reich boundaries, remains unrevised.

The question of the need for military neutrality to be proclaimed by both states, and for them to implement practical measures to lower the level of armament and to demilitarize both German states is being raised, and, justifiably so, in our view.

It goes without saying that it will be necessary to come to an agreement with the four powers on the extent of their rights and responsibilities.

Evidently, understanding is also needed in terms of the fact that the 1971 four-power agreement on Berlin does not lose its force in the period of the emergence of German unity, which does not in any degree mean the city's exclusion from the system of active international and inter-German exchanges.

It is by no means a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union—and, indeed, I think, also to other European states—what place the new German entity would take in the military-political structures already existing on our continent. An even more important question arises—a question of its place in a new, peaceful order in Europe and in the all-European home. Briefly, reliable political, juridical, and material guarantees are needed so that German unity will not in the long term create a threat to the security of other states and to peace in Europe.

The preliminary views which have been expressed here, should, of course, not be regarded as exhausting our approaches and the range of possible questions.

I will stress that we are advocating the possible creation of a united, peace-loving, and democratic Germany, which will occupy a worthy place in the world community and become an important and strong link in European and universal security.

We want the Germans' move toward a united fatherland to develop without cataclysms, not upset European and world balance, and not create threats to neighbors. I think that this is a natural and legitimate wish.

Kornilov Comments on German Unification Plans

LD0202182590 Moscow TASS in English 1748 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

Many news organisations are commenting on the concept of a united Germany, as advanced by Hans Modrow, prime minister of the German Democratic Republic.

They describe his concept, actually a plan to unite the two German states, as an important and constructive initiative.

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that most Germans want unification, noting that this process will be proceeding with the framework of the European process and in accordance with the security interests of other states, above all the Soviet Union.

The news organisations had hardly reported the GDR prime minister's statement when West German circles called into question a number of fundamental provisions of the document. According to broadcasts on West German television, Rudolf Seiters, head of the office of the federal chancellor, rejected the idea that the GDR and West Germany would adhere to military neutrality as they merged into a federation. He said that this defies the logic of European development.

In an interview with the West German television network ZDF, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner went even further. He asserted that the proposed neutrality could lead to the emergence of a zone of instability in the heartland of Europe.

The debates about a united Germany's membership in NATO are in full swing in West Germany, the Parisian LE MONDE writes today.

There was a time when any initiatives coming from the East were rejected out of hand in Western capitals.

Those to whom these initiatives were addressed did not even bother to study them.

Times are now different, and the East-West dialogue increasingly assumes the nature of a serious, businesslike, constructive quest for mutually acceptable solutions.

Is it worthwhile to reject some or another provision in the Berlin concept, without first considering all the pros and cons?

While advocating a united Germany, the GDR prime minister emphasised particularly that the ultimate solution to the German question can be achieved only in cooperation with the four powers that won the Second World War and having taken into consideration the interests of all the European peoples. The rapprochement of both German states and their subsequent unification should not be viewed by anyone as a menace. This is one of the cardinal provisions of the plan of Germany's unification.

The demand by some Western politicians for the entry of a united Germany into NATO are holdovers from outdated thinking about military blocs, said Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the Bundestag.

As regards the Soviet public, it is shocked by the idea that a united Germany should be a NATO member.

Moscow TV Interviews Bulgaria's Lilov

LD0202232190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of Bulgarian Supreme Party Council, by correspondent Golovanov in Sofia 2 February—recorded; from "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party ended in Sofia. [passage omitted]

[Golovanov] The congress has elected the Supreme Party Council, the Central Commission on Party Ethics, and the Central Finance and Auditing Commission.

Aleksandur Lilov has been elected chairman of the Supreme Party Council. [video shows Golovanov speaking to Lilov] Can one suppose that the congress has consolidated the party and that the first step has been taken on the path toward eliminated the crisis in society?

[Lilov] I do not like strong definitions when the role and importance of party forums is at issue, although I understand very well that there are special congresses in the history of the party. I think there are many reasons for the congress that has just ended to be extraordinary and emergency: first, because of its importance, it had to resolve problems connected with the crisis in which our party and society exist, and it had to chart ways out of the crisis. Second, this was a very difficult congress because it was held in the conditions of the severe legacy we have inherited from the past regime in the sociopolitical and moral spheres. This was also an extraordinary congress because it had to tackle problems of renewing our party and to propose radical changes that could guarantee changes in all of society. This is why I would like to call it the congress of change, transformation, and renewal. This is where its importance lies.

Gorbachev Cables Congratulations to Lilov

LD0202200990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent the following telegram to Aleksandr Lilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Bulgarian Communist Party's [BCP] Supreme Party Council:

Esteemed Comrade Lilov, I cordially congratulate you on your election as chairman of the Presidium of the BCP Party Council. I wish that you, Communists, and all the working people of fraternal Bulgaria, may successfully implement the decisions of the 14th BCP Congress. I take this opportunity to confirm, in the name of Soviet Communists, the consistent line of the CPSU in developing constructive cooperation with the BCP and other public and political forces in Bulgaria, which have chosen favor of democratic socialism.

TASS Reports New Bulgarian Party Leaders

LD0302074790 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia February 3 TASS—By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Stepanenko and Andrey Chupskhin:

The Supreme Party Council of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) elected its Presidium late Friday night [2 February]. On the Presidium are Alexander Strezov and Georgiy Pirinskiy, deputy chairmen, Rumen Sergezov, secretary of the Presidium, Andrey Lukanov, Vasil Nedev, Dobri Djurov, Ivan Stanev, Iordan Radichkov, Nadia Asparukhova, Nenko Temelkov, Peter Mladenov, Peter-Emil Mitev, Petia Yorganova, Stanka Krystenova, Filip Bokov, and Chavdar Kyuranov, members of the Presidium.

Alexander Lilov was earlier elected the chairman of the Presidium of the BCP Supreme Party Council.

The new leading bodies of the BCP were formed in accordance with the party rules endorsed at the BCP's 14th Extraordinary Congress held from January 30 to February 2.

The delegates to the congress elected council members on Friday. The Presidium was elected on the same day at a plenary meeting of the Supreme Party Council.

Quotes Lilov, Lukanov

LD0302121990 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia February 3 TASS—By TASS correspondents Igor Mishakin, Aleksandr Stepanenko and Andrey Chupakhin:

Aleksandr Lilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Party Council of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), referred to the BCP's 14th Extraordinary Congress that ended in Sofia on Friday as a congress of renewal.

"The congress competently and specifically reviewed the situation in the country which is experiencing a serious political, economic and moral crisis," he told a news conference which was also attended by Andrey Lukanov, member of the BCP Supreme Party Council.

"The forum mapped out ways along which the party should develop if it wants to overcome the present hard position and to lead the masses to the remaking of society," Lilov emphasised.

"That was a truly extraordinary congress, not only because it was convened earlier than previously scheduled but also due to the fact that it was of exceptional importance to the party, since it rid it of the political legacy of the recent and distant past.

"The congress drew a clear line of distinction between the party and the former authoritarian regime of Todor Zhivkov. And finally, that was an extraordinary congress for its degree of responsibility: Our party can no longer remain unchanged, because conditions in Bulgaria and in the world are now different.

"We cannot but take these changes into consideration. We formulated the question as follows: The party may count on success only provided it is reformed."

Touching upon the party's foreign policy matters, Lilov said that the policy was characterised by both continuity and deep changes.

"The BCP maintains close contacts with the parties of East European countries where similar processes are taking place. It will develop cooperation with the Soviet Union and will remain a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). WTO membership guarantees the country's security, he emphasised.

Lilov pointed out that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev "is one of the major political leaders in the present-day world" and emphasised that Bulgaria would be more widely open to the world and as a European state would strive to participate in the building of a common European home.

In answer to questions connected with the country's economic problems, Lukanov pointed out that their solution required radical measures, some of which might prove painful.

"I would like to add at once," he said, "that we see the meaning of creating a government with a broader social basis, a government of national concord, precisely in getting as wide social support as possible for the main goals of the anti-crisis programme."

"In this connection we consider it necessary to hasten the holding of parliamentary elections so that would be possible immediately after that to form a new people's Assembly and a new government enjoying broad support and thereby capable of carrying out a radical economic reform based on the principles of a market-oriented economy."

Only a Bulgarian People's Assembly at its session will be able to give an answer to the question as to who will head a new Bulgarian Government, Lukanov said.

Lukanov Elected Bulgarian Prime Minister

LD0302130190 Moscow TASS in English 1229 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia February 3 TASS—Andrey Lukanov, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Party Council of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was elected chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers at a People's Assembly session held here today.

He succeeded Georgiy Atanasov who tendered the government's resignation on Thursday [1 February].

USSR Council Congratulations

LD0302152790 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—The USSR Council of Ministers congratulated Andrey Lukanov on his election to the post of chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

"We are convinced that at the present period of profound social changes in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, relations of fraternal friendship, allied interaction and comprehensive cooperation between our countries will receive further fruitful development, continue to reliably serve the interests of Soviet and Bulgarian peoples, to promote stronger peace and stability in Europe," the telegram runs.

Bulgarian Party Congress Approves Statute

PM0502114790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by special correspondents L. Zhmyrev and A. Krushinskiy: "With Hope, Into Future. Our Special Correspondents Report From 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress"]

[Text] Sofia, 2 Feb—The typical features of the 14th Extraordinary BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Congress are the enhanced activeness of its participants and their lofty responsibility in decisionmaking. Delegates comprehensively analyzed the draft documents which had already been thoroughly prepared by commissions. Amendments were introduced one after the other.

The most substantial part of remarks and proposals concerned the appraisal of the past period in party history, the features of the society of democratic socialism, some aspects of the party's ideological and theoretical foundations, and the tasks of reducing the party apparatus. It was decided that the question of the party's name should be submitted to a partywide referendum.

The keen interest shown in the preparation of the new BCP statute testifies to Communists' commitment to the ideas of profound organizational perestroyka, A. Lukanov, chairman of the Commission for Preparing the Draft and Statute, declared in his speech. He noted that Communists perceive this perestroyka as a mandatory prerequisite for the renewal of the BCP's entire activity, the mobilization of its moral and political reserves in the difficult struggle to regain the people's trust, and the strengthening of the party's position in the country's political life.

In terms of size, contents, and basic principles, the submitted draft is radically different from the previous statute. In compliance with the congress' decision, the principle of democratic unity has been introduced in place of democratic centralism as the fundamental principle of the party's activity. According to the new statute, the party's political mainstay is provided by Communists themselves and the primary organizations created by them. The statute enshrines guarantees against any revival of authoritarian style in party life, against monopolization of power and the detachment of leading figures from rank-and-file Communists and the realities of life. These guarantees lie in the affirmation of the principles of multiple candidacies and competitiveness, in the right to criticize all party organs and figures, and in glasnost.

The new statute provides for the self-determination of primary party organizations. Communists are given the right to decide for themselves the question whether to create primary organizations at their places of work, places of residence, or places of study.

On the question of intra-party pluralism, the congress confirmed the commitment to genuine intra-party debates to ensure a real opportunity to maintain organizational unity under the diversity of views and ideological platforms. The statute confirms the minority's right to be represented on leadership organs. It is laid down that delegates "will retain their mandates"; in other words, they should assemble for brief annual sessions until the next congress to decide especially important questions of party life.

The party's policy in state and public organs and organizations will be implemented by its members participating in these structures on a legitimate basis. A special role is assigned to the deputies' group in the National Assembly. There has been substantial renewal of the rules governing payment of membership dues: Communists whose incomes are below minimum wage will contribute only 10 stotinki per month to party funds. The remainder will decide the amount of their membership dues for themselves, provided they are not less than 1 percent of their incomes. "We expect that Communists with large incomes will support the party in this complex period," A. Lukanov noted in his speech. The new statute contains the demand, submitted by the majority of primary party organizations, that one-half of membership dues should remain at their disposal.

Finally, the congress approved by an overwhelming majority (2,769 "for," 11 "against," and 12 abstentions) a document whose title, in its final version, reads: "Manifesto of Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria." The new statute was also ratified (2,222 delegates "for," 383 "against," and 42 abstentions).

The delegates moved to the final item on the agenda—elections to central party organs. Guests and journalists were asked to leave the People's Palace of Culture; it was decided that the sitting should continue behind closed doors.

This sitting lasted a long time. According to the radio, it was not before 0400 hours that they successfully agreed the ballot papers for a secret ballot using the multimandate principle: There were 158 candidates proposed for the 131 seats on the Supreme Party Council (the organ which will replace the former Central Committee), and two candidates for the position of RABOTNICHESKO DELO chief editor. But the majority of candidates failed to win a sufficient number of votes in the first round.

"Into a Fitting Future—With a Fitting Party"—that was the "banner" which headlined one of RABOTNICHESKO DELO's reports from the congress. It is only natural that delegates would wish that the people who head the party should be worthy of their lofty mission in all respects.

The debates at the 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress generated wide public interest in Bulgaria. Moreover, the appraisals are most diverse. One can sense that this congress has given hope to many people. In parallel with hope, however, concern is expressed in the press and in the opinions of people we talked to that there is still no complete clarity as regards the ways out of the crisis.

The time of the congress coincided with alarming events: A political strike by medical personnel is at its height, demanding the resignation of the Ministry of Health leadership, while trade network personnel are threatening to strike.

The Bulgarian People's Republic Government headed by G. Atanasov resigned late last night. It was reported here that the resignation was attributed to the need to form a government on a broad coalition basis with the participation of opposition forces. The Council of Ministers will temporarily perform its functions until the National Assembly session due to be held tomorrow. It must be noted that the government's activity was seriously criticized in speeches by a number of delegates during the congress.

And so, difficult days, months, and maybe years lie ahead of the new leadership of the thoroughly renewed BCP and all Bulgarian Communists. Tremendous efforts and energy will have to be applied to overcome the grave political and economic crisis.

Hungarian Party Congress Statement Reported

LD2801232790 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Budapest January 28 TASS—In conclusion of the second phase of the 14th Congress, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) adopted a political statement of the party and an address to the electorate.

The statement evaluates the recent past. The process of the renewal of the country and democratisation was launched in 1987-1988 on the initiative of the HSWP.

At present the HSWP which is renewing itself actively presses for further democratisation of society. "At the same time," the statement says, "the country is now facing an apparent danger from the right: the danger of bourgeois restoration and the restoration of capitalist relations."

"The Hungarian communists are stating: We want to build such a 'collective society' which would be based on the diversity of the forms of ownership. The HSWP is not against private ownership but collective one should predominate. It should serve the entire society, and not just a narrow circle of people. At the same time each form of property should have its own master."

What the communists suggest in the agrarian sphere is to keep cooperatives with a rise in production efficiency and not to restore private land ownership.

The HSWP openly proclaims its political goals and will work to attain them by democratic means under conditions of a multiparty system. The renewing Marxist party seeks to restore the true meaning of socialism.

Putting forward the principles of its foreign policy, the HSWP emphasises that it comes out in favor of international security and maintenance of military balance. The party insists on the renewal of the council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and rejects one-sided pro-western orientation.

Talks Held on Withdrawing Troops From Hungary

Aboimov Heads Delegation

LD0102194690 Moscow TASS in English 1932 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest February 1 TASS—Soviet-Hungarian negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory opened here today.

The Hungarian delegation is led by Foreign Ministry Secretary of State Ferenc Somodyi and the Soviet—by Deputy Foreign Minister I.P. Aboimov.

The MTI news agency believes that in the course of two-day negotiations the sides will set forth the two countries' stands on the troop withdrawal and discuss the withdrawal time schedule.

Hungary's state assembly is known to have authorised the government to insist in the course of the negotiations on the early elaboration of the full Soviet troop withdrawal time schedule, MTI reports. The aim is to see to it that the troops should be fully withdrawn in the current year or in 1991 at the latest, the MTI reports.

Talks Conclude 2 Feb

LD0202155390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, 2 Feb (TASS)—The talks between the Soviet delegation headed by I.P. Aboimov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and the Hungarian delegation headed by F. Somogyi, state secretary of foreign affairs of the Hungarian Republic, about the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops located on Hungarian territory ended here today.

During the talks, the sides set out their positions and agreed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be carried out in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement. It was decided to continue work on the text of the agreement and the timetable for the troop withdrawal.

G. Horn, Hungarian foreign minister, received I.P. Aboimov, head of the Soviet delegation. Colonel General F.Karpati, Hungarian defense minister, received Colonel General B.A.Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Romanian Salvation Front Official Resigns

LD3001113790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent V. Vedrashko: "Trust Needed"]

[Text] Bucharest, 27 Jan—The Romanian public's attention is currently focused on two events: the trial of four former members of the country's leadership, which has now started, and the resignation of Dumitru Mazilu, first deputy chairman of the National Salvation Front [NSF] Council.

T. Postelnicu, E. Bobu, I. Dinca, and M. Manescu are facing a military tribunal in Bucharest. They are accused of participating in genocide. Here is what Romanian Prosecutor General G. Robu said the other day in connection with the trial:

"We are in a position to ensure that all individuals who have in one way or another encroached on the rights, freedom, and dignity of the Romanian people will be investigated and tried. And no one will be able to avoid responsibility. But to establish the truth you have to be meticulous and strictly follow the demands of the law. We need trust on the part of all citizens.

"Thirty-one of the top people under Ceausescu have now been arrested and are under investigation.

"As for D. Mazilu's resignation, it was, in my view, an inevitable consequence of the recent press campaign to discredit him as a politician and citizen. There is scarcely any doubt that there are forces interested in splitting the NSF leadership. Very likely they have been fueling passions. The persecution of the well known lawyer and human rights expert D. Mazilu forced him to send a letter to the media in which he writes, in particular: 'I am painfully aware that the Stalinist methods of pinning labels on people and making accusations while pounding the table with one's fist are still being used and that the press is still being used to eliminate some and promote others.'"

Former Romanian Leaders Face 'Genocide' Charges

Newspaper Previews Case

PM2601103990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Romania: Case Forwarded to Tribunal"]

[Text] Bucharest, 23 Jan—The ROMPRESS Agency reports that Romanian General Prosecutor G. Robu provided the following elucidation Monday:

In a final charge of the General Prosecutor's Office, dated 22 January 1990, it has been decided to try former leaders—E. Bobu, I. Dinca, and M. Manescu, members of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Central Committee Political Executive Committee; and also T. Postelnicu, candidate member of the RCP Central Committee Political Executive Committee and minister of the interior—for complicity in genocide.

It has been established that the accused, by means of their conduct at the Political Executive Committee sessions 17 and 22 December 1989 and also through specific actions undertaken by each of them, aided the dictators N. Ceausescu and E. Ceausescu in realizing their orders to suppress by force of arms the popular uprising in Timisoara, Bucharest, and other cities in the country.

It was reported that the case has been forwarded to Bucharest Territorial Military Tribunal.

Prosecutor Comments on Trial

PM2901130090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Romanian General Prosecutor Gheorghe Robu by own correspondent V. Volodin in Bucharest: "Romania Judges Tyrant's Henchmen"; date not given]

[Text] Bucharest—Justice will prevail, in the view of Romanian General Prosecutor Gheorghe Robu, who answered questions for IZVESTIYA's own correspondent before the start of the open trial of the first group of former high-ranking officials.

The guard has been reinforced in the hall of the old building where the prosecutor's office is located. Soldiers with mine detectors search visitors. The family of the former "boss" of Bucharest, Barbu Petrescu, a close relative of Elena Ceausescu, who is under arrest, is also here; his relatives have brought him a parcel—warm clothes, food.

My interviewee is Gheorghe Robu, general prosecutor of Romania, elected to that lofty post by his fellow lawyers as a man who, in 30 years of work in the prosecution service, did not sully himself by participating in a single one of the former regime's dubious trials.

[Volodin] I well understand that you are extremely busy, and I thank you for finding time for this talk. Let us therefore come straight to the point. Who will be the first in the dock? What charges will the prosecutor bring against them?

[Robu] We have completed investigations into the cases of four people who took part in the dictatorship's crimes. They are all former members of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Central Committee Political Executive Committee. They are Tudor Postelnicu, who held the post of minister of the interior, and also Emil Bobu, Manea Manescu, and Ion Dinca. They are being charged with genocide, with carrying out Ceausescu's orders to fire on unarmed demonstrators, which led to the tragedies in Timisoara, Bucharest, and other cities. The four also will be charged with undermining the national economy.

A huge volume of investigatory work has been done, for which purpose 60 extra lawyers had to be brought in. Each of those under investigation is guaranteed the right to defense. I think we are now moving toward the creation of a true rule-of-law state in Romania.

As for the other people who made up Ceausescu's immediate entourage, as well as the members of his family, the investigation is not yet complete. I can say, for instance, that one of the charges against Nicu Ceausescu (the dictator's son) could be that of undermining the national economy. The charge is based not so much on the assets found in his possession as on what he did in the important posts he held. Furthermore, as candidate member of the Central Committee Political Executive Committee and regional RCP first secretary, he gave the order in Sibiu City to "shoot without warning," which contains the elements of a genocide charge.

[Volodin] Is it possible that Nicu Ceausescu still hopes to avoid punishment, or believes that there are forces, perhaps those same terrorists (after all, they have not all been arrested!) who will free him?

[Robu] I do not know; I do not really care what he thinks. What we want is to investigate his activity with the utmost seriousness, thoroughness, attentiveness, and impartiality, and to send the case to court. As for the terrorists, I do not think there is a force in existence now that is capable of changing the course of Romanian history by means of terror.

[Volodin] But who are they, in fact, these terrorists? On the evening of 21 December, in the square in front of the Intercontinental Hotel, I saw armed people in military uniforms, militia uniforms, and the coveralls of the so-called antiterrorist subunit. Which of them were killing the demonstrators? Who was fighting against the people even after the tyrant had fled?

[Robu] We will find out in time. We are conducting an investigation, but, if you will excuse me, the details are official secrets at the moment. I will only say that the prosecutor's office is making every effort to expose those who were shooting at the people then. They could be from various troop subunits. When we have completed the investigation into the case of the last detained terrorist, we will present our conclusions to Romanian and international public opinion. In any case, the truth will triumph. I want to say one thing: We are not taking vengeance on anyone.

The trials will take place with all due respect for the legal norms that are accepted in civilized countries. As you know, the death penalty has been abolished in Romania. As a lawyer, I believe that life imprisonment is also an exceptionally severe punishment.

[Volodin] What form should the prosecutor's office take, in your opinion, in a free Romania?

[Robu] The article of the Constitution that will define its place in the state's legal structure is now being drawn up. I hope we lawyers will at last lose the inappropriate functions that we carried out under the dictatorship, and be able to do our job. The prosecutor's office will become a flexible body that is independent of administrative and political pressure and answers to the people.

Trial's Outcome Reported

LD0202224290 Moscow TASS in English 2228 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest February 2 TASS—The Romanian dictator's aides Tudor Postelnicu, Emil Bobu, Ion Dinca and Manea Manescu were sentenced to life imprisonment, with their personal property to be confiscated, by the military tribunal today.

Apart from the maximum punishment under the criminal code of the country, the defendants have been stripped of service grades and civil rights.

"The defendants, who have for many years held top party and state posts, are guilty of the bloody suppression of insurgent people," the public prosecutor said in the indictment. They were accomplices in the genocide because they approved the dictator-suggested repressions. Although they were able to prevent them from being adopted and implemented.

Bobu directly participated in taking the decision to burn down corpses of demonstrators killed in Timisoara, of whom it was later announced that they "fled abroad."

Dinca was instrumental in taking to Timisoara 20,000 "patriotic guards" to suppress the insurgent residents.

Postelnicu, as the interior minister, bears responsibility for repressions in Timisoara and Bucharest. Moreover, he was personally involved in beating demonstrators in Bucharest on December 21-22.

Lawyers in their speeches tried to substantiate the statement that their clients were only instruments in dictator Ceaucescu's hands, that they did not take independent actions to carry through the decisions dictated to them, and cited various extenuating circumstances.

All defendants pleaded guilty and were repentant. All of them, but Dinca, asked the tribunal for mercy and wanted to appeal against the sentence.

Shevardnadze Meets With Romanian Ambassador

LD0302130990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, today received Vasile Sandru, Romanian ambassador in the USSR, at the latter's request.

Topical issues concerning Soviet-Romanian relations were touched upon during the conversation. It was noted that broad opportunities for further development of cooperation between the two countries in various spheres had been created in the new conditions as a result of the revolutionary transformations in Romania.

Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that people in the Soviet Union wish success to the Romanian people in the cause of the democratic renewal of the country, and in overcoming the difficulties arising along that road. Respect for its freedom of choice and nonacceptance of interference in the internal affairs of Romania or of attempts to destabilize the situation in the country are an important condition.

Mutual interest was confirmed in active interaction between the USSR and Romania in the international arena in the interests of strengthening security, confidence, and cooperation in Europe and throughout the world.

Changes in Romania's National Salvation Front

LD0402101690 Moscow TASS in English 0803 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest February 4 TASS—By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Dyakov:

A session of the National Salvation Front of Romania was held here on Saturday. From now on it will be part of the recently formed Provisional National Unity Council consisting of 90 members—active supporters of the National Salvation Front from among prominent scientists, cultural personalities, workers, peasants, young people, students and representatives of national minorities, and as many representatives of the newly formed political parties. It will be a kind of a two-chamber "mini-parliament" whose membership can be increased along with the creation of new parties.

A meeting held on Saturday by leaders of local branches of the National Salvation Front Council decided to introduce a similar structure for local organisations. Thus, the National Salvation Front has been turned into a political organisation with an independent structure and platform which will take part in elections on equal terms with other political parties.

Silviu Brukan, member of the Provisional National Unity Council, told TASS by telephone that the main task of the Council which will operate until a new parliament and the country's president are elected is preparation for the forthcoming elections and the creation of a favourable climate for a normal economic, social and cultural life in the country. National Salvation Front councils at enterprises and organisations will discontinue their activities. Only trade union organisations will remain there, Brukan said.

The first plenary meeting of the Provisional National Unity Council will be held on February 9, this year.

PRAVDA on Romanian Economic Recovery Effort

PM2601143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Special correspondents V. Vedrashko, Ye. Spekhov, and A. Sharyy dispatch: "Not By Rallies Alone"]

[Text] Bucharest, January—Well-known scientist Professor Alexandru Birladeanu, member of the National Salvation Front [NSF] Council, has described what is now happening in Romanian industry as the elimination of the consequences of economic megalomania.

The old regime left many unprofitable industrial giants without power and raw materials. Investment policy, which resulted in unwarranted losses of vast funds, was ineffective. Statistics were false. For instance, according to figures for plan fulfillment for the first 11 months last year, the quantity of industrial output produced was overstated by 93 billion lei and the figure for exports for convertible currency was "exaggerated" by 392 billion lei. Of course, Romania does not currently have a substantial foreign debt. But only the Romanian people know what this achievement has cost them.

Former "successes" have now become problems. How can one begin to resolve them? The new leadership's first steps have already defined quite clearly the direction of the movement—reorientation of the economy to social needs.

A palpable improvement in people's life is a priority aim. The leadership of Romania's Ministry of the National Economy has concentrated its efforts on elaborating a program for the first quarter. Its purpose is to reduce the negative consequences of the acute shortage of power and resources. A considerable proportion of them have been channeled into housing and utilities. This will naturally entail a reduction in production at some metallurgical, machine building, and chemical enterprises.

Is there a way out of this abnormal situation? Romanian economists and experts in the sphere of foreign economic ties see it as follows: first, increasing electricity and gas imports; second, using available free capacities to fulfill orders from those foreign partners who supply Romania with raw materials, semimanufactures, and power. There are, of course, also other proposals aimed at extricating the economy from the crisis. They include developing sectors that have proved their relative effectiveness and renouncing the attempt to produce everything by their own efforts.

At present you rarely hear the word "plan" here. The point is that the main development indicators for the immediate future are not of a directive but of an approximate nature. People here believe that it will thus be easier to ensure flexibility and maneuverability in the process of stabilizing the economy. Looking somewhat ahead, the leadership of the Ministry of the National Economy asserts that only after complete stabilization will it be possible to embark on all-embracing economic liberalization. Then there will also be conditions for discussing the principles of switching to a market economy.

Realizing that the country's economic system cannot be changed overnight, the NSF is actively engaged in seeking ways to gradually transform it in a systematic but rapid fashion. In other words, the former economic carcass is being given a different social and political substance. P. Roman, head of the Romanian Government, said that the revolution's task is to give people the right to political initiative. But it is hard to square current turbulent political life racked with unrest with an economy whose pace is akin to that of a clock operating on a totally dead battery.

"We have made our choice once and for all not to draw former officials who served Ceausescu into the government," an NSF leader said in a television interview. "However, there are very many competent people among those who worked with him. We need them." The revolution is resolving the eternal question: How can old cadres be used while there is a shortage of new ones.

The incumbent leadership realizes that the revolution is entering the constructive phase and it is well known that construction is not equivalent to demolition. Political authority is only just finding its feet and NSF councils are still being formed in the localities, and they are the ones who must ensure conditions for the more or less normal operation of enterprises.

These questions are not resolved solely "from above." The authorities are of course adopting decrees but things get done a long way from offices.

We set off for the Bucharest Heavy Equipment Plant—one of the country's largest enterprises employing 15,000 people, skilled people who particularly support the cause.

Engineer metallurgist Nicolae Doycescu is the head of the plant's NSF council. The council building is extremely humble—bare walls, two tables, and four chairs.

"How are relations shaping up with the administration?"

"The former leaders have been left running the plant," Doycescu said. "The council is not interfering in their work. If contentious issues arise, we try to resolve them peacefully and seek compromises."

"For instance?"

"In the heavy casting workshop, most workers demanded that the boss be replaced. We studied the situation and decided that this was a fair demand. But the administration opposed this. Then we appealed to the NSF council in our sector (rayon) of the city The conflict was settled."

"How was the front council formed at the plant?"

"The workers themselves chose the best prestigious people."

"Just workers?"

"No," Nicolae answered. "Why are there no good engineers or workshop chiefs?"

"Are there former Romanian Communist Party members on the council?"

"We have the following criteria: competence and honesty. We try to prevent any discrimination. If workers elect a former communist, that means he is a worthy person."

"Do you tackle production questions?"

"So far as they are connected with front tasks. While there was fighting in the city, the front council organized a guard for the enterprise because there are tanks at the plant containing explosives. When buses and trolleys stopped because of snow and frost in the city, they dealt with the matter of taking people to their place of work."

"What concerns you now?"

"The plant's power supply has been halved; therefore, people have been released. Cadres must be redistributed. This naturally provokes dissatisfaction; it is not always possible to find the correct solution straightaway."

Doycescu believes on the whole that the main task is to ensure normal working both at the enterprise and in the country as a whole. It has already been decided to change investment policy and this means that some major industrial facilities will be frozen and, consequently, some production units at the plant will have to be retooled. Following the revolution, the plant became independent. At present it is directly subordinate to the ministry. We can now organize ties with the outside world, Doycescu said. We can plan what we will produce ourselves. This opens up new greater opportunities for effective cooperation with the USSR.

It was not only the plant that won independence. People began to think more boldly and more freely.

"The council is trying to operate," the engineer said, "to ensure that political emotions do not have an impact on the enterprise's work. All problems cannot be resolved by rallies. But, unfortunately, not everyone realizes this. Some people believe that everything can be achieved by means of threats and force alone."

"Must they be persuaded?"

Doycescu shrugged his shoulders.

"There's enough work to do. I run from workshop to workshop. People now have very great trust in front representatives."

Politics always goes hand in hand with the economy. The NSF is urging its organizations at a local level to conduct a policy of constructive participation rather than exerting pressure through command when resolving economic problems. This is because it realizes that the task of the moment is to keep production "afloat," retaining old structures, endowing them, where possible, with new substance, and relieving them of unwarranted restrictions. After all, a complex economic organism requires delicate surgical intervention rather than the butcher's knife. Of course, at present the surgeons are not too experienced, but they do not lack persistence and a desire to reach their goal.

TASS Reviews CSSR Changes Since Election

LD2901151390 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] Prague January 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Rzhevsky:

The month that has passed since new President Vaclav Havel was elected, has seen numerous changes in Czechoslovak society.

New social and political structures, including the "Civic Forum", nominate their members to leading posts in central and local power bodies, public organisations and enterprises.

At the state level this is done after consultations with major political forces, but at the local level the dialogue is often replaced with pressure and defamation of former leaders. Similar things happened 20 years ago to supporters of reforms.

People are assessing the past two decades with difficulty, Brno scientist B. Cada believes. The majority are critical about this time. Great opportunities to restructure economy and politics have been missed.

Former Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal agrees with Cada. He thinks that instead of developing the idea of democratic socialism, Czechoslovakia has been building a neo-Stalinist model of Socialism since 1970. The main reason for all failures was the instructive method of implementing the Czechoslovak communist party's leading role and the former leadership's unwillingness to fulfil actual reforms.

The present Czechoslovak Government is speeding up political transformations and only now begins to carry out economic reforms. Possibilities to attract foreign capital in the country's economy are expanding.

President Havel has put forward a legislative initiative to exclude the world "socialist" from the name of the republic. The government approved his proposal. Such a change suits the majority of Czechoslovak political forces. Names are not important, participants in the roundtable negotiations believe.

In contrast to negotiations beween major political forces in Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak roundtable is special. The media rarely publish a brief communique on its results. The public do not know who participates in the negotiations and represents their political parties.

Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Jiri Machalik told TASS he is not informed about the content of the roundtable and preliminary agreements elaborated there. Spokesman for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Political Executive Committee Josef Hora said that the close character of the negotiations is the result of an agreement between their participants.

Dozens of new political parties, public organisations and clubs have announced their formation over the past month. Trade unions are in crisis. The church is on the rise. The Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama and Pope John Paul II are expected to visit Czechoslovakia. Numerous high ranking officials are visiting Prague.

There seems little doubt that the general elections next summer will begin a new stage of Czechoslovak reforms.

Havel Slated To Visit in Late February

LD0102162390 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel will visit the Soviet Union late in February by mutual arrangement.

West Europe

Soviet Warships End Visit to Greece

PM3001161190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin: "Goodbye, Piraeus"]

[Text] The official visit to the Greek port of Piraeus by a detachment of Soviet warships under the flag of Admiral M. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, is over. There were meetings between sailors of the two countries, friendly talks, and visits to historical sites in ancient Hellas. The visit proceeded successfully in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The detachment has left the hospitable port.

Documents on Tsar's 'Murder' Up For Auction

LD0202202890 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] London February 2 TASS—By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Voskoboinikov:

Documents throwing light on the circumstances of the murder of Tsar Nicholas the Second and members of his family are to be auctioned out at Sotheby's.

Sotheby's managers reported that a niece of Price Vladimir Nikolayevich Orlov had turned over to the firm the archives of Nikolay Sokolov, an officer who investigated the events in Yekaterinburg after the city was seized by White guards.

Sotheby's has circulated photocopies of a telegram that was sent to Moscow by Beloborodov, who arranged the murder.

The telegram was addressed to Gorbunov, secretary of the Soviet of people's commissars and marked "confirm reception."

The text of the telegram, when deciphered, reads as follows: "Please inform Sverdlov that the entire tsar's family shared the lot of its head. It is to be officially reported that the family disappeared during the evacuation."

Sokolov had succeeded in collecting other materials. Analysis of one of the documents indicated that the bodies of the executed were destroyed by sulphuric acid.

The whereabouts of Sokolov's archives have long been unknown. During emigration he continued his research with the financial backing by Orlov, the tsar's former driver, who settled down in France and deposited the archives in a bank.

He did not reveal the contents of the documents to his relatives but said that he possessed "explosive papers."

The documents from Sokolov's archives will be sold at Sotheby's on April 5. The Sotheby's administration believes they may fetch 300-500 thousand sterling.

Latin America & Caribbean

Bogomolov Denies Arms Delivered to Region

LD0302023990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2345 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS)—"As we confirmed to a PRAVDA correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry, the well-known decision made by the Soviet Union by agreement with Managua to suspend arms deliveries to the Nicaraguan Government is in force to this day in full measure and without any divergences. As far as the equipment which is currently arriving in Nicaragua under protocols on trade is concerned, it is exclusively civilian equipment in specification and direct designation."

This is stated in a rejoinder written by Pavel Bogomolov and published in PRAVDA today: "False Alarm or Simply a Provocation?" His article was occasioned by press reports that appeared in a number of countries a few days ago. These reports asserted that military helicopters manufactured in the USSR and destined for the Sandinist People's Army had allegedly been disembarked at the Nicaraguan port of Corinto this week.

The REUTER agency, the ABC television company, and certain other mass information media which are spreading these reports," writes P. Bogomolov, "have drawn what is clearly a hasty conclusion—that the Soviet Union is supposedly violating its own obligations to assist the peace settlement in Central America, obligations which have been affirmed repeatedly, including in Malta."

The author considers that the timing of such published material's release and the airing of the television programs was not coincidental. "The sensation which has been created is clearly connected with the approaching date of the Nicaraguan general elections, 25 February. The fallacious aim of those who started the canard about combat helicopters is obvious: It is accusing Moscow of attempting, by means of its arms deliveries, to wreck the democratization process in Nicaragua, and simultaneously destabilize the situation throughout the Central American region."

Brazil's President-Elect Collor Concludes Visit

Attends Lunch With Lukyanov

PM0202151390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "New Stage of Cooperation"]

[Text] A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, gave a luncheon 31 January in honor of Brazilian President-elect F. Collor, who is in Moscow as a guest of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

With reference to bilateral relations, the sides noted the need to develop them further with a view to raising Soviet-Brazilian cooperation to a qualitatively new level in keeping with the two countries' potential. It was noted that the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Brazilian National Congress have an important role to play in the process of deepening understanding between the two countries' peoples. It was stressed in this context that the Soviet side attaches great importance to the upcoming visit of a Brazilian parliamentary delegation to the USSR.

The luncheon passed in an amicable, warm atmosphere.

It was attended on the Soviet side A.S. Dzasokhov, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs; A.A. Ananyev, deputy chairman of the Committee; V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister; and L.F. Kuzmin, USSR ambassador to Brazil.

On the Brazilian side the luncheon was attended by Sebastiao do Rego Barros Netto, Brazilian ambassador to the USSR, and the officials accompanying the president.

Addresses Academy of Sciences

PY0302234690 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 2 Feb 90 p 4

[By Luiz Recena]

[Excerpts] Moscow—In the government of President-elect Fernando Collor, Brazilian scientists, invited by the Soviet Union, will be able to participate in the construction of a new nuclear reactor. The cooperation proposal was the most significant result of Collor's visit to Moscow, which concluded yesterday. The importance of the proposal was emphasized by Brazilian Ambassador to the USSR Sebastiao do Rego Barros. He explained that this is the first concrete offer by the USSR for another country to participate in the new reactor project—a joint venture involving the USSR, the United States, Japan, and the EEC. Only the signatories of the first agreement can invite new partners.

The president-elect, who is now in Dusseldorf, West Germany, on the first leg of his European tour, wants to do business and engage in cooperation projects with the USSR. [passage omitted]

After a speech to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Collor talked for about 1 hour with the leaders of that most important of Soviet scientific institutions. This institution is so important that each of its five [as published] vice-presidents has the rank of a secretary of state. The talk began when the president-elect asked what type of high technology the USSR could transfer to Brazil in the fields of environment, industrial pollution, and energy.

"We have a number of technologies that would be useful for Brazil, technologies that can yield positive results," responded Yevgeniy Velikhov, one of the vice-presidents. Guriy Marchuk [president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences], who has already visited Brazil, was not in Moscow.

The talk ended with concrete suggestions for cooperation between the USSR and Brazil in the fields of information science, metallurgy of noble metals, educational television, ecology, and environment. [passage omitted]

Collor invited the Soviet scientists to attend the World Congress on Environment and Development, scheduled for 1992 in Brazil, and to visit Carajas and other mining areas in Amazonia, and to visit other sectors in which there can be bilateral cooperation. The Soviets accepted enthusiastically. [passage omitted]

At Shemeretevo International Airport, the president-elect was accompanied by the same official who met him first, Anatoliy Lukyanov, the first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Also present were Soviet Ambassador to Brazil Leonid Kuzmin and [Brazilian Ambassador to the Soviet Union] Sebastiao de Rego Barros.

Collor's youth delighted and charmed Moscow residents, who mainly monitored his visit over the radios, which gave details on the activities of the illustrious guest. The television and the newspapers also dedicated much space to the president-elect. His fondness of sports, his two races through the Hills of Lenin—where he resided—and his walks through the street made Collor a popular man in Moscow, whose residents will comment for a few days to come on his visit, the first one by a president-elect of a country outside the socialist bloc. [passage omitted]

Central Committee Plenum

'100,000' Plus Rally in Moscow on Eve of Plenum

AU0402140690 Paris AFP in English 1123 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 4 (AFP)—More than 100,000 demonstrators were converging Sunday on a square next to the Kremlin in a show of support for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and further democratisation in the country.

At the head of the procession was a group shouting "Down with the KGB" and "Down with the Central Committee"—respectively the security services and the Communist Party's parliament-like body which was to meet Monday to discuss wide-ranging reforms, journalists reported. Others were shouting "Down with (Yegor) Ligachev," the leader of the conservative faction within the ruling politburo. Leaflets distributed in the underground (subway) accused Mr. Ligachev "and his clique" of wanting to seize power. Banners read: "Freedom for Mikhail Gorbachev," "The law above the party, not the party above the law" and "Beware of pogroms," a reference to rumours here of possible attacks against Jews by conservative elements.

A number of reform-minded deputies, including party maverick Boris Yeltsin, were due to attend the rally which, police said, had been authorized.

Some demonstrators also carried placards calling for repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution which gives the Communist Party a guaranteed monopoly on power. This is one of the subjects likely to be discussed at the two-day Central Committee plenary meeting.

The demonstration was called by a number of informal organisations, including the Moscow Association of Electors, the Moscow Popular Front, Memorial and the union of servicemen called Shield. But in what appeared to be official sanctioning, Radio Moscow announced Saturday it would go ahead and some workers in the procession told AFP they had been told of the rally at their factory over loud-speakers.

Supportive, Critical of Gorbachev

AU0402163790 Paris AFP in English 1529 GMT 4 Feb 90

[By Anne Penketh]

[Excerpts] Moscow, Feb 4 (AFP)—More than 100,000 Moscow radicals joined forces Sunday to march on the Kremlin in an anti-conservative rally ahead of a crucial Central Committee plenary session called to chart the Communist Party's future. One organiser, radical Deputy Yuriy Afanasyev, told a reporter that the huge demonstration which wound up at Manezhnaya Square outside the Kremlin was against "the rightists" and in support of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, "but also critical" of him. "The people want him to go faster and deeper with reform," Mr. Afanasyev said.

The demonstration, reminiscent of recent large rallies in Eastern Europe, was the largest political gathering to be held in central Moscow. Although it was organised by unofficial organisations, Moscow Radio had, in an unusual step, publicised the event in advance, and some participants said they had been informed of the rally by loudspeakers at work, indicating involvement by party authorities. [passage omitted]

Radical Deputy Boris Yeltsin, himself a Central Committee member, told the rally that the plenum was "the last chance to democratise the Communist Party." In comments to an American television network he added that the two-day session of the policy-making body was "Mikhail Gorbachev's last chance". [passage omitted]

Mr. Yeltsin outlined a five-point platform to enthusiastic applause, saying he would try to present it to the plenum on Monday. The deputy, supported by many banners in Sunday's march, notably demanded that the congress should be held in May or June. He said the congress delegates should be elected in secret ballots. Mr. Yeltsin, who criticised the Central Committee's record of "half measures and compromises" under Mr. Gorbachev, demanded "a democratic platform within the party" to replace the "formal unity" defended by his conservative arch-rival Mr. Ligachev.

The demonstrators had assembled in bright sunshine outside Gorky park, then set off along the Moscow ring road, some chanting "down with the KGB" secret police and "down with the Central Committee" before turning into Gorky street and heading towards the Kremlin. The marchers, watched by thousands of police, had originally intended to stop outside Moscow town hall, but microphones were hastily dismantled from a platform there as it became clear that there was not enough room for the advancing crowds. The procession took more than an hour to file into Manezh Square.

Banners and slogans were widely varied, as were the groups taking part which ranged from anarchists and the Democratic Union, set up as a political party to challenge the communist party's supremacy, to a group of Hare Krishna sect members. Some banners demanded the abolition of the party's monopoly on power, while many called for Mr. Ligachev's resignation. "72 years on the road to nowhere," said one openly anti-communist banner. Another read: "Give everybody in the politburo a 2-room apartment in Mytishchiy", a Moscow suburb, in an ironic reference to privileges enjoyed by the party elite.

As the rally wore on, and the crowd began to thin out, some speakers adopted a more radical tone, with Deputy Telman Gdlian calling for "Gorbachev and his friend Ligachev" to resign. The call was greeted by approving chants of "resign, resign".

According to Mr. Afanasyev, Mr. Gorbachev stood no danger of losing his post as party general secretary at the forthcoming plenum. But he added that the rally was needed "to give a clear message to the plenum's participants". [passage omitted]

'Unity of All Democratic Forces'

LD0402165190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Unity of all the democratic forces—this was the motto of a rally that took place today in Moscow. Our correspondents Aleksandr Zhetvin and Irina Chirkova report on the event.

[Zhetvin] I would like to say, first of all, that, although I have lived in Moscow for years, I have never seen such crowds of people in my life in Moscow. The rally was to have taken place at Sovietskaya Square, opposite the Mossoviet [Moscow City Soviet]. The procession advanced from Krymskaya Embankment. But so many people arrived at Sovietskaya Square that organizers of the rally had to move it here, to 50th Anniversary of October Square. Thousands, thousands upon thousands of people! True, instead of the stationary platform that was built at Sovietskaya Square, a truck has been brought here and people are speaking from this makeshift platform.

[Chirkova] Apart from those people whose social and political activity we all know very well, on the platform today we see faces not very familiar to us journalists. But the words they utter are words of people for whom a democratic and free society is of highest value.

[Zhetvin] They include representatives of clubs of electors, representatives of party clubs; i.e. those who are concerned over the progress of perestroyka.

[Chirkova] The appeal and the response of the whole square, of all the men present on the square, was the highest emotional peak of the meeting taking place here, at Manezhnaya Square. All men took off their hats....

[Zhetvin, interrupting] Yes, that was very moving, when organizers of the rally called on them to take off their hats in memory of the Tbilisi victims and the victims of the Transcaucasian events in Baku and other spots. All the people on the square took off their hats. And that was a sort of unity, a desire to prevent similar things from ever happening again.

[Chirkova] I see that Nikolay Ilyich Travkin, USSR people's deputy who has just spoken, is leaving the platform.

[Travkin] First of all, I regard this rally as the unification of society's healthy forces, of forces fighting for democracy. This is the main goal. The second goal is to push forward the course of events and to accelerate perestroyka. There have been prophecies and croaking of late that political awareness is in decline and the people do not care about anything but sausages. Nothing of the sort! Today, the people live not by sausage alone. We are witnessing precisely this.

[Chirkova] Thank you, Nikolay Ilyich. (Oleg Germanovich Rumyantsev) is a candidate Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy. (Oleg Germanovich), you said that you had walked the entire road with the column, from Krymskaya Embankment to Manezhnaya Square. What can you say about people's feelings?

[(Rumyantsev)] We formed our social-democratic column—I am a co-chairman of the Social-Democratic Association founded at a congress in Tallin. Of course, there was a variety of slogans but, on the whole, I can compare the general elan only with what I witnessed recently, in late December, in Berlin, both in West and East, when the Wall was being pulled down. The intensity, the emotional tension and the general joy were about the same. That is what I can say, in general.

[Chirkova] (Oleg Germanovich), in your view, was it a crowd or people united by an idea?

[(Rumyantsev)] I would put it the following way: The people's transformation into society is taking place every minute before our eyes today. Those people who are standing on the sidelines are the crowd, but those who leave the sidelines and join the column are making a step toward society.

[Chirkova] Thank you.

[Zhetvin] Many various positions and platforms have been put forward at this rally, which has lasted for many hours. Some are controversial, others are indisputable, in our view. But they have one thing in common—a desire to speed up perestroyka, a desire to unite all the democratic forces in the fight against those forces which are hindering perestroyka.

'Sanctioned Mass March'

LD0402200190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1910 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 4 Feb (TASS)—A sanctioned mass march and rally were held in Moscow today. The participants proceeded from Krymskaya Naberezhnaya along Sadovoye Koltso and Gorkiy Street as far as 50-letiye Oktyabrya Square, where, according to a rough estimate, about 200,000 people took part in a meeting. Speaking at the meeting were, among others, USSR's People's Deputies Vitaliy Korotich, Nikolay Travkin, Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Telman Gdlyan, Yuriy Afanasyev, and many candidate people's deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

The organizer of these events was the so-called bloc of democratic forces, but the most varied informal associations took part in them—from the Moscow voters' club to the "Social- Democratic Party," from the "Memorial" society to the "Monarchists." The variegated composition of the participants also predetermined the varied content of the slogans and speeches at the meeting. There were also businesslike, sensible speeches. The calculation on unanimous support for ultraradical demands did not come off—Muscovites did not support them.

But, unfortunately, the tone was still set by those whose so- called "constructive program" can be reduced to the endlessly repeated call "Down with!" Down with this, down with that, and what in exchange? In essence—nothing useful for society, or for perestroyka. Among the ranks of those at the meeting, there were also the sort who take extreme positions, and in their speeches they essentially exposed themselves as extremists who are not at all concerned about the destiny of perestroyka and renewal, but who have decided to exploit the rostrum of the meeting for direct pressure on the public, on the authorities. The meeting, at first presented as support for democratic processes in society, was in actual fact turned by them into a a means of pressure and blackmail. Preparations for this mass event have been conducted against a backdrop of various absurd rumors about possible pogroms and riots.

It seems that the struggle against pogroms should start, first of all, with refraining from calls for any pogroms. Unfortunately, however, many speakers forgot this truth. Individual speeches had the mark of the striving of some groupings to initiative struggle for political power. Thus, it was stated that the number of those assembled was enough for "storming the Winter Palace or the Lubyanka."

Such extremist utterances were not supported by the majority of participants in the rally. At the same time, one cannot fail to mention how dangerous, if not fateful, calls for violence may prove, and to what extent they are fraught with inpredictability and a tragic nature of progress of events—along a totally different path and not for the sake of the noble goals which the demonstration and the rally seemed to have pursued initially. And those who organize similar actions should be aware of the whole measure of responsibility they take upon themselves when they propagandize calls for extremists acts and destabilization. The country knows only too well today the price to be paid for someone's irresponsibility and instigation.

One should note that many people came to the rally thinking that it was organized in support of the policy of perestroyka. But when its prevailing destructive orientation started showing itself, people started to disperse gradually.

'Democracy, More Democracy'

LD0402214890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev; correspondent Shashkov video report from Moscow rally on 4 February]

[Excerpts] [Sagalayev] I'd now like to draw to your attention the correspondent's report from the meeting, promised earlier in the program:

[Begin video recording] [Shashkov] Not even Manege Square could contain all those taking part in the meeting. Gorkiy Street, too, was inundated with people brought here by concern for the fate of restructuring. They were united—and there were the most varied political tendancies at the meeting, from Democratic Communists to Anarcho-Syndicalists and Krishna Consciousness disciples—by the Democratic Platform in the CPSU and the desire to repel the nationalism and chauvinism that have recently appeared in the guise of the Pamyat Society:

[Shashkov to young man holding black flag with a red star in the center] What's this flag?

[Unidentified Man] It's the flag of the confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists.

[Second Unidentified Man] We have great differences of opinion with, say, the interregional group, but we agreed to come to this meeting together to demonstrate our opposition to Fascism and ultimately our displeasure at the policies of the ruling nomenklatura.

[Shashkov] Not lack of trust in the party on the eve of its Central Committee plenum, but lack of trust in that part of the party apparat which it is customary here to call right-wing conservative, they said from the rostrum at the meeting:

[Shashkov to a third unidentified man] What has brought you to the meeting today?

[Third Unidentified Man] Our common objective.

[Shashkov] What objective?

[Third Man] To unite and demonstrate our strength against the Party....[clarifies thought] not the party but-....[prompted by indistinct female voice] that's right. Against the apparat and in favor of democratic elections. Of course, we too are in favor of our democratic system, our democratic system.

[Shashkov] Democracy, more democracy. This is precisely what people want and precisely what they expect of tomorrow's CPSU Central Committee plenum.

[Unidentified elderly man] I think that the resolution of the plenum should, at least, be a wise one: Restructuring in the country and restructuring in the party, of course. Without it, without restructuring of both, there'll be no restructuring at all.

[Unidentified woman] We all expect our lives to change for the better.

[Shashkov] What do you expect from tomorrow's plenum?

[Fourth unidentified man] Something good will come of it.

[Shashkov] Only good?

[Fourth man] That's right.

[Second unidentified woman] I hope that the government will show reason and that the Central Committee plenum will take what we have to say into account after all. [passage omitted: Yevtushenko declaims a poem to The Children of Culture, stressing that we are all in favour of freedom, but only of a certain type of freedom] [Video shows meeting in Manege Square; militia cordon; slogans denouncing chauvinism, Pamyat and fascism; closeups of interviewees; speaker on rostrum with Korotich behind him; many different flats to be seen; more interviewees; Kremlin in background; Yevtushenko on the rostrum] [end recording]

[Sagalayev] Well, then: Different people and different points of view on the events that have taken place today and the different political forces that took part in them. I don't think we will understand all this so easily, and no doubt some time will pass before we realise the profundity and importance of the processes under way today. I should like to join my voice sincerely to the wishes that were heard in our correspondent's interviews, aimed at those taking part in the CPSU Central Committee plenum to be held tomorrow and to the desires for fruitful, constructive work to the good of our party, people and democracy.

'Major Demonstration'

LD0402202690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev]

[Text] Good evening! Tomorrow a CPSU Central Committee plenum opens. The world's news agencies have been telling their audiences all week to expect something very significant in the political life of the Soviet Union to occur. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had to publicly deny rumors that he would leave the post of party leader at the plenum. Indeed, in the past week one of the most powerful recent outbursts of civic activity of people has taken place. Here is the news I received from our correspondent:

[Unidentified correspondent] A major demonstration of democratic forces took place in Moscow today. You probably remember the recent informal demonstrations in the capital on 7 November and on Human Rights Day—we told you about them in our program. Once again, as then, it was the Moscow People's Front, the Association of Voters, Memorial, the Moscow Party Club and other public movements that acted as initiators of today's action. But by comparison even with those well-attended processions, this one has brought together immeasurably more people. The capital has probably never seen anything like it since the first years after the revolution. [video shows street march, many placards]

For the first time, thousands of communists, representatives of Party organizations, have joined the ranks of an informal demonstration in an organized way. They marched in the combined column of the CPSU Democratic Platform. Such a demonstration has been permitted for the first time right in the center of Moscow. Originally it was envisaged as a rebuff to chauvinist right-wing conservative forces which are trying to destabilize the situation in the country, and calling for a return to a strong hand. But in fact it has gone far beyond the framework of that aim. Representatives of the most varied organizations, sometimes far apart from one another in aims, have gone into the streets with placards which speak of their mood better than anyone could say.

Whatever the variety of slogans, one thing is clear: People have no desire to remain on the sidelines when the fate of the country, their fate, is being decided. This has been an action in defense of perestroyka, in defense of Gorbachev, in defense of democracy, of the rights and peace of citizens. Amid the ranks of demonstrators there were members of Pamyat and groups like it, but note that this time they could not bring themselves to raise their Black Hundreds slogans. [video shows several placards with anti-Pamyat slogans]

The stream of people passed for about two hours along the Sadovoye Koltso and Ulitsa Gorkogo to the center of Moscow, with more fresh groups of demonstrators joining in all the time. It very quickly became clear that Sovetskaya Ploshchad, in front of the Moscow Soviet building, where a meeting was to have been held, would not be able to accommodate tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of people, and then it was decided to relocate it to the Kremlin walls, to the square in front of the Manege. We will tell you later about what happened at the meeting. [video shows the following prominent slogans among those on banners and placards carried by demosntrators:

"Union of Democratic Forces Named After A.D. Sakharov";
"For Recognition and a Guarantee [words indistinct] of Human Rights! [Words Indistinct] A.D. Sakharov";
"Army! You Must Not Shoot At Your Own People!"
"Whose Side Are You On, Mikhail Sergeyevich!?"
"Until 1917 the Russian Workers Was Among the Highest Paid in the World. Why Is He Now the Lowest?"—other side of same placard—"The Soviet Worker Has Nothing To Lose But Poverty";
"Chauvinism Is The Last Straw for the Partocracy";
"Gorbachev—Yes, Ligachev, Yazov—No"; (ligachev's and yazov's names are crossed out);
"Remember Fascism—Let's Ban Pamyat";
"No To Ethnic Discord";
"We Demand a Television Relay of the Plenum";
"We Shall Support Gorbachev";
"Bring The Instigators of Civil War To Book!"
"Democratic Platform in the CPSU";
"Party Apparatus, Return the 20 Billion Addition in Your Pay to the People";
"Dinosaurs of The Partocracy—Retire!"

"The Law Above the Party, and Not the Party Above the Law!"
"Russians, Unite!"
"Pamyat, Come To Your Senses: the Partocracy Is The Common Enemy!"
"Shame on The High-Up Patrons and Sponsors of Pamyat";
Placard with road sign for no right turn depicted at top—"Mikhail Sergeyevich, Halt! You Are Violating the Highway Code"

Supports Perestroyka

LD0402171490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev]

[Excerpts] [Sagalayev] Good evening. Tomorrow a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opens. All week the world news agencies have been trying to get their audiences to expect something very significant in the political life of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had to publicly deny rumors alleging that he would leave the post of party leader at the plenum.

Last week one of the most powerful recent outbursts of activity of democratically minded forces of the party and society took place. A very large rally in defense of perestroyka and Gorbachev, in defense of democracy, rights and calm for citizens is taking place in Moscow today, literally at this very minute. Our mobile television stations are set up in the squares and streets, and I can see here on the screen.... [changes thought] Our correspondent Aleksandr Shashkov should appear now, and we'll try to organize a live report from this rally. Aleksandr, can you hear me? [video pans over large crowd waving banners, some red, some blue, others placards with illegible slogans]

[Shashkov] Yes, I can hear you.

[Sagalayev] Yes, now I can see you and hear you, too. Tell us, please, about how many people are taking part in this rally, do you think?

[Shashkov] There were very many people here, several thousand. Now basically the procession has already set off for the square in front of Mossovet [Moscow Town Soviet], so not so many people are left here, but I think that very many will join the procession as it passes.

[Sagalayev] What do you mean by several thousand?

[Shashko] I think that there were about 10,000 people here, approximately, by the modest calculation. Anyway, there were very many people here.

[Sagalayev] So what is the nature of this rally? Is it really, as I said, a rally of democratic forces in support of perestroyka, in support of....

[Shashko, interrupting] Yes, basically there were placards here in support of, and there were speeches in support of, perestroyka; but nevertheless I noticed that there was a plethora of the most varied placards. Among other things there were slogans ranging from monarchist to anarcho-syndicalist ones, and it seems to me that—well of course—the majority were democratic slogans, even though I did get the impression sometimes that very many groups had decided to make use of this rally, simply to state their platform at the approach of the elections.
[Sagalayev] Their existence, too?
[Shashko] Their existence, certainly.
[Sagalayev] That's political pluralism. I understand that you are ready to do a few interviews. Please go ahead. [video shows Shashkov standing in middle of crowd; film of march proceeding]

[Sagalayev] I'd like to ask you what people expect from tomorrow's Central Committee plenum.
[Shashkov] Yes, of course. Please tell me, what you are expecting from tomorrow's plenum, the Communist Party Central Committee plenum?
[First woman] Glasnost; let them show it on television.
[First man] It's essential that they show it on television.
[Shashkov] Live?
[First man] Live, yes.
[Shashkov] What are you expecting from the plenum?
[Second woman] Glasnost, the truth.
[Second man] Another fraud.
[Teacher] No one in our school trusts the party because, to judge from the state of the party organization in our school....

[Shashkov interrupting] Tell me, what are you expecting from this rally and from tomorrow's plenum?

[Third man] I think that there is a necessity for very radical decisions by the government, very radical ones, because the people are already very exasperated [vosmushchen] at the inactivity of the government on many, many problems.

[Georgian] What I am expecting from this rally and from the plenum is that everything should be clarified, who was responsible for these or those other things that have happened, that are still happening, that happened recently, who encouraged things for example. I am a Georgian: Who encouraged the events in Tbilisi? We understand, it has already been said, for example, some sort of pogrom; but who encourages one lot against others? There is a kind of differentiation going on among the people, this is noticeable. I would like this to be cleared up, so that I can understand for myself what is happening, you understand?

[Sagalayev] I understand. Sasha, Sasha, I think it is time for us to finish this report, because our time is limited. I understand that here in the square the main problems are coming up that are now worrying all Soviet people, communists, and nonparty members. This can be felt. Would you like to say a few words in conclusion?

[Shashkov] I would like to add that apart from the placards in support of democracy, for democratization, and for more radical reform, called for by the organizers of this rally, there were very many rallies here against chauvinism, against national-chauvinism, against Pamyat, and against the events fresh in everyone's minds that happened in the Central House of Literature [anti-semitic meeting on 18 Jan].

[Sagalayev] Thank you, thank you.

Yeltsin Addresses Rally

AU0402141590 Paris AFP in English 1321 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, Feb 4 (AFP)—More than 100,000 demonstrators in central Moscow heard Communist Party maverick Boris Yeltsin attack the party's Central Committee on Sunday, saying four years of reforms had produced nothing but "half-measures" and "compromises". Mr. Yeltsin, himself a member of the Central Committee, told the crowd at a square near the Kremlin, "can't carry on like that", journalists reported. A two-day plenary meeting of the Central Committee due to start Monday was "the last chance for democratisation of the Communist Party", he said.

To wide applause, Mr. Yeltsin said he would speak at the plenum to urge democratic elections to the Central Committee—currently dominated by conservatives—and would appeal for an extraordinary congress of the party in May or June.

Radical deputy Yuriy Afanasyev, for his part, called for mass rallies throughout the Soviet Union to push for more political reforms on Feb. 25, the anniversary of the first democratic revolution of Feb. 1917. "Long live the revolution of 1990," he said. [passage omitted]

IZVESTIYA Rally Photo

PM0502141390

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 February 1990 Morning Edition front-pages a 9-by-7.5-inch photograph, attributed to V. Svartsevich, depicting a large crowd of people apparently crossing one of the bridges over the Moskva River. The unattributed caption accompanying the photograph reads: "A rally in support of perestroyka authorized by the city authorities took place in Moscow 4 February. As had been announced earlier, it was intended to unite all the democratic movements existing today, as well as people seeking to accelerate the changes taking place in the country. The capital had seen nothing like it before. The rally attracted hundreds of thousands of people. Carrying their banners, flags, and placards, the participants moved from the Gorkiy Central Park of Culture and Relaxation to Manege Square, where the rally proper was held. The movement of transport on the streets used by the columns of marchers was halted by the militia in good time.

"Our photocorrespondent attended the rally. The shot we publish was taken at 1200 hours."

Of the few legible banners, one reads "Democratic Platform in CPSU." A second—located fairly prominently in the center of the photograph—which is partially obscured by another banner, appears to read "Down With Ligachev and (name, word, or acronym obscured)."

Announcement on March

LD0302190490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] A march and meeting are scheduled to take place in Moscow tomorrow. All Moscovites favoring toward democracy and citizens aspiring to radical changes in our country are invited. The organizers of the meeting and the march are the Moscow Voters' Association, the Moscow Party Club, and a number of other movements. USSR People's Deputies will be among those taking part, as, of course, will candidates for deputies of the Russian Federation and candidates for deputies to the Moscow City Soviet. The objective of the venture is to consolidate the city's democratic forces prior to the elections. Participants are to assemble at 1200 outside the exhibition hall opposite the central entrance to Gorkiy Culture and Leisure Park. The march will then go along the Sadovoye Kolsto [bypass] to Mayakovskiy Square and then along Gorkiy Street to the center, where the meeting will start. Moscovites wishing to take part in the march should join it on the bypass.

CPSU Central Committee Plenum Opens 5 Feb

LD0502071990 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee opened at 1000 [0700 GMT] here today. It will consider the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the party's 28th congress. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will make the report.

Attacks on 'Center' Forseen

PM0402172990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Valeriy Vyzhutovich "Journalist's Notes": "At Turning Point"]

[Text] An enlarged CPSU Central Committee plenum begins today. The expectations about it are great: The plenum is to adopt the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress. Thus the debate about party reform and much else that is currently a subject of our hopes and concerns will acquire support and a creative thrust. I think that for the first time preparations for a congress will take place in the context of a struggle of opinions and social forces. The plenum cannot fail to take account of this readiness on the people's part to independently select their future path and propose and defend various plans for renewing both the CPSU and society as a whole.

The party is going through a difficult period. Perhaps the most difficult period in its entire history. Not only radicals, but even the most steadfast and convinced party members of many years' standing are now saying that we are in a crisis and that confidence has been exhausted. The party apparatus has never before been such an open target for criticism. Well, times change: In the past, criticism came from the top, and now it is coming from the bottom. This, it turns out, also requires no particular civic talent: There is no shortage of disparaging remarks about the party leadership. The entire apparatus is criticized as some kind of monolithic mass. But new democratically elected people have now joined the Tyumen, Chernigov, and Volgograd Oblast Committees. Incidentally, all of them, or almost all, are also from the apparatus. They are vigorous and energetic initiators of change. What should we do with them? List them as "opponents of perestroyka?" The plenum should answer this question, too, and separate all the sensible, strong, and healthy aspects of the party today from everything that is helpless, obsolete, and compromising. The arguments of power convince nobody. Only the power of arguments is convincing. The time has come not to declare the leading role, but to affirm it in practical policy, striving for real results at the same time.

It is an unfortunate fact that hundreds of communists are leaving the party. Admittedly, the losses are exceeded by the thousands of applications to join the CPSU, and among the applicants there has been something of a reduction in the number of people for whom a party card is like a safe-conduct pass or a guarantee of a job. This is seen as a sign of the emerging faith in the possible—and necessary!—democratic renewal of the party, its statutes, and its program. This balance of distrust and faith, fatigue and energy also reflects the overall state of the country. Society is at a turning point. Today every resolute step forward or backward can have the gravest consequences.

It is not hard to foresee that this plenum, too, will probably throw up speakers whose attempts to blame the center for everything have virtually become a ritual demonstration of "boldness." The slogan "Make the Politburo Answer!"—first heard on the banks of the Neva—seems to have become popular at local party level. The election campaign is on, and some top leaders of oblasts, cities, and rayons are scoring points by impetuously criticizing the initiators of perestroyka, thereby diverting from themselves the population's extreme indignation about local policy and its results. However, this would-be transfer of responsibility from the lower level to the upper level will no longer save anyone. The strong movement of reformist Communists is rocking the offices of those who clearly became ensconced during the Stalin-Brezhnev era and, having being given the chance to restructure, used it in a way that was destructive for the cause.

I think that when the plenum participants get down to work they should realize that clarity is probably the main thing which we are expecting from the CPSU Central Committee platform for the forthcoming congress. Clarity in policy. Clarity in the assessment of the party's relationship with society. Clarity about our short- and longer-term prospects.

'Time To Build Bridges'

PM0402213090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

["Journalist's Notes" by Aleksandr Ilin: "Time To Build Bridges"]

[Text] It is said that life is wiser than we are. Life teaches us lessons.... These are good old simple truths. They do not lose their value when we forget about them. We are the losers. Either by trying, contrary to life, to urge on the time as if it were an obedient steed. Or, on the contrary, by trying at all costs to hold back our time, like a mediocre soccer team playing for a draw.

But by degrees life invisibly does its work, cooling off the excessively hot-headed "riders" and mercilessly punishing those who try to hang on to a favorable score at all costs. It teaches us, but how hard it is for us to learn its lessons.

The PRAVDA editorial mailbag persistently makes us turn our minds to these everyday precepts. In the days before the CPSU Central Committee plenum that opens today, the nature of the letters and telegrams has eloquently reflected both the concerns of communists and all citizens of our great country, and their hopes and expectations. Understandably, they talk about the choice of ways to get the party out of its crisis. The people expect radical and, at the same time, profoundly thoughtful solutions from their plenipotentiary representatives. They expect fundamental steps in perestroyka and party renewal capable of restoring to these processes the dynamism they have somewhat lost during their difficult progress.

The fundamental renewal of our party ranks and their uncompromising cleansing of bureaucrats, careerists, complacent officials, and timeservers is an urgent matter. Without it—and most of the people writing to PRAVDA are convinced about this—it will be impossible to revive the party's prestige. This is shown by the recent events in a number of major party organizations, where communists have indicated their lack of confidence in "leaders" who have clearly stayed in office too long. It is also shown by the highly acute struggle for deputies' mandates in the campaign for election to republic Supreme Soviets and local organs of power, whereby people are rejecting apparatus shows. Certain informals may not be acting in a "gentlemanly" fashion, scoring points with their wholesale criticism of the party, but we communists cannot and must not abandon our honest and pure struggle for people's hearts and minds.

The criticism of the party—and I want to emphasize yet again that it has brought the trouble down on its own head—contains a lot of excess, manifestations of extremism, and, let us be frank, cases of shameless manipulation of public opinion. But now, I think, is not the time to settle scores; now is the time to build bridges. This is probably the main thing for party members today and for everyone who values the interests of the fatherland.

The telegrams to PRAVDA contain many resolute demands to the Central Committee: To be persistent and consistent in implementing radical transformations. To step up the struggle against resistance from conservative forces and to overcome the gap between the party's base—its primary organizations—and higher components. To consult with communists not for the sake of form, but to actually take account of their opinions, proposals, and ideas.... Well, the demands to democratize the party's life are just, and PRAVDA has been striving to reflect them as fully as possible in its articles and "Discussion Pages."

All of us—both communists and nonparty people—are pinning a great deal on the plenum's work. That is justifiable and natural. However, let us build bridges from both sides. After all, it so often happens that we pin the blame for all our failures and shortcomings on the leadership of the party and the country while we fail to recognize or simply brush aside our own responsibility. Let us look around: Why do we tolerate mismanagement and shoddy work in our collectives, why do we keep secretaries who are not "up to the job" in party organizations? Why do we sometimes find ourselves ensnared in group egoism or lack principle in our assessments of embezzlers and shoddy workmen? Sometimes we willingly listen to inveterate silver-tongued orators who promise to move mountains once they are in power. We are sometimes so inattentive to what it said by working people—experts in working rather than talking....

Let us all rise up together and strengthen the structure of the bridge across which we must advance both the cause of perestroyka and our entire life. Let us be concerned about ensuring that our movement is not hampered by barriers—the obstacles of previous stereotypes. Let us clear the "obstacles" placed in our way both by the "daredevils" who want to force the pace without regard either to our real potential or to the feelings in society, and by those who are slamming on the brakes and reversing back to discredited administrative-edict methods. Let us support those people who boldly take the initiative, take a risk, and pave the way for others. Let us make a common effort to find the correct solutions.

Daily Urges No Return to Past

PM0302192990 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Feb 90 p 1

[Aleksey Morgun article under rubric "Topical Subject": "We'll See on Monday"]

[Text] In 20 years' work in the press, I cannot remember anything like the huge amounts of mail coming in from readers on questions of party life. I remember something else: Just 5 years ago we had to organize—these professional methods in Soviet journalism still exist, unfortunately—speedy reactions to resolutions of routine Central Committee plenums or speeches by the head of the party and the state. But now, it seems, there is no subject more topical for both Communists and nonparty people.

Admittedly there is rather less cheerfulness in the reactions. The main theme running through readers' letters nowadays was very accurately expressed in a letter from R. Goncharov, a pensioner from Gomel Oblast's Petrikovskiy Rayon: "We must support the perestroyka program at all costs through the efforts of all society. And we should keep in mind the main thing: If the party does not renew itself perestroyka will come to a grinding halt."

Would anyone like to publicly take issue with that statement? I doubt it. The question lies elsewhere: What constitutes this renewal? What party "legacy" do we need to resolutely abandon, if we are really talking about profound reform rather than a cosmetic exercise? And, finally, the main point—on what principles should the renewed CPSU be based, and how is its structure and norm of life envisioned? Actually, we will not have to wait long for the answer: The CPSU Central Committee plenum which opens tomorrow to discuss and adopt the platform for the 28th party congress will have to demonstrate its view of these problems. But this time I am certain of one thing: Whatever these decisions may be, we should not expect them to be approved unanimously, as was the case in the past. Both within society and within the party itself there are already diametrically opposed views on how the party should be renewed, what pace should be set, and where indeed we should be heading.

Or rather, there is no doubt about the "direction." A powerful and this time really unanimous call can be heard: Forward! But what lies behind this seeming unanimity? Here it would be apposite to quote some lines from the very angry letter from S. Avramchenko of Tavricheskoye Village, East Kazakhstan Oblast. Naturally, the writer is a supporter of perestroyka, but.... Let me quote: "The CPSU leadership has already repeatedly stated the need to renew our party, but it is keeping quiet about how it envisions this renewal. Perhaps it is the kind of renewal seen in Hungary or Bulgaria? In that case, thanks, but we don't need it and it should be prevented!" His concern is understandable. But bear in mind that earlier the writer had been quite unambiguous about pluralism of opinion, discussions in the party, and diverse approaches to the most important party problems: "There is no place in Lenin's party for any opportunists or renegades.... On certain issues, instead of rebuffing antiparty elements, the Politburo is even supporting them."

In short, complete unanimity—and no discussions or options! We are used to that.

So then, forward to.... Stalin? Or to Brezhnev? After all, one encounters—and not all that rarely—letters virtually bemoaning the passing of the recent serene past: Moscow would merely be preparing to adopt a resolution and the first secretaries of the 14 union republic communist parties, and party oblast committees and kray committees would salute in unison. Should we be nostalgic about that?

"I don't know about it, I haven't read it myself, but I angrily condemn...." This familiar formula can be found quite often not only in archive files of old newspapers. It is also common in today's editorial mailbag. In front of me are a good dozen responses to the decisions of the last, extraordinary Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, which announced the party's autonomy. The correctness of that decision can and even should be doubted. We can try to show our Lithuanian comrades that they have found by no means the most correct or error-free way out of the complex situation in which—and this too should not be forgotten—the Lithuanian Communist Party finds itself, bearing in mind the unprecedented level of political activity among the population of that small republic. But nor should we fail to take something else into consideration: The door is not closed to talks, their constructive continuation is more than possible following the adoption of a really reforming CPSU platform for the forthcoming congress. But perestroyka supporters who look to the past, while honestly admitting that they are unfamiliar with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party program, nonetheless propose a different and, in their view, more effective means of solving the problem: breaking up the Lithuanian Communist Party, neutralizing the dissidents, instilling iron order, and... continuing perestroyka.

Of course, it is always difficult to give up stereotypes which we have grown accustomed to and grown up with over decades. But here it is important to explain what we are giving up and why. Is it really so bad if in the familiar phrase "democratic centralism" we clearly accentuate the first word? Will the interests of our work really suffer if in the party's cadre policy we resolutely abandon the arbitrary appointment of leaders from "above" without any discussion? Does the CPSU really derive no benefit from gearing itself above all to the will of primary organizations and the people's masses? I repeat that it is hard to abandon stereotypes, but at some point it is necessary!

That is why I hope that in this instance I am expressing the opinions and aspirations of the majority: This time we really have no alternative—there simply cannot be any return to the past. Only a renewed CPSU is entitled to hope that, having initiated perestroyka, the party will continue in the future to retain its vanguard positions in this now mass-based and truly nationwide movement.

Incidentally, there is no need to whip up emotions. The CPSU Central Committee plenum starts tomorrow. We'll see on Monday, as they say.

Time for 'Fateful Decisions'

*PM0302194190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1*

[Pavel Gutiontov article under rubric "Journalist's Notes": "Our Choice"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Party Central Committee plenum begins on Monday. We await its decisions with hope, but with concern, too. For they will determine just **how** we will proceed and along what path. And it is historically dangerous that some people would very much like the plenum decisions to be made in a nervous, tense, and unstable situation; they would like the shadow of Baku to cover the streets of other cities; they would like.... They would like there to be none of the decisions we are hoping for.

And what forces have been suddenly brought into play; what rumors have been sweeping the country and the world!

A few days ago there was a rumor about Gorbachev's resignation (IZVESTIYA has already described the panic this caused, even on the U.S. stock market). Extremists are provoking interethnic tension using rumor and gossip. Anti-Semitism has made itself felt in an unprecedentedly open way, and against a backdrop of shameful inaction by the law-enforcement organs there have even been calls for pogroms.

There will be no pogroms, of course, and Gorbachev—we now know this, and will all be campaigning for it—will not be quitting. But, needless to say, everything that is happening is no accident. And the unprecedented galvanization of those forces which are depicted as "conservative" on our conventional political map is no accident either. They too realize that the fate of perestroyka lies on this map. And, I think, nobody any longer believes the myth that there are only supporters of perestroyka in society.

Today it is important for everyone who is concerned about the destiny of the people and the country to realize that the time has come for real courage, it is time to make fateful decisions. It is around these decisions that a political struggle in the full sense of the word is under way and is sharpening. We will recognize this fact and determine our place in this struggle. And then we will see that there are 1,000 times more of us—those who have placed our hopes, faith, and very destiny in the hands of perestroyka, those who are struggling for its success, and those who are prepared to work and work to that end—than there are of those who do nothing but shout: "Where are we headed? And why?"

CPSU 'Dropping' Leading Role

*LD0302183690 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 3 Feb 90*

[Text] According to Moscow press reports, at its session beginning the day after tomorrow, the CPSU Central

Committee will yield to the demand of public opinion and will assent to dropping from the Constitution the clause defining the party's leading role. This will open the way to introducing a multiparty system. Gabor Izbeki reports from Moscow.

[Izbeki] According to advance, leaked reports on the Central Committee session, this session might see the CPSU renouncing its constitutionally guaranteed leading role, which was (?not done) in parliament in November. the session will reportedly accept the justification of a multiparty system and the existence of private property in the Soviet Union; however, these will not be considered a final solution to the country's problems. According to unnamed sources, Gorbachev will deliver a keynote speech entitled: For a (?Humane), Democratic Socialism.

In the interest of the party's transformation, the leading bodies will also be reorganized. A party chairman and his two deputies will assume duties as directors of the party. The Politburo will become an executive bureau, and the Central Committee will be trimmed into a 200-member body, presumably to the detriment of the conservatives.

Reprentatives of the republics' parties would be delegated to the Central Committee, too.

it has been said for days, indeed weeks, that the decision of this Central Committee session will determine the future of reform in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has already personally denied that he might resign. However, the issue of the size and extent of a breakthrough by the reformists is still in doubt.

AFP Cites INTERFAX Plenum Document

AU0402161290 Paris AFP in English 1114 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, Feb 4 (AFP)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was set Monday to launch his most radical offensive to revamp the Communist Party, dragging it down a path of democratic reform already trodden by other Eastern bloc parties, according to observers here. Conservative hardliners appear ready however to fight him tooth and nail at the two-day plenary meeting of the party's Central Committee which opens Monday in Moscow and which is to prepare a congress of the party, its supreme decision-making body. The congress, already brought forward to October, could now be held in the spring as the tide of reform rises. [passage omitted]

The draft platform for reform to be discussed by the plenum calls for the party to abandon its constitutional monopoly on power, so paving the way for a multi-party system, according to a semi-official Radio Moscow news digest, INTERFAX. All the other communist parties in eastern Europe's Warsaw Pact alliance have now, under popular pressure, relinquished their right to rule. The draft also proposes allowing different voices to be heard within the previously monolithic party, INTERFAX said. It also suggested that the party's ruling body, to be renamed the Political Executive Committee, include representatives from every constituent republic rather than be dominated, as is now the case now in the ruling politburo, by ethnic Russians. Such a move would aim to satisfy some of the demands for greater autonomy by republican communist parties, following last December's decision by Lithuanian communists to break with the Moscow party line.

The party's secretary-general would be replaced by a chairman, assisted by two deputies, so allowing Mr. Gorbachev to delegate responsibility and concentrate more on his job of state president, INTERFAX also suggested. INTERFAX said the policy-making central committee would be further reduced from some 251 full members to 200, with 10 per cent being co-opted between congresses.

On the economy, the draft calls for a multi-sector economy, including private ownership.

The report was the first official word on the leadership's plans for party reform, and reflected an apparent change of heart by Mr. Gorbachev who last December had rejected a parliamentary debate on amending Article 6 of the Constitution which guarantees the party's right to rule. [passage omitted]

End of Power Monopoly

AU0302113790 Paris AFP in English 1109 GMT 3 Feb 90

[By Anne Penketh]

[Text] Moscow, Feb 3 (AFP)—The Soviet Communist Party is prepared to abandon its monopoly on power enshrined in the Soviet Constitution as part of a radical overhaul of the party programme, the Radio Moscow publication INTERFAX reported Saturday.

A draft platform to be approved at a party Central Committee plenum on Monday and Tuesday "calls for a radical perestroyka (restructuring) which will fight for its leading role, but assume no state or government powers, nor lay any claim to having its role set down in the Constitution", INTERFAX said.

"The multi-party principle is not rejected, but is not a panacea," the document says, according to INTERFAX, echoing a recent statement in Lithuania by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The platform states that "our ideal is humane democratic socialism", and the party rules concerning democratic socialism "have to be modified".

A congress, the party's supreme instance with the sole right of changing the party rules, has been scheduled for October, but this is now widely expected to be brought forward to April or May in the wake of the plenum.

The INTERFAX report was the first official word on the leadership's plans for reform, and reflected a sudden public change of heart by Mr. Gorbachev who less than three months ago was insisting that the Soviet people were attached to their "Socialist choice".

But during a visit to the Baltic state of Lithuania last month, where he failed to persuade local party leaders to reverse a decision to set up a local communist party and split with Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev said that the introduction of a multi-party system would not be "a tragedy".

If the conservative-dominated Central Committee approved the proposal to abolish Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, the move would catch up nationally with rebel republics which had already begun to repeal the corresponding article in their own constitutions.

So far, Lithuania and Latvia have held parliamentary votes to abolish the party's political monopoly and usher in a multi-party system ahead of local elections.

Estonia is poised to follow suit, while there is grass-roots pressure in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and elsewhere for an end to the party's stranglehold on power.

The party in the southern republic of Georgia on Friday approved abolishing the constitutional article.

At the same time, the reform plans outlined by INTERFAX bore striking similarities with those already adopted by East Europe's communist parties, where all the Warsaw Pact countries have now renounced the party's political monopoly.

INTERFAX said that a new body, the Political Executive Committee, would be set up, including representatives of the communist parties of all the Soviet republics.

The new body would apparently replace the Politburo, most of whose 11 members are ethnic Russians.

The Georgian Party on Friday proposed a "union of independent communist parties" whose leaders should be in a new Politburo.

A mass resignation of the Politburo, as has occurred in other East European countries, could therefore not be ruled out at the party congress if the Central Committee decided to adopt the platform and submit it to the congress.

INTERFAX said the policy-making Central Committee would be further reduced from some 251 full members to 200, with 10 per cent being co-opted between congresses. There was also a proposal to replace the post of general-secretary by a chairman and two vice- chairman.

The draft platform also appears to point to an ultimate official break-up of the party, already seriously divided by conservative and radical factions.

According to INTERFAX, "the draft recognises the right to platforms inside the party and the right of a minority to defend its views. However, the party will not permit factions with an internal organisation or discipline of their own."

Radical party deputies in Moscow have formed a group called Democratic Platform.

One of its leaders, Vlasheslav Shostakovki, said in an interview published by the Madrid daily EL PAIS on Saturday that recognition of platforms or tendencies within the party would "avoid scission, guarantee political stability and allow for a strategic consensus between conservatives and radicals."

He said the next congress would be the party's "last chance". He believed that between 35 and 40 per cent of membership wanted to see radical renewal.

Party and non-party radicals, including maverick Communist Deputy Boris Yeltsin, plan to march through Moscow on Sunday, ahead of the plenum, to call for "roundtable negotiations" with democratic forces to find a way out of the country's chronic economic and social problems.

On the economy, the draft platform demands a multi-sector economy, with "equal rights" of private ownership alongside state property.

Further on INTERFAX Report

AU0302124890 Paris AFP in English 0820 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 3 (AFP)—A package of radical proposals to end the Communist Party monopoly on power and move towards democratic socialism will be put before a Central Committee plenum here on Monday and Tuesday, the Radio Moscow publication INTERFAX reported on Saturday.

Proposals include a major revamping of the party and the abolition of its monopoly on power, enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution. The party will continue to fight to retain its leading role, but will not claim executive or state powers by right, INTERFAX said.

The reforms recognise the right to express differences of opinion, but the party will not tolerate factions, INTERFAX said. A multi-party system is not ruled out, but is not regarded as a universal panacea.

Reforms to the party itself include a proposal for the Central Committee to be limited to 200 full members—it currently has 251, with 109 non-voting members—and for 10 per cent of these to be co-opted from the two congresses.

In future the president and two vice presidents of the party are to be elected.

Another proposal is to create a new body, to be called the Executive Political Committee, composed of representatives of communist parties of all the republics in the Soviet Union. Observers believe this could eventually replace the existing Politburo, whose membership is almost all Slav.

On the economic front, the programme envisages a transition towards a mixed economy, which would no longer reject private ownership.

Progressive groups, backed by the leading radical MPs Yuri Afanassiev and Boris Yeltsin, have called a demonstration in Moscow for Sunday on the eve of the plenum, INTERFAX reported.

Organisers emphasised that the plenum was the last chance for the party to win back the confidence of the people and to open dialogue with democratic forces to try to find a way out of the deepening crisis.

Groups involved are the Association of Muscovite electors, the popular fronts in Moscow and the Federation of Russia as well as other "radical groups".

INTERFAX said the protest was intended as a show of strength ahead of local elections on March 4.

Commentators Discuss CPSU Plenum

Tasks Viewed

LD0302114890 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—By TASS commentator Aleksandr Mineyev:

As far as the present generation of Soviet Communists remember, it is for the first time that preparations for a regular plenum of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee have assumed such a high political intensity, with the idea of radical changes coming from below—from primary party organisations and from rank- and-file party members who criticise the leading bodies of the party.

As was already reported, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee at its meeting on January 22 resolved to submit the Central Committee's draft platform for the party's 28th congress to the committee's plenum, scheduled for February 5-6, for consideration.

Now that intense work, full of keen discussions, on the document is drawing to an end,its principal idea can be defined: Directing all activities of the party towards building a humane, democratic socialism in the Soviet Union.

The not easy process of elaborating the draft platform has been taking place in an atmosphere which is complex for the party and the entire country and against the background of rapid changes and dramatic developments in the Soviet Union and the world.

The beginning of the year was marked by General Secetary Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania where the issue concerning an independent status of the Lithuanian Communist Party was discussed.

Within the past month party leaders and whole regional committees of the CPSU resigned under the pressure from rank and file communists and the general public in such large centres as Tyumen, Volgograd and Chernigov.

Ordeals fell to the lot of Communists in Azerbaijan and Armenia where an inter-ethnic conflict flared up in January with numerous casualties.

Soviet Communists send messages to the Central Committee, expressing serious concern over the state of affairs within the party and in the country, the increase in centrifugal trends, the mounting tension in political and socio-economic life and the decline in the party's prestige.

In Leningrad, Volgograd and a number of other cities, these problems have been discussed not only at party conferences and plenary sessions but also at mass rallies in the cities' squares.

Participants in the January 25 plenary meeting of the Barnaul (Western Siberia) Regional Committee of the CPSU see the root cause of the problems in the fact that the actions of the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee are lagging behind rapid economic and political processes.

They believe that glasnost should bring into the open the forces that apply brakes to perestroika not only at the local level but also in the Soviet Government, the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo.

The Communists of the Krasnoye Sormovo (Gorkiy) engineering amalgamation are calling for openness in the work of the CPSU Central Committee, for radical changes in the organisational structures of the party, and for democratisation of inner party life. Herein lies the way towards the revival of the party's prestige, they believe.

Specific proposals conveyed in the communists' collective messages to the forthcoming plenum suggest transferring the CPSU'S regular 28th congress, which is scheduled for October 1990, to an earlier date and holding it in two stages, with a report-and- election campaign at the local level in-between.

Communists suggest direct elections of delegates to the congress from districts, and not multi-stage ones, as are provided for by the current rules of the CPSU.

These and other suggestions are being studied and generalised by the Central Committee.

A discussion at the plenum lies ahead. There is every ground to expect that it will be as keen [as received]. This is question of choice of the CPSU's road in the new, rapidly changing situation, and of the party's destiny.

'High Political Intensity'

LD0502102190 Moscow TASS in English 1006 GMT 5 Feb 90

[By TASS commentator Aleksander Mineyev]

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—A regular plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee opened today to discuss the Central Committee's draft platform for the party's 28th congress. Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, will address the plenum.

Preparations for a regular plenum of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee have assumed a high political intensity, with the idea of radical changes coming from below—from primary party organisations and from rank-and-file party members.

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'Readiness To Share Power'

LD0302142590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] It has been announced that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party gathers for a fullscale meeting in Moscow on Monday. Special attention is given in this country to this meeting, writes our commentator Yuriy Rogachev. The meeting is expected to answer many questions that have accumulated in society.

These days the problems of perestroyka in the party are the focus of attention not only of the communists but also of the people nonaffiliated to the party. Lively discussions are under way in party organizations and in labor staffs, as well as in the press. Questions about the role and place of the party in our society were also raised at the recent Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and at a session of our parliament.

The demand to remove from the Soviet Constitution Article 6 enforcing the vanguard role of the party in society is no longer seditious and is shared by masses of people. The discussion about a possible multiparty system in this country is regarded as a matter of course. Apart from the discussion a multiparty system is already become a fact actually in a number of sovereign republics. In Lithuania the Communist Party has split into two parties, both communist. One of the two has decided to withdraw from the Communist Party of the whole of the Soviet Union.

In the past few years the 20 million-strong Soviet Communist Party has been reduced by nearly 2 million members. The massive withdrawal from the party is not compensated for with a flow of new members. In general the party is going through a highly complex period in its history. It is subjected to criticism in society more than any other public and political organization. I think that this is due, above all, to the frustrated expectations of the people for the changes for the better in their life. It is generally known what the results of perestroyka are—perestroyka launched on Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative to develop greater democracy, openness, and spiritual reawakening of society. Yet the situation with food and consumer goods has worsened. The budget deficit and inflation are rising. But most people judge about the results of perestroyka first of all by the changes in the social sphere. People hold the party responsible for the worsening of their position. This is natural, since the party still holds the monopoly of power and assumes all responsibility. For this very reason the public expects that the coming full-scale meeting of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee will show the party's readiness to share the power and the responsibility not only with the Soviet renewed or being renewed, but with other public organizations and movements.

I believe that the meeting should also discuss a redistribution of power between the central government and the local bodies of power, between the two echelons and the grassroots, naturally in favor of the grass roots. The meeting should also deal with restoring the leading position of elected bodies regarding the now omnipotent party apparatus. It will also discuss truly democratic elections with every seat contested by several candidates, beginning with the leaders of the local party branches and ending with Politburo members of the Central Committee.

Only a party renewed along truly democratic lines has a chance to regain its declining prestige in society and remain the political vanguard, the leading force of perestroyka. The near future will show how well prepared the party is for the renewal. The Central Committee meeting is expected to last for several days.

Lithuanian Party Leaders Take Part in Plenum

LD0502111590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Excerpt] We have been able to receive information from reliable sources which confirms that all four secretaries of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee are taking part in the work of the plenum: A. Brazauskas, V. Beriozovas, J. Paleckis, and K. Glaveckas, as well as Vytautas Sakalauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee.

The party group which still adheres to the CPSU platform—we can call them the members of the provisional central committee—is also taking part in the work of the plenum.

The Lithuanian issue is to be discussed at the end of the plenum; it is not yet clear whether it will take place on Tuesday or Wednesday. We also know that attempts were made to postpone the discussion of this issue until Saturday. It is believed that this was a deliberate attempt of some members of the CPSU CC Politburo. With the resistance to this on the part of our delegation and with M. Gorbachev's help, this delay in discussing the Lithuanian issue has been avoided. [passage omitted]

Transcaucasus Situation

Transcaucasia Talks Open in Riga 2 Feb

Baltic Council Mediates

LD0202182690 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 2 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga February 2 TASS—Representatives of the popular movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia today got down to the negotiating table in the quest of a settlement of an ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia. At 19 hours Moscow time, Soviet and foreign newspaper photographers registered this event in Riga.

One of the three Baltic republics, Latvia, has become the venue of the meeting. The leaders of the popular movements of the Baltic republics are in the Baltic Council which assumed the functions of a mediator.

The meeting at the negotiating table was held following separate consultations which the Baltic Council had held with each delegation.

Members of the board of the Armenian National Movement, at a news conference, expressed gratitude to the Baltic Council for organising the meeting which, they believe, opens the road to reasonable solutions. They proclaimed the readiness to cooperate with the democratic wing of the Azerbaijani Popular Front.

Representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation expressed gratitude to the Baltic Council yesterday. They believe that the very fact of such conversations in Riga is a good result leading to a better mutual understanding and to the destruction of the enemy image.

Sides Continue Riga Talks

LD0202145190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1200 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] The mutual consultations between the Baltic Council and the People's Front of Azerbaijan and the National Movement of Armenia on the possibilities of settling the conflicts in Transcaucasia are continuing in the Union of Writers building. The delegation of representatives of the National Movement of Armenia arrived in Riga today. Following their meeting with members of the Baltic Council, a news conference is planned for 1600.

Yesterday, after mutual consultations with members of the board of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, statements were given to the press. The representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan expressed the view that bringing troops into Azerbaijan contradicted the norms of international relations, which the government of the Soviet Union has accepted.

There is a possibility that this evening a round of mutual consultations will take place, at which the delegations of the People's Front of Azerbaijan and of the National Movement of Armenia would meet.

Aim Is To 'Promote a Dialogue'

LD0202155890 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Riga February 2 TASS—By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina:

A meeting between the Baltic Council, encompassing the Latvian and Estonian popular fronts and the Lithuanian Sajudis [Movement for Restructuring], and Ashot Manucharyan, David Vartanyan and Ashot Belyan, members of the Armenian National Movement's Board, opened in Latvia's capital Riga today.

The aim of the meeting is to promote a dialogue between representatives of public organisations of the two conflicting Transcaucasian republics—Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Baltic Council met envoys of Azerbaijan's Popular Front on Thursday. It expressed hope that the two sides would possibly sit at a negotiating table today. The Azerbaijani delegation has already agreed to that. Journalists will learn about the Armenian representatives' stand at a news conference to be held this evening.

The parties to the consultations preliminarily agreed to discuss the decision to move troops into the Transcaucasus, the refugee problem and the exchange of hostages. They agreed not to touch upon the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Speaking to journalists last night, two members of the Azerbaijani Popular Front's Board—Hikmet Gadzhi-Zade, a physicist, and Sabit Bagirov, a mathematician, expressed profound gratitude to the Baltic council for the initiative. They said that the formation of a similar Transcaucasian Council could accelerate democratic transformations not only in the southern republics but also in the USSR.

'First Step' Toward Rapprochement

PM0502092190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Cautious Optimism Recorded"]

[Text] Riga, 3 Feb—The first-ever meeting between full representatives of the people's movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia ended at 0200 this morning. It was held in Riga with the assistance of the Baltic Council. The communique signed by all the meeting participants stressed the need to make every effort to settle the conflicts in the Trancaucasus peacefully. The practice of hostage-taking was unanimously condemned. Both sides intend to use their prestige and influence to secure the release of hostages by 1 March. Agreement was reached to exchange exhaustive information no later than 15 February on all cases of the seizure of civilians by armed persons. It is planned to establish permanent contact between the leadership of the Armenian Pannational Movement and the People's Front of Azerbaijan. The Armenian side proposed involving representatives of Karabakh's Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in consultations in the future. It considers the recognition by everyone of the fact of self-determination for the Karabakh population to be a highly important factor in stabilizing the situation in the region. The Azerbaijani side stated that recognition of the existing borders between the two republics is such a factor. The adopted communique will be examined by the leadership of the people's movements and will only assume the force of mutual obligations after it is ratified.

Late that night there was a news conference which noted that the discussion of the problems had not been easy but that hope had emerged that differences could be overcome by democratic means. As both sides discovered, a number of their theses do not have sufficiently serious foundations. A psychological barrier sometimes cropped up because facts had not been examined from different standpoints.

In their speeches the members of the two Transcaucasian republics' social organization boards noted that the first step had been taken toward rapprochement and that it is necessary to try to continue down that path. That, in their opinion, was the main outcome of the meeting.

Riga Accords 'Jeopardized'

LD0402132490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1149 GMT 4 Feb 90

["Difficulties in the Way Towards Implementing the Accords Between Armenia's and Azerbaijan's Popular Movements"—TASS headline]

[Text] Yerevan. 4 February. TASS special correspondent Leonid Timofeyev reports:

The feasibility of implementing the Armenian Pannational Movement (AOD) and People's Front of Azerbaijan (NFA) accords, which were attained in Riga yesterday, has been jeopardized. The residents of the Armenian villages of Kamo and Azad, Khanlarskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan, have been requested to leave their residences on the pretext of the curfew in force there and the danger that they might be attacked.

The TASS correspondent was told by telephone from the AOD press center that, taking into account the situation that has arisen, the AOD Board sent a telegram to Riga which says, i.a., that in connection with the dramatically changed situation resulting from attempts of forced deportation of Armenians from the villages of Azad and Kamo of Khanlarskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan, "The AOD board does not consider it possible to continue the joint consultations between representatives of the AOD and NFA in Riga conducted at the initiative of the Baltic Council. The AOD Board did not ratify the accords attained during the consultations, including the joint communique, and they are declared null and void. The holding of future joint consultations and talks is possible only on the condition of stopping similar actions," the telegram says.

The necessity to exert every possible effort for peacefully settling the Transcaucasus conflicts was underlined in the communique on the results of the Armenian National Movement and the People's Front of Azerbaijan was planned to be established, too. As this communique was meant to receive the status of mutual obligations after its confirmation by the leaderships of people's movements of both republics, today's decision of the Armenian party shows the fact that there are still significant difficulties on the way to peace in the Transcaucasus.

Armenians 'Suspend' Talks

AU0302191590 Paris AFP in English 1830 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, Feb 3 (AFP)—Armenian nationalists decided Saturday to suspend talks with Azeri representatives in the Latvian capital of Riga, Martin Martirosyan, a spokesman for the Armenian National Movement, said. The decision to suspend the talks followed a demand from the Soviet army for activists of the Armenian National Movement to leave two Armenian-populated villages in the Guetachent region of Azerbaijan, the spokesman said. "The leadership of the movement decided to suspend the discussions in Riga and not to ratify what had already been signed as long as the ultimatum from the army is not lifted," the spokesman said by telephone from Yerevan.

The Azeri representatives are Khikmet Khajizad and Sabit Bagirov of the nationalist Azerbaijan Popular Front. The representatives of the Armenian National Movement are Ashot Manucharian, David Vartanian and Ashot Belian. They had agreed ahead of the talks that the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh would not be discussed. But according to TASS, the Armenian side said the Azeri and Armenian communities in Nagorno-Karabakh should be asked soon to vote on the territory's status, arguing that the principle of self-determination was a major consideration in stabilising the situation in the region. The Azeri delegates rejected the proposal, insisting on the inviolability of frontiers between the republics, TASS said.

Talks in Riga End

LD0302103190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0950 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Riga, 3 Feb (TASS)—The taking of hostages was condemned unanimously at the first-ever meeting of the authorized representatives of the popular movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which ended late last night.

The meeting was held in Riga with the assistance of the Baltic Council. A communique signed by all participants stresses the need to make every effort to settle conflicts peacefully in the Transcaucasus. Both parties intend to use their authority and influence to secure the release of hostages by 1 March. An accord was reached on the exchange, by no later than 15 February, of exhaustive information on all instances of the seizure of peaceful civilians by armed persons. Permanent contacts will be established between the leadership of the Armenian Pannational Movement and the Azerbaijan People's Front. The Armenian side proposed that representatives of the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Karabakh be asked to participate in future consultations. They regard recognition by all of the fact of self-determination for its population as a highly important factor in stabilizing the regional situation. The Azerbaijani side stated that recognition by all of the fact of self-determination for its population is a highly important factor in stabilizing the situation in the region. The Azerbaijani side stated that recognition of the borders existing between the two republics is such a factor. The communique which was adopted is subject to examination by the leadership of the popular movements, and only after approval will it assume the force of mutual obligations.

A late-night news conference was held, where it was noted that the discussion of the problems was not easy but that there was hope that differences could be surmounted by democratic means.

Landsbergis Remarks on Armenian-Azeri Talks

LD0102192690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] A consultative meeting between the Baltic Council and the popular movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia began in Riga today. Here is a report on this by our correspondent Ninel Meshkun.

[Begin recording] [Meshkun] Representatives of the Baltic Council, having taken on the role of mediators in the talks—and the popular fronts of Latvia and Estonia, and the Sajudis [the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka] are members of it—began the day with a closed sitting without guests or the press. After this they will hold conversations separately with each side. We are all following the dramatic events in the Transcaucasus with great alarm. For this reason, the afternoon press conference which anticipated an exchange of opinions between the sides aroused the most lively interest. It must be said that around 100 Soviet and foreign journalists from the most diverse publications and television companies have been accredited at the current meeting. I asked a question at the press conference. Are you counting on a fundamental solution to the problem; do you have any hopes on this score? Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the council, the sejm of Sajudis, answered me.

[Landsbergis] If we manage to reach the point where talks begin between the very influential social forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia, we will consider this a great success. For the moment we are still only on the threshold of the attempt.

[Meshkun] It may now be assumed that the first round of such talks at this consultative meeting may finish tomorrow. [end recording]

[Announcer] Of course, we all now expect a lessening of tension in the Transcaucasus and we are also optimistically viewing the contacts between representatives of the Popular Fronts of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite everything, they must find within themselves the strength to touch on the main issue, the main sore point, of Nagorno-Karabakh. This problem can only be resolved by peaceful means, by talks, at any level whatsoever.

Latvian Popular Front Official on Riga Meeting

LD0102210390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The leaders of the informal associations of Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed on a consultative meeting in Riga. That dialogue began today. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Kasyanova] But Nagorno Karabakh seemingly has become the bone of contention. Maybe that is a consequence? The reason lies considerably deeper, as we all understand. But, you are not touching territorial claims. How can one then count on attaining some kind of serious resolution of this problem?

[D. Ivans, identified in caption as chairman of the Popular Front of Latvia] First of all, the talks have not yet begun, and we do not know whether both sides will agree to the talks. In the meantime, these are only consultations which we will conduct separately, and perhaps later together with both sides. But, we cannot even tell you the agenda for the talks or conversations because we must reach full consent with each of the two sides. We will agree on the agenda with them.

[Kasyanova] What led to this initiative, to this desire to act as intermediaries in this negotiation?

[Ivans] Our programs and the program documents of the Baltic Popular Fronts emphasize only a nonviolent and peaceful road to freedom and democracy. We desire that other peoples should proceed along such a road. Naturally what is happening in Transcaucasia puts into difficulty the democratic processes here in the Baltic as well.

Central Press Continues Reportage of Events

Causes, Nature of Crisis Viewed

PM0202144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[PRAVDA special correspondents A. Gorokhov, V. Okulov report: "Daybreak After Night; That Is Way You Could Describe Present Situation in Azerbaijani Capital"]

[Text] Baku—This city of two million people still has not cooled off after the blow it has received, still has not recovered from its upheaval caused by the events during the night of 20 January. Fresh tears are still being wept at the graves in Nagornyy Park. Not every enterprise has begun work again. Not all transport is back on the road. Intermittent shooting is heard when darkness falls: Only a small number of weapons have been confiscated from the extremists. The patrols work invisibly at night.... But newspapers are being published, television screens are lit, and people are reading, watching, arguing furiously, discussing, getting indignant, and weeping....

A commission under the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet is investigating the events. A commission has also been set up under the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Ways to resolve the crisis are being sought. It would be absurd for us journalists to claim to reveal the sources of the events before these commissions have completed their work, which is going to take many days and months. It would be equally strange to remain silent, not even attempting to contribute our own thoughts to help to draw closer to the truth in Baku—a city that has yet to cool down after its upheaval.

Assessment of Situation

Ramiz Akhmedov, first secretary of the Kutkashenskiy Azerbaijan Communist Party Rayon Committee (raykom), spoke from the rostrum of the Central Committee plenum....

The plenum convened on the night of 24-25 January. All apparently was calm in the darkened city. Only here and there on the outskirts was the silence broken by the sound of gunfire. The crackle of the shots did not reach the Central Committee building, high up on a hill. Emotions were running high in the hall, the speakers demanding an answer from members of the Central Committee Bureau: Had they known earlier that troops were going to be brought into Baku, and why had they failed to prevent this? Ramiz Akhmedov said from the rostrum:

"I do not know what the situation is in other rayons or in Baku, but in our remote rayon there are figures in the People's Front who have never worked in their lives, never done anything of benefit to Soviet power, their own families, or society in general. It is not political dialogue that they seek—they want power. The Communist Party is the biggest impediment to this, and they are doing everything to destroy it. If the Azerbaijan party organization does not take specific measures, there will not be a single party membership card left within a week in a number of rayons.

"They came to me in the raykom, carrying weapons, and said: 'You must burn your party membership card.' I replied: 'I will burn myself with my membership card.' Members of the aktiv were sitting alongside and looking at me. Some respected people said to me: 'Ramiz-Muellim, perhaps we should get rid of our membership cards. Then they will leave us alone.' I said: 'It would be desertion, betrayal. When everything was going well in the party you were ready to kiss its feet, but as soon as tension arises and the party finds itself facing a test, you want to leave? We must be men, we must be brave....'"

Akhmedov continued: "Many emotions have spilled over from this rostrum; we are all horrified. Our international city of Baku is covered with blood. I condemn the bloodshed. People should have been warned, but who is to blame for this? Are we ourselves not to blame? Are we not accessories to this tragedy? You say that the troops must leave. But it is an illusion, Comrades, that we will be able to retain power, because the extremists have set up detachments and so could start the terror in the city all over again tomorrow.

"I know what people are going to say after my speech. I will be accused of being an enemy of the people. Let them say what they like, but as someone aware of the situation I say this: We must now make the most responsible decisions. If we do not resolve the Karabakh problem by taking urgent measures, we will not be able to strip the extremists of their main trump card and we will find ourselves prey to new ills. But, once we have done this we will unite people around us and be able to take power into our hands...."

I feel that the Kutkashenskiy secretary assessed the situation accurately. The events of the mid-January period—the pogroms, riots, and rallies—brought the Azerbaijani people to the brink of national catastrophe, because in whatever sphere of life you look, you find a crisis situation: a crisis in the economy, a crisis in the party, a crisis of authority.

Work To Live

"We cannot reduce all our problems simply to socioeconomic problems," one senior official remarked in a conversation with us.

We agree, especially since during the days we spent in Azerbaijan we made contact, or, to be more precise, endeavored to penetrate the different strata of these problems. We will try, however, on the basis of some of last year's results, to analyze the economic situation in the republic.

Many remember the popular formula from the stagnation era: "Azerbaijan is boldly striding ahead!" This charming, majestic piece of nonsense has in reality proved a catastrophe for millions of Azerbaijanis, because the republic's economy is really on the brink of collapse.

In a recent report issued by the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the republic is among those that failed to meet the plan in many areas (incidentally, it has company in this from Armenia and Georgia, but for the moment we are only concerned with Azerbaijan). So what are some of these results? A reduction in the total volume of industrial output, failure to honor contract commitments in industry, the highest failure rate among the railroads to meet the plan for dispatching rail freight, a drop in cotton fiber purchases, a substantial drop in herd sizes and feed procurement, a reduction in milk and grape output, and failure to meet programs for commissioning public health care facilities, agricultural installations, and public education facilities and the plan for commissioning housing....

And now the figures that were not included in the report but which are being talked about here anyway. Last year the republic failed to receive 75,000 railroad cars carrying various kinds of freight: timber, cement, and automobiles, and meat, flour, and other foodstuffs. Azerbaijan now has 300,000 unemployed, or, to be more precise, had 300,000 unemployed because 160,000 people driven out of Armenia and some 40,000 Meskhetian Turks who have left Uzbekistan have "turned up." Tens of thousands of them need work. Meanwhile, the construction of a personal computer plant in Baku and an automobile plant in Gyandzha (Kirovabad) is on hold.

...Some 150,000 new jobs would have to be created to ease the tension in any way. But even this is only half the story because to provide permanent accommodation for the "new arrivals"—200,000 people—will cost a considerable amount of money: approximately R2 billion, according to local estimates. A republic which "exports" one-fourth of the national income it generates (R2 billion precisely) does not have that kind of money. And the USSR Council of Ministers evidently thinks that the refugees from Armenia and Uzbekistan have only "temporarily left their place of permanent domicile." You do not have to be a prophet to realize that, distressing though it is, these people have, alas, abandoned their homes forever.

The end result is what you would find in the elementary textbook of basic political education: Imbalances in the economy and flawed planning, multiplied by the soapbox democracy and strikes that have swept the republic, have broken many of the already overstretched strings of intereconomic ties and cast this land of plenty even further back from the economic results it is striving to attain. This is even more distressing when you realize that just the cotton, high-quality fuel, and grapes alone could bring it real prosperity.

It will seem to some that we are supplying grist to the separatist mill. Nothing of the kind! It is just that it is simply time to learn to run the economy intelligently: not for a favorable entry in the State Committee for Statistics report but for the individual.

What did it take to push the farmer into the abyss of unlawful action—like a stone from a precipice—when he fled in fear of death from Armenia to industrial Baku, a man without a roof over his head and, as a rule, with a far from ideal political education? What did it take to incite this man to commit outrages, a man so fired up with rage and nursing a grievance against fate, the

Armenians, and, ultimately, Soviet power? It is a fact that some who fled from Armenia were a driving force in the pogroms and looting which took place in Baku on the night of 13-14 January.

..."After every night comes morning," they say here. Today, after the many days spent mourning the people of Baku who were killed on 19-20 January, and after the departure of the "black tulips" carrying fallen soldiers and officers from the military airfields, the republic is as if shaking off the vestiges of a nightmare. Life has to go on, and to live you have to work.

This was the subject of our discussion with A.N. Mutalibov, the new first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Before being elected to this post, he was chairman of the Council of Ministers and, before that, chairman of the republic's State Planning Committee.

"The main thing I would say," Ayaz Niyazovich stressed, "is that life goes on. I say that we must do everything possible to restore life to normal and bring the republic out of its deep crisis. I say that we must get down to work, because the future of Azerbaijan depends on it."

Our interlocutor has inherited a difficult legacy. This was clearly shown, in particular, by the Central Committee plenum at which he was elected leader of the republic party organization.

They say in the East: "You cannot sow wheat with a sharp sickle." By this we mean that as long as the state of emergency lasts the troops are going to stay here. Once the economy is sorted out and order and calm prevail, they will go. In many respects, speeding up this process depends on the people of Baku themselves.

When Authority Is Lost

If we are going to be perfectly frank, by 18-19 January the state structures of authority in Baku had ceased to influence the course of events. Extremist forces in the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF] had seized the initiative in this informal organization and were essentially leading the situation in the direction of rebellion and coup d'etat.

The APF came into being on the tide of the democratic processes taking place in the country and attracted a massive following by managing to persuade people that it offered a really positive program and was capable of putting it into effect. Various people came together in the APF leadership and in the body of its supporters. However, those who were simply exploiting the atmosphere of perestroyka and glasnost to satisfy their desire for power and their personal ambitions moved into the forefront.

But there are also a considerable number of people with common sense among the APF leaders. A dialogue could and should have been conducted with them and cooperation built. The authorities balked at taking this step for a long time. The opportunity to build bridges was lost.

However, these bridges should have been built—from both sides—because the APF was finding increasingly broad support from the people, while the authorities were losing it in equal measure. The catalyst for this process was the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, in which Armenia's territorial claims against Azerbaijan led to interethnic conflict and brought the two republics to the brink of war. It has been the absence of a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem that has allowed the APF to become a cohesive organization, form cells and structures parallel to their state equivalents, and essentially become an opposition party struggling for power in the republic.

Many of the people we spoke to here in Baku—party workers, representatives of the intelligentsia, and members of the military—were inclined to regard the blunders made by the center, blindly followed by the republic's leadership, as one of the causes of the worsening interethnic conflict. The center was too slow to act, when it would still have been possible to put out the fire. It should, they told us, have sought a solution to the problem from the very outset on the basis of giving unconditional recognition to Azerbaijan's constitutional sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. On this basis the interests of everyone living in the oblast could have been brought together. The state acts confirming Azerbaijan's territorial integrity were late in coming, while unconstitutional actions taken with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh were not condemned immediately and uncompromisingly.

However, blaming everything on the center is now possible among those who are incapable of doing their own job properly. Hiding behind the demand to "give us independence" we find a considerable number of people eager to shift the blame for their own negligence by casting their eyes upward. A typical attitude—and Baku is no exception.

...Karabakh appeared to cause communists and the Central Committee to go separate ways. The broad masses of the republic's population and its leadership distanced themselves from the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and made the center responsible for finding a solution. The Azerbaijani leadership seemed to create a vacuum between itself and the people. This was seized on by APF radicals. The vacuum of influence was filled by the "frontline fighters." The growing mistrust of the center merged with mistrust of the local authorities; the things that had a literally explosive impact on people were pushed out of the forefront of the republic's problems by unrealistic or simply ridiculous programs, broadly advertised in the local press, such as "the universal computerization of the republic" and "a public bath for every village." To a considerable extent this was made possible by the work style of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and, in particular, Central Committee First Secretary A.R.Kh. Vezirov, who worked under cover of "perestroyka" phraseology without the proper collective approach or consideration of public opinion and scorned the democratic process in resolving cadre issues.

"What kind of professionals are we talking about?" our interlocutor in Baku sighed bitterly—a man made wise by his experience of life and the party and weighed down by the lofty titles achieved through hard work. "He may be an ambassador in an insignificant country or running the affairs of millions of people. If there is anything the professionals do like, it is concealing the true situation in the region to make themselves look better. Avoiding people like the plague, they use words like 'informal associations' and 'fronts' as if they were pet names, without bothering to analyze the nature of these movements, which sometimes have organizational structures akin to those of political parties. Completely heterogeneous forces, which are sometimes polar opposites, have come together under the umbrella of the APF, which regards itself as a front in defense of perestroyka. It sometimes happens that a 'formal' leader is a member of an informal organization. A different approach must be taken to different people, and unsinkable 'professionals' like Vezirov are incapable of that kind of creative policy...."

...Thus, by mid-January power in Baku had virtually passed into the hands of the People's Front. The Central Committee building was under blockade, its columns were covered with offensive inscriptions, and the approaches to it were swamped by demonstrators; a symbolic gallows destined, presumably, for the leader of the republic's Communist Party rose over the mob.

APF pickets were active on the streets, checking documents. Thus, having paralyzed life in the city, the front introduced a de facto state of emergency. Nonetheless, attempts were made to persuade APF leaders to refrain from illegal actions.

Ye.M. Primakov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, held a discussion with a mob of many thousands at an 18 January rally. They listened to him, but he had scarcely finished speaking when "Front" radicals tried to neutralize the impression produced by his speech. V.A. Guseynov, member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and chairman of the republic's KGB, held a discussion with APF leaders 19 January about the situation in Baku.

However, it was impossible to sway the extremist wing of the "Front." Troops began to enter the city at night to occupy the positions they had been ordered to take when the state of emergency was announced in Baku.

Eyewitnesses to the events of the night and the morning of 20 January described how they developed. Resistance to the troops, who were met by inhabitants, primarily young people, blinded by propaganda, entailed bloody losses on both sides. The number of fatalities has still not ceased to rise. By 30 January, according to official data, it totaled 142 people, including 28 servicemen. These figures will probably rise owing to those with serious injuries.

We bow our heads to all those who have died during this time....

According to up-to-the-minute data, we were told by servicemen, whom there is no reason to disbelieve, that troops pre-empted the extremists by no more than 24 hours. An assault on the Central Committee was scheduled for 20 January. Lists had been prepared of those who were to be isolated after the successful rebellion.

Shock

Bringing troops into the city reduced the people of Baku, without exaggeration, to a state of shock. Unaware of the serious reasons for the crisis, they felt aggrieved, as if a foreign army had entered the city. But it was their own army, and the need to obey an army that entered with guns blazing, to obey its commands and curfew, and to walk along the street in the evening under the watchful gaze of a man with a submachinegun—in short to live compelled to cope with the whole range of problems and inconveniences entailed by the presence of masses of armed men, this need was bound to cause emotional rejection.

We saw this for ourselves when we met with representatives of Baku's intelligentsia in an attempt to jointly understand the reasons for the crisis and derive or, more correctly, formulate some lessons.

"Reasons?" Anar, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Writers Union, people's deputy, and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, asked us. "I believe the tragedy could have been averted. After all, the authorities have a very powerful apparatus. The pogroms should have been averted. I also accuse those who sent unarmed people against tanks.... But close contacts should have been established with the front's healthy forces and the 'hawks' thus isolated. I often said this to Vezirov, but he only brushed me aside with talk of bandits and CIA agents...."

We drank the traditional tea while the pale sunlight beat against the windows and the nearby sea sparkled — nothing seemed reminiscent of the tragedy.... But no, we noticed that feelings were seething in the heart of our 52-year old host.

"I would say," Anar continued, "that my boyhood ended in 1956 when our troops went into Hungary, and my youth in 1968 when there was Czechoslovakia.... I now feel that life ended with January in Baku...."

The tragic intensity of the writer's words could be put down to professional emotionalism. But one cannot disregard the assessment of a well-known representative of Azerbaijan's intelligentsia, who has given the world—and this is no exaggeration—stars of the first magnitude.

"One must be able to extinguish the conflagration before it scorches us," the writer continued. "I believe that both the people and the soldiers were hostages here...."

Anar spoke of the prestige of the decisions taken at local and central level and of his inability to fulfill his own resolutions, in particular, relating to Karabakh. He spoke of the destructive impact on any city caused by the mass exodus of inhabitants of other nationalities. He also said that breaking off dialogue with healthy APF forces may result in more pernicious consequences.

"Indecisiveness in solving the Karabakh problem," Anar reckons, "was in many respects the cause of the outbreak of nationalism both here and in Armenia. National alienation is not our way. After all, Russian mothers also ask the following question quite reasonably: Why should their children perish on their own—Soviet—soil?"

We began discussing the departure of some Russian families from Baku.

"I see this as a personal tragedy," Anar said. "We must not kindle hostile sentiments in the Russian people toward Azerbaijanis. We must hold up to shame those who stooped to ill feeling toward Baku's Russian-speaking residents and forced them to become refugees. We would like them to return."

We agree with the writer. But who is entitled to condemn these people—the officers concerned for their wives and children? They witnessed terrifying crimes. There were also threats and insults.... It is pointless to hide this only to ensure that no doubt is cast on the traditional internationalism of a city whose inhabitants describe themselves as the "Baku nation." Just as we must not hide the fact that most of the Russian-speaking population feel quite calm. And just as one must take serious trouble to ensure that there is no unnecessary reaction from those people who are unable to separate the people from the villains and extremist elements' actions in Baku from Azerbaijanis' benevolence and their age-old habit of living cheek by jowl with Russians in response to the flood of refugees, which has dried up but which, we believe, should be reversed in the future.

USSR People's Deputy Olzhas Suleymenov, who rushed to Baku in its mourning, was right when he said that he was plunged into a sea of despair, grief, and hope when he met the people. Speaking on the "revived" television, Suleymenov urged the people of Baku to fuel the emergent confidence that it will prove possible to turn the tragic page and not lose one another—not to lose faith in the future and actively embark on life, heeding the voice of healthy forces.

Certainly, it is only by concentrating on the future that we can see a way out of the crisis. The road to the temple cannot be paved with bitterness and lust for vengeance.

"Democracy in Peril"

Soviet power in Lenkoran in the Azerbaijani subtropics fell on the night of 11 January. The local branch of the People's Front decided to suspend the activity of party, soviet, and law-enforcement organs throughout the rayon's territory. The leadership took on a "temporary defense committee." No, there was no shooting and no blood —Allah be praised, as they say. But the legitimate authorities were overthrown—whatever the quality of their work. Overthrown, whether undemocratically or simply by criminal means.

We are mentioning events in Lenkoran (incidentally, there are approximately 24,000 unemployed in this area) in connection with the fact that, from our observations, the word "democracy" has become a kind of small change here of late—of no account, one can say without exaggeration. Of course, everyone is at liberty to interpret democracy in his own fashion, viewing this concept from the standpoint of his own experience of life, his own idea of the course of history. But should we allow extremists to use democracy as a means of achieving their by no means democratic ends?

"Democracy in Peril!" That was the headline of an editorial in a recent edition of the APF's AZADLYG (FREEDOM), which was banned after the state of emergency was introduced by the Baku City commandant. Let us say for clarity's sake: It was published several days before Army subunits were brought into the city, but after the pogroms of 13 January. How did this newspaper assess the bloodshed? Unequivocally. Certain forces provoked it to ensure the introduction of a state of emergency in the republic, which would play into the hands of the center, Armenia, and Azerbaijan's irresponsible leadership and help quell democratic transformations in the republic using troops.

Whereupon the same edition said: "We primarily need technical self-defense systems. In every collective we must think about the possibility of producing them. Think and act! We need people with experience of defensive struggle and with theoretical knowledge in this sphere. Our homeland's defenders need warm clothing, transport, and a great deal else, and every collective, every village, and every home must provide them... Everything to defend the homeland."

Those are blatant appeals. Permit us to ask: Since when could a blatant call for an armed uprising been described as democracy? Since when could the development of events in Baku in the second half of January been described as "defending the fatherland" rather than as an anarchic rebellion with all the features of such "democracy"? When do innocent people become hostages to this "defense"? What is this? We understand the kind of figures involved here—informals. With a grenade? You would have thought that, as soon as the People's Front proclaimed itself a front in support of perestroyka, it would have set about perestroyka.

A leader of the republic's party organization told us in a fit of temper: "When splendid rallies had been under way in the city for six days in a row, I became firmly convinced that all this signified farewell to democracy."

The situation was indeed still unpredictable after the Armenian pogroms reached their peak. Internal troop subunits stationed in the city could do virtually nothing to resist the pogromists: Regular-issue weapons stood in the barracks, they could only be used on orders from Moscow and only after the state of emergency was introduced (let us note that the internal troops' legal status has still not been defined). Local forces preserving law and order were unable to cope with flying gangs of extremists, nor perhaps did they make too much effort to do this. The spirit of interethnic conflict deformed the actions, positions, and sentiments of executive organ staffers' themselves.

Democracy was indeed in peril. Let us try to look at the situation from a distance, as it were. In our view, events in Baku brought the process of democratizing our entire society to the point of instability, beyond which many people saw a need for "ironhanded" interference. Antidemocratic forces picked up weighty arguments to substantiate calls for perestroyka to be curtailed and prove its untimeliness. We do not doubt that they are also recalling Herzen, who once wrote that it was too early to give a people with no democratic traditions democracy.

The Baku crisis has also forced us to think about something else. Some of the popular movement which was brought to life by perestroyka is slipping into extremist positions amid the complex economic situation and the lack of fruitful cooperation between the authorities and the people. The situation is one and the same throughout the country. Here in Azerbaijan a theme has emerged—the nationalities question along with territorial claims on the neighboring republic, which were not settled in a clear, constitutional, and timely manner and resulted in an interethnic conflict; this catalyzed events and brought about a crisis in the republic's communist party, a crisis of power, and bloodshed.

But if we do prefer social therapy to surgical intervention, we must cure not the symptoms of the disease but its root causes. We do think that anyone should object to that.

Azerbaijan Situation Updated

PM0302195590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Special correspondent Ruslan Ignatyev telephone report: "Baku, Early February"]

[Text] Baku and the republic's other citizens are relatively calm at the moment. Public transport is running, stores have opened, schools are back at work, and students are attending the winter session. Many factories and plants are getting back to normal. However, it is too soon to talk about a complete stabilization. The situation in the republic continues to be tense. Strikes are continuing in a number of regions and by no means all enterprises—including major plants in Baku and Sumgait—have gone back to work. The shortage of Russian-speaking specialists, who have left the republic, is beginning to take its toll.

The situation is also extremely complex on the Azerbaijani Railroad. On the evening of 2 February, there were still 104 freight cars abandoned on the tracks. School classes are only one-half or one-third full, some even less. Virtually no junior students are going to school. Their parents are scared to let the children leave home.

According to official reports, extremists continue to be active in the capital and other cities. Attacks continue on posts and subunits of troops maintaining the state of emergency. Thus, a post in the vicinity of the V.I. Lenin Oil Refinery was shot at on the morning of 2 February. On Baku's Sharif-Zade Street, a GAZ-24 car without license plates ran over a serviceman who was part of a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops patrol detail. The officer commanding the detail fired warning shots in an attempt to arrest the criminal, but the bandit escaped. Last night a vehicle carrying assault troops was fired upon in the vicinity of Bina Airport (again after encountering a GAZ-24 car). Late that night, a ZIL-131 ran over three servicemen not far from the population center of Alyat. As a result, Senior Lieutenant K. Aleksandrov lost a leg and two sailors were seriously injured.

On the night of 1-2 February, 128 people were arrested for breaking the curfew. In this period, 35 firearms and around 2,000 different items of ammunition were confiscated. A helicopter was fired upon at 0810 on 3 February in the vicinity of the dacha settlement of Govsan.

Rallies are being held in certain parts of the republic. Demands are being made for the troops to be withdrawn from Azerbaijan. Leaflets are being distributed among the population stating that if the troops are not withdrawn people will not return to work. Extremists are trying to convince people that it was only the declaration of the state of emergency that provoked the unrest and led to bloodshed.

Hardly a single factory is working in Stepanakert. Production has also stopped in Mingechaur, with the exception of enterprises providing vital services. Mass departures [vykhody] for the state border were recorded in the vicinity of Nakhichevan City 2 February.

According to official figures, as of 3 February 1990, the number of servicemen and civilians injured in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and Armenia during the state of emergency stood at 148 dead and 503 injured.

Weapons Seized, Returned

PM0302000190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under general headline "State of Emergency: Steps Toward Further Stabilization": "Ministry of Internal Affairs Report"]

[Text] The situation in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] is gradually returning to normal. Nevertheless, according to State Committee for Statistics data, 48 percent of enterprises are not operating because of strikes.

The population in Khanlarskiy Rayon has voluntarily surrendered 12 units of weapons. Militia staffers in Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic confiscated 19 homemade grenades and 42 kg of explosives.

Armed raids for the purpose of seizing weapons have occurred in the Armenian SSR. Gukasyanskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department was attacked, and more than 20 units of different weapons were seized. As a result of measures taken, a large proportion of these weapons has been returned.

Weapons are still being surrendered in Yerevan and many of the republic's rayons. The largest quantity was surrendered in Artashatskiy Rayon (26 guns and over 1,800 bullets).

Stepanakert Developments Noted

PM0202235390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under general headline: "State of Emergency: Steps Toward Further Stabilization"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Stepanakert—The strike in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast continues. The military commandant's office is taking measures aimed at stabilizing the situation.

Commandant's offices have been set up at the railroad terminal, where cars with national economic freight continue to arrive, and at Stepanakert City communications junction to ensure normal operations under state of emergency conditions. An appeal by the military commandant has been sent to all rayons where a state of emergency has been proclaimed, calling for common sense and the prevention of unlawful actions.

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Reshetnik, leader of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs temporary press center, announced that a convoy of Internal Troops and Soviet Army servicemen arrived in the city of Dzhebrail, Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, for the purpose of creating a commandant's sector. In the process, and according to orders from the military commandant, the Azerbaijan People's Front rayon section was disbanded, three of its aktiv members were detained, and seven automatic rifles were confiscated. No weapons or special means were used during the operation, and the city population in general showed understanding for the action which was taken.

Passport regime inspections continue in the region, illegally held weapons are being confiscated.

Army Role in Baku Reported

PM0202145590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 4

[Major General G. Kashuba article under the rubric "In the State of Emergency Zone": "In Favor of Open, Honest Dialogue; Who Benefits From Fabrications About the Soviet Army's Actions"]

[Text] The Baku suburbs. A military convoy was advancing. A group of excited people was blocking the road. Voices could be heard saying: Why have you come, why do you not spare even old men, women, and children...? Captain S. Tafrov approached those assembled. Look at us, he said, do we really look like murderers and aggressors...? Think, who benefits from sowing seeds of discord and hatred?

Yes, it is not easy to report the truth today, it is difficult for it to penetrate the shroud of slanderous rumors and fabrications. Especially as in a number of Azerbaijan's regions the local papers have not been published for a long time, and the central papers have not been delivered. Extremist, nationalist elements rule in some local media. Now the situation is improving. But the dark wave of lies and provocative rumors has still not abated. Those who are inflaming passions, sowing the seeds of nationalist strife, and provoking unrest often present themselves as supporters and defenders of the people. There is silence about the fact that repeated calls for reason and practical steps to stabilize the situation and restore calm preceded the state of emergency.

With the aim of exposing the provocative rumors being spread among the population, the inflammatory appeals, and other actions by the extremists, more than 20 different leaflets with a total print run of more than 200,000 have been published by the Transcaucasus Military District political organs. Official items, the commander's reports, and the previous day's summaries are being published in the form of leaflets.

Now that television is working again and the printing of the central newspapers and the publication of local newspapers has started again, the main emphasis is on work in the labor collectives. Joint groups of political work officers and representatives of the city and rayon party committees and public organizations are traveling out to enterprises.

There is no need to explain what communications mean in this emergency. They are, apart from everything else, a most important factor in establishing stability. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine how many problems arose when telephone communications between Baku and Stepanakert were cut off. A cable was damaged in a ravine. Military communications personnel under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel V. Komissarov worked there with the republic's Ministry of Communications for 4 days almost without sleep. They got there by two modes of transportation: First by helicopter, then by armored personnel carrier. Now the line is operating. The military communications personnel laid more than 30 km of cable during this time. With their assistance the work of many city and rural mail and telegraph departments was restored. Each day the republic's Ministry of Communications is allocated aircraft and helicopters to deliver mail.

In Gyandzha City the unit command gave the public the opportunity to visit the military camp and to meet with the personnel. And once again the slanderous fabrications about the killing of Azerbaijani soldiers, which allegedly took place here, failed. In spite of the tense situation, these "open days" are being arranged in other garrisons' units and subunits. There are joint rallies in military camps. Servicemen, including soldiers and sergeants, are making speeches to inhabitants in city squares and streets. Contacts are being strengthened with local party and soviet organs, and there is also dialogue with different strata of the population. Political workers Colonel V. Salimullin and Colonel S. Ustyanov regularly meet with the elders and inhabitants of regions where their units are stationed.

"We have nothing to hide, our conscience before the people is clear," said Lieutenant Colonel S. Shilo, speaking on local television. "Let us together unmask the provocateurs and instigators."

Many stories are being spread in connection with the operation on 28 January in Yerevan to confiscate military hardware seized earlier by extremist groupings. It has also been presented in a distorted fashion in a number of foreign mass media. In particular, rumors about numerous victims and the "illegal" confiscation of arms are being exaggerated.

This is what Colonel V. Vostrotin, who was in Yerevan at the time, said in this connection:

"Extremists set up a hardware and arms dump in the territory of the local Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] committee. There was a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, and eight wheeled and tracked vehicles for different purposes. This was mainly equipment stolen from the military departments of the city's higher educational institutions. What is more, three 100mm hail suppression guns were hidden here. All the vehicles were filled with fuel and ready to move. The only thing missing here was ammunition.

The assault troops moved in a convoy in combat vehicles. At the approach to the DOSAAF committee building, extremists inside the building and on the roof opened fire with automatic weapons. Fortunately, none of the servicemen was injured. But afterwards many traces of bullet holes were found in the combat vehicles. We tried to start talks with the extremists, but without success. The assault troops had to return fire. I would like to stress that the soldiers generally are not the first to open fire. That was the case on this particular occasion.

Unfortunately, one of those firing from the trolley depot at the assault troops was killed.

But the main point is that all this was done in people's interests, for the sake of calm and safety. The army has always been inseparable from the people. It is also with them today in the land of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Only he whom it prevents from achieving his own aims, which, as it turns out, are far from the people's genuine interests, can oppose its presence there.

Moscow Radio Coverage of Transcaucasus Conflict

MVD Report on Baku Situation

LD0202145990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] The USSR Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] press center reports from Baku that the city has been living through a state of emergency for 2 weeks. During that time over 900 people have been detained for curfew violations. The process of normalization of life in Baku continues. The majority of enterprises and transport are operating normally. Important life-support facilities are functioning without interruption. However, some enterprises are shut down. The reasons for this are agitation by members of extremist groupings, and threats against workers by individual hooligan elements. Decisive measures are being used against such persons. For example, in (Nasinskiy) and other rayons there have been instances of workers detaining agitators and pickets who have been trying to prevent them from entering enterprises. Every day the population is receiving more active assistance from the Internal Affairs bodies and the troops responsible for maintaining public order in the city.

MVD Official Comments

LD0202183990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Telephone interview with major General Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nechayev, deputy head of the USSR Interior Ministry Internal Troops Political Directorate, by correspondent Sergey Omelchenko; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Omelchenko] Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, the media, the press, television, and radio are reporting daily on the situation in Transcaucasia. How is the situation shaping up today? What are the specific features of the situation today?

[Nechayev] In describing the situation which has formed to date in Azerbaijan, we note that it is tending toward operational stabilisation. However, not everything is so simple. The extremist circles are not calming down. Today they are continuing to spread all manner of rumors and fabrications. In some districts of Baku, representatives of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan are distributing leaflets calling on people not to go to work. Attempts at picketing enterprises have been made. We are conducting active explanatory work with the population. Propaganda groups have been set up in all rayons in the curfew sectors. In order to guarantee normal attendance at schools, the political workers of a number of units organized meetings with parents at their place of residence.

The Council of Veterans and the Council of Internationalist Troops are playing a very positive part in propaganda work, something which unfortunately you will not say about the representatives of the local soviet and party organs. Naturally, the troops are not involved now in any propaganda activity. That is understandable. As before, they are fulfilling the task of guaranteeing the security of citizens and the upkeep of pubic order.

The internal troops, jointly with the soldiers of the Soviet Army, are continuing to uncover and detain extremists or bandits, to confiscate weapons and ammunition. Among those who have been detained there are persons who are suspected of murder and robbery. shots are still ringing out. Regrettably, there are cases when troop details are fired upon from passing cars.

The situation in Gyandzha has also deteriorated somewhat in the past 24 hours. A radio station, ammunition, and military uniforms have been discovered near Adzhikend. Forty-two kg of ammonal, approximately 30 home-made explosive devices, and ammunition for automatic weapons have been confiscated in the Nakhichevan ASSR.

[Omelchenko] I know that a strike is taking place in Stepanakert. But what is the situation like generally in Nagorno-Karabakh?

[Nechayev] The vast majority of enterprises are still on strike in Stepanakert. A hostile attitude to servicemen is intensifying. Dozens of wagons which have not been unloaded have accumulated on the railways. Instances of sabotage are taking place. A column of refigerator vehicles arrived on 1 February from Baku with fish, canned meat, canned milk and other foodstuffs for sale in the retail network of Stepanakert. However, officials refused to accept it. Sarkisyan, the director of trade, has been held for 30 days for sabotaging the unloading operation.

Measures to confiscate weapons from the population in adjacent rayons are also continuing. In the city of Dzhebrail, seven automatic weapons were confiscated from the activists of the local detachment of the Popular Front.

[Omelchenko] And what can one say about the situation in the Armenian SSR?

[Nechayev] The situation today in Armenia is also difficult, especially in Goris Rayon and Gukasyan Rayon. Train traffic in the direction of Megri has not been restored. In short, there too, there are more than enough problems.

Progress of Baku Investigations

LD0202155190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Here is a report from the temporary press center of the USSR MVD in Baku. It is about the work of investigatory groups. In connection with the investigation into criminal cases related to events in Baku, an investigatory group of the Main Military Procuracy has been set up and has started work. The bodies of the Military Procuracy are a component of the USSR procuracy and are not subordinated to the military administrative bodies. So there cannot be any talk about any kind of pressure being applied to the group by the command of the USSR Armed Forces. The group is led by Colonel of Justice Klimov, deputy military procurator and chief of the Investigatory Department of the Military Procuracy of the Transcaucasian Military District. Experienced investigators of various nationalities are working under his leadership.

Investigatory groups of the USSR MVD and Procuracy are also engaged in investigating the circumstances connected with the murders and the infliction of grievous bodily harm and injuries by individuals from the civilian population as well as with the pogroms and the destruction of refugees' property. Included in these are also representatives of local law enforcement bodies.

All of the facilities of expert criminological technology—biological, ballistic, expert testimonies relating to clues and other things—are being used in the investigation.

'Confidential Telephone' Installed

LD0402120690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs press center reports from Baku. The confidential telephone installed a few days ago at the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs has not been quiet for one minute. This has been done to inform the population objectively and deal with various kinds of rumors. Although during the first days of the telephone's operations there was a considerable number of provocatory calls, now there are practically none. The majority of people calling the confidential service is citizens interested in the quickest possible stabilization of the situation in Baku and the cessation of the activity of provocateurs and hooligans.

Many calls demand the adoption of more resolute measures towards irresponsible persons who are hindering the resumption of the normal labor process. People are urgently demanding the severe punishment of the the organizers of these criminal acts. Among the questions which have literally rained down on the group manning the confidential telephone are many requests for the acceleration of the pace of the investigation of criminal cases into incidents of murders and pogroms. Requests are expressed to help restore public order in one or another rayon of the city and to not withdraw the troops before the full normalization of the situation in Baku.

The information arriving at the group is checked and handed on to competent persons, commandants of the city rayons, leaders of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR procuracy and relevant subunits of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs and procuracy. The officers of the political directorate of the country's Ministry of Internal Affairs who are manning the confidential telephone are working very intensely and with complete realization that by their activity they are making a practicable contribution towards normalization of the life of the Azerbaijani capital.

Journalists in Baku Appeal for Help

LD0202142890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0512 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From the "Panorama" program, with unidentified presenter; dispatch from Baku by Leonid Lazarevich]

[Text] [Lazarevich] Today the press publishes an appeal by the editorial staff of the KASPIYETS military newspaper to the journalists of the central mass information media who are reporting events in Baku. This appeal says: Unfortunately, in reading the material of a number of correspondents of IZVESTIYA, PRAVDA, and other central newspapers, we sometimes see in them a touch of sensationalism and even a failure to understand the situation. Yes, it is complicated and contradictory, but not so much so that a correspondent from Moscow could these days allow himself to move around Baku only with the accompaniment of two armored transporters.

We advise those who display an interest in reporting events in Baku with the maximum degree of objectivity to listen to Mayak. We invite those who want to help us in working in this city to telephone 39-54-59: That is 39-54-59. We give advance warning that our microphone will not be placed at the disposal of those who, by virtue of circumstances, have changed their point of view to the opposite one, nor to those who are trying to heat up passions. One more thing: Since 20 January, our team of journalists has not had any transport.

[Presenter] Why not?

[Lazarevich] We don't have any transport. Our driver refused to work with us and since then the vehicle has been standing idle. If there is an organiztion to be found in Baku which is willing to help us with transport, please get in touch with us on the same telephone number: 39-54-59. Help will be accepted if it is not accompanied by any conditions whatsoever. This has been a dispatch by Leonid Lazarevich, Mayak correspondent reporting from Baku. All our material is prepared by me, together with my comrades in the editorial office Islam Kuliyev and Gennadiy Kolenov, and also Andrey Pavlov, correspondent of our radio's external broadcasting service.

[Presenter] Leonid, thank you. For all of us here in the editorial offices in Moscow, and for you, too, where things are happening, it is of course very pleasant to receive a high appraisal on the spot for the work of Mayak and our contribution towards the stabilization of the situation, the very complex situation, in Azerbaijan. Of course it is very pleasant to hear this, that we are, so to speak, fulfilling this very complicated mission with honor and doing this work. Comrades in Baku who are listening to us today, do help us, help us. You understand the usefulness of our work. Help us with the transport, without any conditions, selflessly as we work selflessly. Please help, please help.

Border Situation Normalizing

LD0402195290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The situation on the Azerbaijan section of the Soviet-Iranian border. Our correspondent Sergey Omelchenko spoke on the phone to Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Borisovich Nizovtsev, spokesman of the Information Center of the KGB Border Troops. Here is the telephone conversation:

[Begin recording] [Omelchenko] Nikolay Borisovich, how can the situation on the Azerbaijan section of the Soviet-Iranian border be described today?

[Nizovtsev] The situation is returning to normal. The border troops are controlling the situation on the border.

[Omelchenko] For several days now the official crossing of the border has been organized, both from the Iranian side and the Soviet side. How do things stand today with the admission of people across the border?

[Nizovtsev] This channel of ours is now operating smoothly, we would say. In the past 24 hours some 300 people have been let through. One could say about the same number to Iran and to the Soviet Union.

[Omelchenko] And how many border crossing points have been installed?

[Nizovtsev] There is one for practically every border detachment on the Soviet-Iranian border. All questions are being decided by the government and the Foreign Ministry. A specific decision will be made about where and how many crossing points are to be installed on the border.

[Omelchenko] So everything will be done for the convenience of the people, the local residents, and the relatives who live in Iran and the Soviet Union?

[Nizovtsev] We for our part are ready to do everything necessary that is incumbent upon us.

[Omelchenko] But has anyone been detained in the last few days at the border?

[Nizovtsev] Yes, we have detained about 200 border violators. Most of them are people who tried to cross mainly for domestic reasons to their relatives but not at the places where we have defined the crossing points.

[Omelchenko] Has any contraband been seized?

[Nizovtsev] No, no cases of that have been noted as yet.

[Omelchenko] And how are relations with the local residents going now?

[Nizovtsev] The ordinary workers who live near the border fully support the measures which we are taking to normalize the situation, so that they may work in peace, and so that their families can be protected. But at the same time, in the daytime attempts have been made by groups, albeit small, to cross the state border. Also, on the section of the Prishibinskiy border detachment in Dzhalilabad rayon, local leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan have been spreading calls to destroy our barriers at the border and to open up free passage to the territory of Iran and back.

[Omelchenko] Are contacts being made with the People's Front of Azerbaijan in order to explain that, after all, a border must be just that?

[Nizovtsev] Of course; we have large groups of political workers and commanders in this sphere and meetings are being held with the People's Front. In most places we have already solved these questions. The situation is gradually being normalized. In future, we shall take all measures in order to control the situation in the Azerbaijan area of the Soviet-Iranian border so that the border becomes inviolable. [end recording]

Moscow TV Updates Transcaucasus Situation

Refugee Problem Discussed

LD0202213590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1000 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A conference has been held in the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on the problem of refugees from Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. It was emphasized at the conference that care for the refugees must become the concern of the Azeri people.

In Sumgait a number of industrial enterprises are still not operating. For the first time since the events of January republican and central newspapers have been delivered to Gyanzdha. Overall, the situation in the town has stabilized. Most industrial, transport, service, and communications enterprises are working as normal.

In Sheki the kindergartens, medical establishments, and enterprises of the municipal, retail, and communications sectors are functioning. Bus traffic has resumed along the intercity routes. Lessons have still not begun, however, in the town's academic establishments, and the collectives of a number of enterprises are still on strike.

The strike in NKAO is continuing. The military commandant's office is taking measures to stabilize the situation.

In the town of Dzhebrail in the Azerbaijani SSR the rayon branch of the People's Front of Azerbaijan has been disbanded by order of the military commandant. Three of the branch's activists have been detained and seven automatic weapons confiscated. Special means weapons were not used during this operation.

In the Armenian SSR there have been armed raids aimed at seizing weapons. An attack has been carried out against the Gukasyan rayon Internal Affairs Department, where more than 20 weapons of various kinds were seized. As a result of measures taken most of this has been returned.

At the same time, weapons are still being surrendered in Yerevan and many areas of the republic.

Azeri Poet Interviewed on Arrest

LD0202112390

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1838 GMT on 1 February carries a 17-minute interview with Azeri poet Khalil Rza by commentator A. Krutov. Krutov first points out that Rza is currently under investigation for violating Azerbaijan's law on racial equality. Krutov begins by explaining that the KGB had phoned the editorial office to say that Rza wished to make a statement on television. Rza confirmed that his appearance was voluntary. According to Krutov, Rza had been arrested for demanding the sacking and expulsion of Armenians from Baku. Rza admitted that his arrest was "necessary," and that he was partly to blame for what has happened in Azerbaijan, adding, however, that his actions were aimed at "saving Armenians" from the pogroms and murders that he sensed might occur.

Rza then reads a statement in a mixture of Russian and Azeri, emphasizing his respect for the Armenian and Azeri peoples, and calling on them to live together in harmony.

TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments

4 Feb Situation Reported

LD0402155190 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—By TASS special correspondents: Baku. The situation in Azerbaijan is being normalised. However, strikes are going on at a number of industrial plants in the cities of Baku, Ganja, Sumgait and Ali Bairamliy.

According to the republican committee for statistics, industrial strikes have been held at more than a half of all enterprises. A material damage caused by them is estimated at over 300 million roubles.

Rallies take place in some areas of the republic. An unsanctioned mass rally took place in the town of Evlah. Those present demanded troop withdrawal and the lifting of the state of emergency. Some speakers called for violent actions.

Stepanakert. Motor roads remained blockaded in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous region. Movement along the roads is done under the escort of troop patrols. Three goods trains arrived at the Stepanakert railway station.

Yerevan. The local population have taken up a well-wishing attitude to the personnel of military units stationed to control the situation in Goris, Kafan and a number of other Armenian areas bordering on Azerbaijan. This was the impression of a People's Deputy of the USSR Major-General Mikhail Surkov, head of the political department of the Yerevan garrison, after a tour of the areas.

The presence of troops is necessary so far, since shots are still fired there, the general said.

According to Surkov, people continue to hand over the earlier stolen weapons and equipment. The bulk of hail-control guns and training armoured vehicles have been returned.

Spokesmen for the Armenian National Movement expressed readiness to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies in uncovering and withdrawing combat weapons.

Riga. The practice of hostage taking was unanimously condemned at a meeting in Riga between the plenipotentiary representatives of the popular movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The meeting which ended in the Latvian capital on February 3 was held under the auspices of the Baltic Council. A communique signed by all the participants in the meeting emphasised the need to make every effort towards a settlement of the conflicts in Transcaucasia peacefully.

The two sides intend to use their prestige and influence for the release of hostages by March 1. The communique is to be considered by the leadership of the popular movements and will acquire the force of mutual obligations only upon endorsement.

Stepanakert. There has been no case of loss of life in Nagorno-Karabakh ever since the state-of-emergency decree entered into force. However, it is too early to speak of complete normalisation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Major General Vladislav Safonov, commandant of the state-of-emergency area, believes.

Touching upon contacts between the military and the local population, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Safanov said that although one cannot say that these contacts are very close, people are showing increasing understanding of the tasks and goals of the commandant's office. At the same time he urged Armenians and Azerbaijanis themselves to establish contacts between themselves.

NKAO Commandant on Security

LD0302175790 Moscow TASS in English 1719 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Stepanakert February 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin:

Since entry into force of the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of January 15, 1990, "on declaring a state of emergency in the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region [NKAO] and some other regions", there have not been a single casualty. However it is too early to speak about the complete normalisations of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Major General Vladislav Safonov, military commandant of the region of the state of emergency, told TASS.

He said that although a number of first-priority matters in preventing the bloodshed in the region have been solved, it is not possible to keep large numbers of interior troops and Soviet army soldiers in the region for a long time.

"We pin great hopes for normalising the situation on the healthy forces of both peoples," Safanov continued.

The major general also said that a number of roads had been unblocked and troops, jointly with militiamen and local population, conducted passport checks in several settlements of the region and adjacent areas, which were especially restless. Troops continue to conduct checks, evict people without residence permits from the region and to reappropriate weapons.

Fulfilling the tasks to it, the military commandant's office is guided by the January 15, 1990 decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and existing legislation, Safonov said. But life poses its own problems. For example, strikes are continuing in Stepanakert, even though the commandant has the right to ban strikes and detain plant managers, for example, for up to 30 days. But will this stop strikes?

In providing the legal basis for the state of emergency, Safanov said, it is necessary to define more clearly the powers of bodies designed to maintain order in the area, on which the state of emergency is imposed. This particularly applies to the mass media.

Speaking about contacts between the military and local population, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Safanov said that, although these contacts cannot be described as very close, the population has recently displayed understanding for the tasks and goals of the commandant's office.

"This can be confirmed by the fact that many operations are being held without the use of weapons and special means. Conversations with people, meetings with members of parliament and activists of mass movements bring positive results. Any step that will help improve contacts with the inhabitants of the region is important today," Safonov stressed. He also urged Armenians and Azerbaijanis to establish contacts with each other.

"It is important to attain the desired peace without sitting down at the negotiating table. There is no other way and this should be borne in mind in the first place," the military commandant stressed.

Baku: 152 Enterprises Working

LD0302114590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Baku, 3 Feb (TASS)—TASS special correspondents report: The working rythm is gradually being established at the enterprises of Azerbaijan's capital. Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, met representatives of workers' collectives in the Central Committee of the Republic's Communist Party.

"However gravely we might experience what has happened, it is necessary to more and more actively restore normal life and to set to work," he said, "and this means searching together for ways of surmounting the crisis and of resolving our fate, relying on the wisdom of the people and their strength and unity."

According to official data, of 255 enterprises in Baku, 152 were working yesterday.

In connection with the tragic events in Baku, an investigatory group of the Main Military Procuracy has started work here. Investigatory groups of the USSR Procuracy and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are also engaged in the investigation into the circumstances of the events connected with murders, the infliction of grievous bodily harm, pogroms, and the destruction of refugees' property by members of the civilian population. Representatives of local law enforcement bodies are also part of these. Dozens of individuals suspected of robbery and murder have been detained during operational investigatory measures.

Work is underway to confiscate weapons, ammunition, and explosives being held illegally by the population. In the republic's Yevlakskiy, Khanlarskiy, and Bardinskiy Rayons two home-made grenades, three AKM [Kalashnikov improved assault] rifles, two small calibre rifles, and 30 hunting rifles were voluntarily submitted to the internal affairs bodies on 2 February. The facts testify to the necessity of such work: Children found a bottle with an incendiary mixture in the town of Dzhalilabad. An explosion took place, six children aged between six and 11 years were seriously wounded.

The trial of a certain Antonyan and Amirdzhonyan [names as received], detained in Lachinskiy Rayon, took place in Baku. Firearms and explosives were found in their possession; the criminals rendered armed resistance to members of law enforcement bodies. Both were sentenced, accordingly, to 10 and nine years imprisonment in an intensified regime labor colony.

Lenkoran. Mourning flags are the only reminder of the tragic events which occurred here a few days ago, when five PFA [Popular Front of Azerbaijan] guerrillas and a Soviet Army officer died in an exchange of fire. Servicemen are working hard to explain the causes of the events. Yashar Rzayev, first secretary of the Lenkoran Communist Party City Committee, and Sardar Guseynov, akhund [equivalent of imam in Iran] of the local mosque, have appealed to the population on local radio for calm and good sense. This is all producing results: People have begun going to work and children to school.

However, armed guerrillas from the PFA's local section who had gone into the forests of Talysh still remain there, something which is prompting anxiety among the population.

A joint appeal by the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies and the command of the local garrison to activists of the Lenkoran PFA, calling on them to suspend rallies, is being broadcast on the radio. Otherwise, the appeal says, the military command will be compelled to bring a contingent of internal troops into the town.

Gyandzha. A significant number of industrial enterprises in the town are still not working. Party and local soviet staff and representatives of social organizations are conducting explanatory work in labor collectives, calling on workers and specialists to return to production. Schools, other educational establishments, kindergartens, medical institutions, and post offices are working.

Sumgait. As on previous days, workers at the majority of the town's enterprises are on strike; only food and power enterprises are working.

Nakhichevan. The situation on the Soviet-Iranian frontier has been calm for the last 2 weeks [as received], and tension is falling in the autonomous republic as a whole. The majority of industrial and construction organizations are functioning.

Baku Curfew Shortened

LD0202225190 Moscow TASS in English 2237 GMT 2 Feb 89

[By TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—The past day was relatively quiet in the Azerbaijani capital, says a report of the Baku Commandant Lieutenant-General Vladimir Dubinyak.

According to the information of the Azerbaijani State Statistical Committee, 152 out of the 255 enterprises in

Baku were functioning today. The work of urban transport is gradually being resumed. At the same time, tension persists. Strikes continue at a number of enterprises.

The commandant also said that in order to create more convenient conditions for residents, the curfew was shortened for another hour and will now last from midnight till 5 a.m.

The January events had a negative effect on the economy of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. According to the information of the local statistical board, the losses from strikes amount to nearly two million roubles.

The strike continues in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The commandant's offices for the ensurance of normal work in conditions of the state of emergency were formed at the Stepanakert railway station, where trains continue to arrive and at the city's communications centre.

TASS learned at the Provisional Press Centre of the Soviet Interior Ministry that a column of internal troops and of servicemen of the Soviet Army arrived in the town of Dzherbrail, Azerbaijan, to introduce the curfew regulations. According to the commandant's order, the district branch of the Azerbaijani Popular Front was disbanded. Three activists were detained. Seven submachine guns were confiscated. Arms and riot-control means were not used during the operation.

TASS learned at the Soviet Interior Ministry that raids to seize arms continue in Armenia.

There was a raid on the Gukasayan District Department of the Interior Minstry. More than 20 units of various arms were seized. As a result of measures taken the biggest part of the arms has been returned.

Representatives of the popular movements of Azerbaijan and Armenia today got down to the negotiating table in Riga in the quest for the settlement of the ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia.

Latvia, one of the three Baltic Republics, was chosen as the venue of the meeting. The leaders of popular movements of the Baltic republics are in the Baltic Council which assumed the role of a mediator.

At today's news conference, members of the board of the Armenian National Movement expressed gratitude to the Baltic Council for holding the meeting which, they believe, opens the road to reasonable solutions.

They expressed the readiness to cooperate with the democratic wing of the Azerbaijani Popular Front.

Representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation yesterday expressed gratitude to the Baltic Council. They hold that the very fact of such conversations in Riga is a good result, leading to a better understanding and to the destruction of the enemy image.

MVD Report on Transcaucasus

LD0302170890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 Feb 90

[From AZERINFORM and ARMENPRES reports.]

[Text] From a bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]:

The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. The situation in the republic is returning to normal. However, at a number of industrial enterprises in the towns of Baku, Gyandzha, Sumgait and Ali-Bairamly, strikes are continuing. According to the State Committee for Statistics of the Azerbaijan SSR, over 50 percent of enterprises are not working. The material loss is in excess of R300 million. Forty-two persons have been detained for infringing the curfew. On the Azerbaijan railroad, 122 freight trains are standing idle, 69 of which are scheduled for despatch to Armenia. The losses from this are beginning to worry labor collectives. Today, 500 staff from the "Nord" scientific-production association turned up at Kishliy station in Baku on their own initiative and helped to unload railcars. One hundred railcars were emptied.

In the capital and other towns, extremists are still active, according to official bulletins. This morning, a helicopter came under automatic fire from the suburban settlement of Govsany.

Rallies are being held in some parts of the republic.

In the town of Yevlakh, an unsanctioned rally of many thousands has taken place. Demands were voiced for the release of leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, the withdrawal of troops and the lifting of the state of emergency. Individuals attending the rally called for acts of violence.

In the town of Talyany, the surrender of weapons continues. At the Internal Affairs department, 255 hunting rifles have been handed in.

In the Babegskiy Rayon of the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous SSR], eight homemade explosive devices were found on the Nakhichevan-Shakhbuz motor road near a tire repair shop.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the blockading of roads continues. Traffic is moving under escort by military details. Three freight trains have arrived at Stepanakert train station.

Only life-support enterprises are functioning in Stepanakert and Martuninskiy Rayon. In Mardakertskiy Rayon, some 10 percent of enterprises are strikebound. In Shushinskiy Rayon, some enterprises are not operating owing to a lack of raw material. Twelve persons have been detained for infringing the curfew.

The Armenian SSR. At the radio center of the republic's MVD, two radio transmitters and six power units have been seized by a group of unknown persons. An investigation is being carried out.

Area 'Gradually Returning to Normal'

LD0202131590 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—The situation is gradually returning to normal in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, strikes continue at some plants in Baku, Sumgait, Gyandzha, Ali-Bairamly, Mingechaur and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the USSR Interior Ministry reported. A total of 150 freight trains, including 106 bound for Armenia, are stranded on the Azerbaijani railway.

Eighty people were detained over the past 24 hours for violating the curfew.

Three submachine guns, two small-caliber rifles and seven hunting rifles have been returned in Khanlar region. In Nakhichevan militiamen seized 19 homemade grenades and more than 40 kilograms of amonite powder.

The situation remains tense in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region. Only key plants operated yesterday in Stepanakert and the Martuninsk, Shusha and Mardakert regions. Industrial enterprises in the Askeran and Gadrut regions operated according to schedule. One freight train arrived in Stepanakert. Twenty eight people were detained in the region over the past 24 hours for violating the curfew.

There have been no marked changes in the situation in Armenia. Previously stolen firearms and military hardware are being returned. However, weapons were stolen in an attack on the office of railway guards in the Idzhevan region last night. An inquiry has been set up. Twenty-six guns were stolen in an attack on the Gukasyan regional department of the Interior troops. Most of the stolen weapons have been reappropriated.

Factories Resume Operation

LD0202130890 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—By TASS special correspondents from the scene:

The situation in Azerbaijan is becoming stabilised. Law and order forces maintain control. The majority of factories have resumed operation in Baku, although strikes are still going on in a number of other cities in the republic.

There are 12,000 Interior Ministry troops and 5,000 Soviet Army servicemen in Baku, Lieutenant General Vladimir Dubinyak, the commandant of Baku, told journalists at a news conference on Thursday.

The Military Command has worked out a four-stage schedule to remove the strain, including lifting the curfew that was imposed in Baku.

Joint groups of political officers, representatives of the city and district committees of the Communist Party and public organisations are visiting enterprises to expose provocative rumours that are being spread among the population, the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA (WORKERS' TRIBUNE) newspaper reported today.

The atmosphere in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is calm. Classes were resumed. Major industrial enterprises are functioning. Farmers are busy preparing for springtime fieldwork. Railway traffic has resumed, too.

The situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region remains tense. No trains have reached Stepanakert station over the past 24 hours.

In Stepanakert and in Martuni district, enterprises with continuous production cycle are operating and public transportation is partially functioning.

The situation in Armenia has not substantially changed over the past 24 hours. People in the republic continue to hand over previously stolen weapons voluntarily.

Attempts by representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia to settle their inter-ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia with the mediation of the Baltic Council will continue here today.

The Baltic Council comprises the popular fronts of Latvia and Estonia and the Lithuanian Sajudis [Movement for Restructuring].

Baltic Council members met the delegates from the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) on Thursday. They tentatively discussed an agenda for the meeting. A delegation from the Armenian National Movement (ANM) is expected to arrive today.

Participants in the consultations agreed in advance to discuss the decision to send troops to Transcaucasia, the problem of refugees, and the hostage exchange issue. They will not touch upon the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Dainis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian Popular Front (LPF), said at a news conference here on Thursday that the organisers of the meeting did not know whether the two Transcaucasian sides would agree to direct talks. As a result, provisions were made at first to have separate consultations with each delegation.

The LPF spokesman specially emphasised that they are engaged in consultations and that the Armenian side objects to the world "negotiations", since "it is not yet disposed" towards negotiations.

Strikes Continue

LD0202131590 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—The situation is gradually returning to normal in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, strikes continue at some plants in Baku, Sumgait, Gyandzha, Ali-Bairamly, Mingechaur and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the USSR Interior Ministry reported. A total of 150 freight trains, including 106 bound for Armenia, are stranded on the Azerbaijani railway.

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Three submachine guns, two small-caliber rifles and seven hunting rifles have been returned in Khanlar region. In Nakhijevan militiamen seized 19 home-made grenades and more than 40 kilograms of amonite [as received] powder.

The situation remains tense in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Only key plants operated yesterday in Stepanakert and the Martuninsk, Shusha and Mardakert regions. Industrial enterprises in the Askeran and Gadrut regions operated according to schedule. One freight train arrived in Stepanakert. Twenty eight people were detained in the region over the past 24 hours for violating the curfew.

There have been no marked changes in the situation in Armenia. Previously stolen firearms and military hardware are being returned. However, weapons were stolen in an attack on the office of railway guards in the Idzhevan region last night. An inquiry has been set up. Twenty-six guns were stolen in an attack on the Gukasyan Regional Department of the Interior troops. Most of the stolen weapons have been reappropriated.

Rallies Held in Baku

LD0202151790 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Baku February 2 TASS—By TASS special correspondents Pavel Sinyakov and Vladimir Fomin:

On most streets in the Azerbaijan capital, recent events have left few traces except for armoured personnel carriers still posted by day on the city's main roads. People are going about their everyday chores. Baku Commandant Vladimir Dubinyak described the past night as relatively calm.

Rallies were held at many plants in Baku. Speakers called for preserving the international traditions of the city. Workers at the Nord plant sent cables to cities throughout the country urging those who have left the republic in panic to return. In response to rail transport problems, workers appealed to Baku residents to help unload freight coaches next Saturday. A meeting on Thursday was addressed by Azerbaijani Party chief Ayaz Mutalibov.

The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers discussed at its recent meeting the problem of refugees from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. It was stressed that the refugees were the responsibility of all Azerbaijanis.

The January events had a negative effect on the economy of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. The local statistical authority estimate a damage from strikes to the economy at nearly two million roubles. Workers are doing their best to rectify the situation as soon as possible.

Open-hearth furnaces have resumed operation at the Azerbaijani pipe rolling plant in Sumgait, but not all furnaces can operate at full capacity due to disruptions of technological process.

A number of industrial enterprises in the city stand idle. Party and government officials and representatives of public organisations have set about explaining to people the need to restore the normal working rhythm.

In Gyandzha most industrial enterprises, transportation, services and communications are functioning as normal. However some enterprises suffer from the acute shortage of raw materials and parts. The production of some types of industrial products have been sharply reduced.

Preparations for spring sowing started in Azerbaijan's Shekinskiy region. Kindergartens, medical establishments, communal utilities, trade and communications establishments are functioning and bus traffic has resumed.

General, technical and vocational schools remain closed in the city. Strikes continue at the local industry factory, the tobacco plant and the garment-making factory. Construction organisations, the production silk association and the local print shop are closed.

General Describes Situation in Armenia

LD0302144590 Moscow TASS in English 1403 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Yerevan February 3 ARMENPRESS-TASS—"The local population is well-disposed towards the personnel of military units monitoring the situation in the Goris, Kafan and other districts of Armenia bordering on Azerbaijan," Major-General Mikhail Surkov told TASS.

The political department head of the Yerevan garrison and a people's deputy of the USSR, has toured these districts.

He said most of the people looked with understanding at the servicemen's mission. The presence of troops is still necessary, since the sounds of gunfire continue to be heard here.

Sergeant Alexey Solodetskiy, who guarded the television tower, was wounded by militants from the Azerbaijani side on February 1. Last night, hunting guns were fired at troops from the side of Saldash village in Azerbaijan. Troops were forced to return the the fire. No casualties were reported.

"A military communique of the past 24 hours says that the digging of trunches and installation of searchlights were observed on Azerbaijan territory adjacent to Udzhanis village of Armenia's Kafan district," Surkov noted.

Earlier seized weapons and equipment continued to be handed in, according to the general. "A large number of hail-control service guns and practice armour were returned. Representatives of the Armenian National Movement expressed readiness to cooperate with law enforcement bodies in searching and confiscating weapons."

Under the earlier agreement between representatives of the two republics' informal organisations, Armenian armed groups were withdrawn from areas of possible contact with the Azerbaijan side.

Further on Detained Newsmen

LD0402175190 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Baku February 4 TASS—By AZERINFORM and TASS correspondents:

Azerbaijani Popular Front militants have not given up attempts to disrupt efforts by party and soviet bodies and military authorities to stabilise the situation in the republic. Slanderous rumors and inciting leaflets are being circulated and political adventure-seekers continue inciting acts of civil disobedience in order to sabotage the decisions of local authorities.

A special telephone service has been set up to provide impartial information and combat all kinds of rumors. It is run around the clock by the Baku Commandant's Press Service at the Azerbaijan Interior Ministry.

The first calls were openly rude and provocative but the situation has changed since. Most people who call up the service are sincerely interested in the speedy stabilisation of the situation in Baku and in the termination of activities that hamper normal life and work. Many people call to demand more resolute actions against irresponsible individuals hindering the restoration of normal work processes. People call for a severe punishment of criminal activity instigators.

The service is flooded with requests to speed up the inquiries into criminal cases connected with murders and pogroms, conduct on-the-spot investigations, help restore law and order in one or another district, organise supplies of essentials and retain troops in the city until the situation is fully normalised.

Every appeal is registered and handed over the the commandant of the respective district, the leaders of the USSR Interior Ministry and the USSR procurator general as well as respective republican bodies.

The military and law enforcement agencies report that military patrols and posts have been fired on. Two stolen armoured personnel carriers were used to fire on a military helicopter outside Baku on the night from February 2 to 3. In the city of Sumgait militants used automatic guns to fire on a hospital. No-one was killed or injured.

An unidentified car knocked over and seriously injured a serviceman in Baku on February 2. In an attempt to stop the car, a military patrol opened fire that wounded an Icarus bus passenger in the shoulder.

In another incident a drunken lorry driver tried to break through a road block guarded by a military post on the Baku-Lenkoran highway. Three servicemen were gravely injured one of them losing a leg in the collision. The lorry was stopped and the driver detained.

In the Divichinskiy district of Azerbaijan three militants of the local Popular Front branch were detained on suspicion of complicity in the rape, robbery and murder of Lyubov Bagdasaryan, a post office official. An investigation is under way.

On January 20, the Azerbaijan KGB officials detained French journalists Jan Daniel Claude, Dominique Dudouble, Stephan Bantura and Michel Peinar, who arrived in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic from the Ararat district of Armenia, for violating the rules of entry and travelling in the border area. A protocol was drawn up and the journalists were sent out of the republic.

French citizens Alain Noghes and Vlastimir Nechitch, accredited in Moscow as photo correspondents of the Sigma and Gamma agencies, were detained under similar circumstances on the same territory on January 27.

On January 31, BBC correspondents Benjamin Brown and Rory Peck, who arrived in Azerbaijan from Tbilisi, were detained in the town of Imishly by KGB officials for violating the rules of travel on Soviet territory and enterance into the border area.

The USSR Foreign Ministry was informed of the facts for it to take corresponding measures.

Azeri Women Meet With Mutalibov

LD0402193190 Moscow TASS in English 1857 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Baku February 4 TASS—By AZERINFORM and TASS correspondents:

The people of Azerbaijan will have to muster all their forces in order to overcome emotions and sort out impartially the reasons for the tragic developments, it was pointed out during the meeting of A. Mutalibov, the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, with members of the Republic Women's Committee.

"For all women in the republic the tragic events in Baku on January 19 and 20 were as their own pain," said Professor Z. Verdiyeva, chairwoman of this public organisation.

"But now, I believe, the main thing is not to give way to grief, but to do all we can to relieve the suffering of those who lost their near and dear, and to restore normal live in Baku, in Azerbaijan as a whole.

Women are actively participating in this work. Verdieyva told the gathering about her meeting with Lieutenant-General Dubinyak, the military commandant of Baku, to discuss the state of emergency in Baku and the easing of the curfew.

She drew the attention of the leaders of the republic to what, in her opinion, hampers the stabilisation of the situation, including the instigator activity of the militants, the one-sided coverage of developments in Baku by the central press and the impassive attitude of Azerbaijan's deputy corps.

There is an urgent need to make clear, as the population demands, what made imperative the introduction of troops in Baku. It should be remembered, among other things, that on the eve of the event, the party and state bodies were no longer able to control the situation and the military no longer concealed their intention to take over the power in the republic.

The Popular Front's most radical leaders and activists in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan, whose personal ambitions led to the death of many people, are even now trying to disrupt efforts by party and Soviet bodies and military authorities to stabilise the situation in the republic, and continue inciting acts of civil disobedience.

In the Jalilabad district, Popular Front militants are seeking to terrorise the population, escape responsibility, cover up traces of their criminal activity and hide weapons and ammunition.

In the Divichinskiy district of Azerbaijan three militants of the local Popular Front branch were detained on suspicion of complicity in the robbery, rape and murder of a post office official. Investigation is under way.

In Govsaniy, an area on the outskirts of Baku, a group of militants used two stolen armoured personnel carriers to fire on a military helicopter on the night from February 2 to 3. In the city of Sumgat militants used automatic guns to fire on a hospital. No-one was killed or injured.

A special telephone service has been set up at the Azerbaijan Interior Ministry to provide impartial information and combat all kinds of rumours. It is run around the clock. Residents of Baku call to ask questions and demand timely and accurate information about the situation in Baku and the republic as a whole.

The first calls were openly rude and provocative but the situation has changed since. Most people who call up the service are sincerely interested in the speedy stabilisation of the situation in Baku and in the termination of activities that hamper normal life and work. Many people call to demand more resolute actions against irresponsible individuals hindering the restoration of normal work processes.

The collective of the Shekinski meat and milk factory is rendering assistance to the families of those who were killed or wounded on the tragic days in Baku. Regular shipments of fresh meat, butter and sausage are despatched to Baku. Team and shop collectives plan to increase the volume of relief shipments to the afflicted families.

Yerevan Media Review Events in, Around Armenia

Operational Staff Meeting Reported

NC0302222590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] A report from the operational staff of the republican council on the state of emergency states that on the night of 2 February the situation in the republic was not calm. Shooting from the Azerbaijani side was reported in various Zangezur rayons. Since the day when near the border zones Yerevan [word indistinct]. Soviet Army and the Internal Affairs Ministry Forces (?have become targets) for Azerbaijani extremists.

Shots were fired yesterday near Kapanskiy Rayon's [name indistinct] from Kubatlu Rayon's [Suvadah) Village. One of the bullets wounded [name indistinct]. The Kapanskiy (?airport) was fired at from (Zangelan) Rayon, and shots were fired near Gorisskiy's (Kornizov) Village at the internal affairs forces stationed nearby.

The soldiers, who are carrying out their mission (?sincerely, replied) the villainous [word indistinct]. The operational staff also pointed out that the activities of the local party and soviet bodies in the Armenian-inhabited areas and especially in Zangezur villages are doing everything they can to facilitate the difficult task of the soldiers stationed there.

During the night, there were no attempts to steal arms. On the contrary, handing in arms and military materiel to the representatives of the militia and the Soviet Army continued. According to the Internal Affairs Ministry, thanks to the measures taken by the militia and [word indistinct] employees, 82 of the 165 (?stolen) cars were found and 31 have already been returned to their owners.

Telecommunications services are operating normally. A stable telephone link exists between the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Shaumyanskiy, and Getashen sub-rayon villages. The residents there are now receiving [words indistinct]. Thanks to the Telecommunications Ministry's efforts, various central newspapers published in these cities [words indistinct] are to be distributed there, while other newspapers will be [words indistinct].

Despite the decision to reestablish the flights to (?Artsakh) [NKAO], Shaumyanskiy, and Getashen, no flights are taking place.

There are 270 refugees being treated in Yerevan hospitals. Yesterday six people were brought to the hospitals, and three were discharged while two were [word indistinct].

Scene at Armenian Border Areas Described

NC0202214190 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] How is the situation in the border regions? The party committee first secretaries of the border rayons replied to this question from a KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN correspondent:

The situation in Megrinskiy rayon last night was relatively calm. Shooting had stopped in the border zones. However, large numbers of fighters of the Azerbaijan People's Front are massing in (Nuvady) and this is unsettling the people.

Despite the agreement reached, no trains have arrived.

Life in Noyemberyanskiy rayon is normal. There is tension only in the border villages. The villagers, in cooperation with the military, are keeping guard day and night. The shots from the other side have ceased.

The situation is also calm in Yeghegnatsorskiy rayon. The inhabitants in the border settlements are keeping guard, together with the troops. The rayon has also received refugees from Baku.

[Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian at 1700 GMT on 2 February reports that the operational staff of the republican council on the special situation has stated that "the situation was tense in the republic on the night of 1 February and dawn of 2 February. There were no cases of arms seizure. The situation was unsettled around Yegvard village in Ghapanskiy rayon due to shots that were fired from the Kubatly rayon of Azerbaijan. The people of Yegvard did not return fire."]

1 Feb Council Proceedings Reported

NC0202213090 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] During the 1 February meeting of the republican council on the special situation, it was stated that, thanks to the measures taken by the Armenian leadership, civil flights between the republican airports and the Armenian inhabited villages in Azerbaijan will resume.

It was indicated that the situation in the republic is under control, though tension persists in many regions. Causing serious concern are the continuing attacks on militia units which are here to defend the republic's population against every kind of encroachment. Such actions are severely condemned by both state and law enforcement bodies as well as public organizations, including the Armenian Pannational Movement and Armenian Liberation Army. Another cause of concern is the fact that unlicensed cars have appeared in different regions of the republic, including trucks which are being used for lawless purposes. The law enforcement bodies were instructed to step up the fight against such phenomena and do everything to prevent such occurrences.

Telephone and radio links with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and with the villages of the Shaumyanovskiy rayon and Getashen sub-rayon are functioning normally. However, the people of Artsakh [NKAO] are unable to watch Armenian television.

According to information provided by the Health Ministry, as of 1 February, 275 refugees from Baku were being treated in the clinics of Yerevan.

Arutyunyan Receives Oleynik 1 Feb

NC0202223090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Yerevan, 2 Feb (ARMENPRES)—Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, met on 1 February with Boris Oleynik, USSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and renown Ukrainian writer.

A comprehensive discussion took place during the meeting on the prevailing situation in the Armenian republic, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and the region as a whole.

The first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee spoke about the measures being taken to stabilize the situation in the republic. He drew particular attention to the exceedingly grave situation that has emerged as a result of the ongoing blockade. An acute shortage of fuel and energy resources is felt and the population is being supplied with foodstuffs and vital necessities with difficulty, he said.

Arutyunyan put forward observations on ways to get out of the critical situation prevailing in the region.

For his part, Boris Oleynik expressed concern over the situation in the region, pointed to the enormous amount of work being done in the republic to normalize it, and spoke about the outstanding problems before the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet.

Issues related to the activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its two councils, committees and commissions were raised during the meeting. It was mentioned in particular that the role and the responsibility of the Council of Nationalities should be broadened in the resolution of interethnic problems.

Baku Radio Carries Announcements of Events

Dubinyak on 'Peaceful' Situation

NC0502105890 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0430 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku—read by announcer]

[Text] The situation was peaceful in the city last night. The operative situation is good. The protection of the [word indistinct] and the (?security) of the citizens through the efforts of the military servicemen, the internal affairs department, and the youths is being maintained.

Last night 52 persons were detained; 37 were detained for violating the curfew and the remaining 15 were detained for breaking administrative rules. The situation in the city is generally peaceful. Every opportunity is being created to allow the city and the citizens to resume their normal activities.
Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku.

Dubinyak on Servicemen's Behavior

NC0202193090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku dated 2 February; read by announcer]

[Text] The situation continued peaceful in Baku last night. The work carried out to protect the citizens using the strength of the Armed Forces and Internal Affairs Department personnel and to report the lawless activities of certain individuals is continuing. A total of 107 individuals were detained during the day. Eight of these were detained for violating the curfew and three for violating the administrative rules and the state of emergency regime and for spreading false rumors.

According to the republic's state committee, 152 of the city's 255 establishments were operating. This is 59.6 percent of the establishments.

Transportation services are being gradually restored. However, tension continues. Complicated developments and obstructionist cases are preventing the restoration of normal life. Demonstrations continue to be held in a number of establishments [words indistinct]. The resumption of classes in the schools is being obstructed.

I urge you not to be carried away by rumors and to resume work. I also urge you to uphold with all your strength the frinedship between the two peoples, which is more sacred than anything and which has been created over many years.

Many Azerbaijanis appeal to us. They uphold the eternal friendship between the Azerbaijanis and the Russians and urge us not to allow the departure of Russian speaking people from the city. The activities of the rumor mongers are forcing the Russians, the Azerbaijanis, and the entire Soviet people to feel deep concern. I believe that through their common sense and awareness, the people of Azerbaijan will set up determined barriers against the rumor mongers who are pushing their own people toward a tragic situation.

Comrades, we are receiving complaints concerning illegal activites by a number of military servicemen. We apologize to the citizens for such activities caused by us. We urge that you convey any complaints to the commandant's headquarters in the city by dialing the following numbers: 992810. I repeat the telephone number: 982810. You can also appeal to all the field commandants.

All the information will be carefully investigated and the guilty will be seriously brought to account. Furthermore, I make it known that a car without registration plates drove toward a group of soldiers in Sharif-zade Street this morning. A soldier was injured in the hip. The soldiers fired warning shots at the car trying to force it to stop. As a result, a passenger of a passing bus was injured. No one else was harmed. An investigation has been launched into the incident.

I make the following appeal to car owners who engage in criminal activities: Put an end to such activities. Innocent people suffer as a result of your activities. I also make the following appeal to the Soviet troops and internal units: You arrived in this city at a difficult time. Approach the citizens with concern. Adhere to socialist laws and forms of courtesy. Calmness, common sense, [word indistinct]; that is what is expected from all of us.

I announce that for [word indistinct] the city residents, the curfew is in effect from 0000 hours to 0500 hours.
Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandat of Baku

Armenian Leaders 'Criminal Irresponsibility'

NC0202180590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] A TASS correspondent has reported the following: It has been reported that, on 28 January, the Soviet Army unit in Yerevan confiscated one tank, one armored vehicle, [word indistinct], eight tracked and wheeled vehicles, and three guns, which had been seized by the extremists earlier.

KOMMUNIST, which is the organ of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, the Armenian

Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, published an article on the matter on 31 January. The article was entitled: The Republic's Council Meets on the Question of the State of Emergency.

The article noted that the republic's council met on the question of the state of emergency on 29 January and examined the dispute that broke out in the 26 Commissars rayon in Yerevan on 28 January. The article continued: It was noted that the military unit carried out an operation to confiscate military equipment without reaching an agreement with the pertinent state organs of the republic. Arms were used during the operation. As a result, (?Matosyan), who was a worker affiliated with the [name indistinct] production union, was killed.

The article went on to say:

The republic's procuracy has launched a criminal investigation, together with the military procuracy. The leaders of the republic categorically condemned this irresponsible incident and reiterated their unchanging conviction that all the problems, including matters related to the confiscation of arms should be resolved through convincing methods, serious efforts to explain matters to the people, and proper adherence to the laws.

Under the circumastances, the concept of explaining the Soviet laws is very surprising. Some people in Armenia are prepared to describe the confiscation of the illegally held arms in that republic as iresponsible behavior, not the illegal possession of various types of arms, particularly various types of technological means of warfare. The criminal investigation was not launched in connection with the theft of military equipment and other technical means of warfare. It was initiated because force had been used to retrieve the arms that were in the hands of extremist elements.

Does the Armenian SSR procuracy regard the removal of all the military vehicles that were based in the military department of the State University of Yerevan for training purposes as a legal action? Does it regard the seizure of the naval gun in the military department of the [name indistinct] institute in Yerevan as legal bahavior? To what extent do incidents such as raids on military troops, militia units, and militarized guards groups with the objective of seizing arms—and such occurrences are not rare in the Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR's—comply with the laws?

The arms that are in the hands of the extremists in the region can be numbered in thousands. There are many cases confirming that these arms have been used against the people in raids and in acts of robbery. Millions of Soviet people have been following the tragic incidents in the Caucasus with great pain and emotion. They are demanding that the meaningless and merciless massacre be ended. Meanwhile, the state organs are taking resolute measures to establish law and order and safeguard democracy and the security of the people. However, some people in Armenia and Azerbaijan do not wish to behave with common sense and sound thinking. Nor do they attach any importance to the calls for the surrender of arms and the establishment of a dialogue, which is they only means of resolving the dispute and reaching a mutual agreement.

Under these circumstances, can it be possible to regard the measures implemented by the leaders of the Armenian SSR as effective measures? As mentioned earlier, can convincing methodes and efforts to explain matters to the people produce the desired result?

Although we regret any death that takes place, it is impossible not to mention that this tragic incident has not been an effective lesson to the nationalist leaders of the informal units. On the contrary, they have used this tragic incident to provoke tension in Armenia. A mass meeting was held in Theater Square in Yerevan on 29 January. The leaders of what has been described as the National Army of Armenia called on the participants in the meeting not to surrender their arms and created fear by brandishing their weapons. (?Matosyan), who was killed on 28 January, was a member of that army. The armed guards unit of the (?Rok) factory in Echmiadzin and the internal affairs administration in Yerevan were attacked on the same day. A total of 116 fireamrs were stolen.

This confirms the extent of the criminal irresponsibility of those who try to inspire nationalist feelings in the people of Armenia and who try to push the Armenians toward a precipice.

Political & Social

Estonians Approve Independence Declaration

Desire Sovereign Status

LD0202195390 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1900 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Correspondent Hannu Vilpponen report from Moscow]

[Text] The Estonians are proposing negotiations for the republic's independence to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Our correspondent Hannu Vilpponen gives an account of the 70th anniversary commemoration of the Tartu Peace Treaty, where the statement was approved.

[Vilpponen] The Estonians are no longer satisfied with demanding extended independence within the framework of the Soviet Union, but want their legal rights and their status as a sovereign nation in the international community back again. The independence declaration was approved today at Tallinn Town Hall on the 70th anniversary of the Treaty of Tartu, and it was approved by altogether 3,900 deputies of various (?levels), from members of local soviets to members of the USSR Congress of Deputies. Only 101 representatives voted against the independence declaration, and 16 abstained. Those voting against were among the Russian-Estonians. This was not an Estonian parliamentary or Communist

Party official program declaration, but since among those making the resolution were the highest leaders of Estonia, right up to the premier and president, the independence declaration was not just any paper, but represents in practice the official wishes of the Estonians. The Estonians justified their declaration on the basis of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, whereby the Soviet state, led by Lenin, recognized the independence of Estonia, and renounced forever its claims on the Estonian people, land, and property. They also appealed to the UN and to the CSCE countries to promote their cause. Estonian President Arnold Routel, who has been elected chairman of the negotiating commission, has apparently been talking about the announcement with Mikhail Gorbachev a couple of days ago, but there is no information about a possible beginning to the talks.

Deputies Protest Declaration

PM0302194990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy: "Declaration Adopted. What Now?"]

[Text] Tallinn—Yesterday Estonia celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty with Soviet Russia. The jubilee celebrations turned into an event which will probably long determine the political situation in the republic. The festivities began with the hoisting of the national flag on Big Hermann Tower in the presence of representatives from all Estonia's cities and districts.

In the evening A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, delivered a speech at a meeting in City Hall of people's deputies at all levels in which he analyzed the situation in the republic and the preparations for talks with the central government on the restoration of Estonian statehood. Categorical calls were heard for the "yoke of occupation" to be "flung off forthwith," for the "withdrawal of occupying forces" to "begin tomorrow," for "everyone to hand in their military documents," and for the Supreme Soviet to be "declared an illegal organ of administration." The growing ferment of emotions and impatience prevented a discussion of the extreme acuteness and complexity of the problem of restoring the statehood of a republic whose arteries are closely bound up with the entire country.

...Late that evening a declaration was adopted on the question of Estonia's state independence. It noted: "The meeting proclaims that, with a view to restoring the Estonian Republic's independence and on the basis of the fact that the Tartu Peace Treaty is still in force, Estonia is initiating through its representatives constructive talks with all sides on which the de facto restoration of the Estonian Republic's independence depends."

In response to the adoption of this declaration a group of deputies from Narva, Kokhtla-Yarve, Sillamyae, and Tallinn asked to read out a statement on behalf of their voters. On being refused, the deputies walked out of the auditorium. This act and the appeals from the assembly presidium worked, and Deputy A. Velko of Kokhtla-Yarve was given the floor.

"The resolution adopted on state independence undermines the process of renewing the federation, runs counter to the interests of a considerable proportion of Estonia's residents, and takes the republic to the brink of a confrontation," he said. "We will be forced to use every measure to defend our rights. To that end, we are setting up a Minority Rights Defense Committee and giving it the following powers. To declare, if necessary, its lack of confidence in the republic's Supreme Soviet. To call for civil disobedience from the population vis-a-vis the republic's organs of power. To appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet to protect the fundamental interests of the ethnic minorities living in the republic who have been turned into internal emigres in their own country. To strive for the immediate adoption of laws on a Soviet federation reinforcing the mechanism by which republics may secede from the Soviet Union. This mechanism should include political, economic, and moral guarantees for those of the country's citizens who oppose the republic's secession...."

What prompted this sharp statement? Supreme Soviet Deputy V. Andreyev of Narva replied:

"For two years the leaders of the Estonian Communist Party and the republic have deceived the Russian-speaking population. They assured us that talk about Estonia seceding was groundless. They tried to persuade us to pay no attention to the appeals from the National Independence Party, the Citizens' Committee, and other extremist groups. Today these same leaders voted in unison for these same appeals which they had recently been equally united in condemning, they voted for cooperation with those same citizens' committees, and approved the Congress of Estonian Citizens. That's politics, they say. In our opinion, it's simply a con. And conning people never does anyone any good. We've been driven into a dead end and left there while people applauded. We'll get out of it ourselves...."

Russian-Speaking Deputies Set Up Group

LD0302201590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Representatives of Russian-speaking deputies of all levels, who were elected in Estonia, have set up an organization named "Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights." A bureau consisting of seven people has been elected, headed by USSR People's Deputy Yarovov. According to the committee's information report, its main goal is defending USSR citizens' political and economic rights within the composition of a renewed Soviet federation or by way of creating a new state and territorial formation. The group of deputies making up the committee has published a political declaration. It expresses the view that the declaration on the issue of Estonia's state independence, which was adopted at a meeting of deputies to local soviets and the Republic's Supreme Soviet, and people's deputies elected from Estonia, contradicts the vital interests of a considerable proportion of the republic's population and, therefore, cannot be implemented without their participation.

Estonian Russians Protest Moves

LD0402083690 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 0600 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Representatives of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia condemned the declaration of Estonian independence that has been approved in Tallinn. According to the Russian representatives, the declaration forces them to defend their rights by every available means. At a meeting held in Tallinn yesterday, representatives of the population that has moved to the republic from elsewhere formed a committee to promote their interests. The meeting also discussed a proposal for the formation of a self-governing Russian region in Estonia.

About 3,000 representatives of Estonian local soviets and congress deputies approved a declaration on Friday [2 February] proposing negotiations with the USSR Supreme Soviet on restoring independence to the Estonian Republic. Most of the Russian-speaking representatives at the town hall meeting walked out in the middle of the meeting.

Party Official Comments

90UN0745B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with V. Malkovskiy, first secretary of Narva Gorkom, by unidentified SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent; place, date not given—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA introduction]

[Text] As we know, the text of the political declaration was issued by V. Malkovskiy, first secretary of the Narva Gorkom [city party committee], in the name of a group of participants to the 16th Plenum of the ECP [Estonian Communist Party] Central Committee. SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA therefore posed to him a number of questions.

[Correspondent] Tell us, Vladimir Sergeyevich, why did the group of Central Committee members and candidate members, and ECP Inspection Commission members consider it necessary to issue their own version of a political declaration at the plenum?

[Malkovskiy] We thought the Central Committee Plenum should more clearly define its position on questions of greatest urgency today in our republic, i.e., it should declare unambiguously that sovereign Estonia will remain in the renewed federation of the USSR, and the independent ECP in the CPSU, progressing along the path of democratic transformation. The matter of consolidating communists and all inhabitants of the republic is a very important issue today.

[Correspondent] And what, in your view, can the basis of consolidation consist of?

[Malkovskiy] The economy, of course. It is our deep conviction that we must now lay aside the national, group, and personal ambitions which are dividing Estonian society and get down to work. Nothing unites people so much as common work and common concerns, which in the final analysis become common interests.

[Correspondent] We know that the very fact of a second political declaration text appearing at the plenum has been evaluated in certain newspapers as a violation of party ethics—even as an underground variant....

[Malkovskiy] This is quite strange—insofar as we handed our considerations over to the drafting commission of the plenum for inclusion in the basic declaration text. And it is the drafting commission that suggested to me, as one of its members, that we read our text out separately, since it would be too complicated to combine both texts. And we would have to suppose that the commission saw this not as a violation of party ethics, and certainly nothing like an underground version, but simply as an opportunity to apprise plenum participants of a point of view which might become a subject of discussion at the coming ECP conference.

[Correspondent] The idea was even perceptible in the mass media that this comprised a platform for creating a new party. They already managed to christen it the "night" party, even the colonial party....

[Malkovskiy] You can invent whatever you like. You can even distort the text.... But we resolutely stress our adherence to the policy line of the 15th Plenum of the ECP Central Committee. And of course we stand for party unity and not division—although, naturally we cannot help but be put on guard by extreme points of view directed straight at ideological division of the party.

Not Meant To Weaken Gorbachev

LD0402220990 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The independence declaration which was approved on Friday by representatives of the Estonian local soviets is not meant to weaken the position of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. According to Toivo Kuldsepp, deputy foreign minister of Estonia, who spoke at the Future Congress of the Jyvaskylae Winter, the independence declaration is rather connected to the parliamentary election campaign which has already started. Reijo Skottman reports:

[Begin recording] [Skottman] The independence declaration which was approved last Friday by representatives of the local soviets of Estonia proposes that the USSR Supreme Soviet hold negotiations to return the independence of Estonia. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Toivo Kuldsepp, who addressed the Jyvaskylae Winter, the aim is to clarify relations with other Soviet republics and not to complicate the matter of reforms, which will be tested at the CPSU Central Committee meeting tomorrow.

[Kuldsepp] It might be that there are such circles who again see it as a sign of weakness of the central administration. On the other hand, we have not asked for or demanded anything unheard of or unproper, but we have wanted to (?take) Estonia's relations to other Soviet republics to some ground of agreement. We have founded a state committee or working group for this which will develop the conditions for negotiations and after that there will be negotiations on what sort of relations we have. This is completely normal between two independent republics, and the Soviet republics are, also according to the constitution, independent.

[Skottman] Were those independence declarations some sort of strategy, occurring just before the meeting?

[Kuldsepp] They were not a strategy, rather they were part of an election campaign in Estonia, that is on 18 March we will have elections of the Estonian parliament. Before that the political sphere must be cleared and we must see what sorts of goals the different groups will advocate.

[Skottman] According to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuldsepp, the worst hindrance to the success of the March parliamentary elections is the varied amount of views which have come up. There are more than 10 noteworthy political groupings in Estonia, and if moderate success and a working parliament is required, then the real aims of the groupings must be uncovered.

[Kuldsepp] The biggest problem at the moment is that there are so many problems that we shoot without having time to load the guns. Thus, some important event ends and a new one is already in view in 10 days or 2 weeks. We should have [words indistinct] situation that we can develop our own goals in a year or two or three, because it is not possible to solve the problems we are now facing in a day or two, not even in a month.

[Skottman] The Russian speaking inhabitants of Estonia have condemned the independence declaration of Estonia. The Russian speakers of the republic say that the independence declaration is against the rights of a large part of the population. At a meeting last night, the Russian speaking inhabitants founded a committee to defend their rights. The meeting took up a proposal to found an autonomous Russian area in connection with Estonia. Of the population of Estonia, about 40 percent are Russian speaking. On Friday almost 3,000 representatives of Estonian local soviets proposed negotiations to the USSR Supreme Soviet on returning the independence of the republic. [end recording]

Estonia's Titma on Time for Talks With Moscow

LD0402213890 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Interview with Mikk Titma, secretary of Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, by unidentified reporter on 4 February; place not specified—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage indistinct] [Titma] But it would be something very positive if Gorbachev's team came out on top at the plenum and made more radical transformations.

I believe that after March it will be the right time to start serious talks with Moscow, including the subject of the special status of the Baltic states and our de facto independence.

[Reporter] Many people here at home ask what are you messing about with Moscow for? In my opinion, however, serious talks are just beginning.

[Titma] I would like to put it like this: We can indeed here at home declare that we are independent and [words indistinct]. Let us assume that we also receive massive outside support. The factual situation, however, will still be determined by the central government of the union. And for that reason [words indistinct]. We can only make a breakthrough with Estonian determined stubbornness, so that the union's central government will understand the situation is like Ryutel said: Here we stand because we can't otherwise. [passage omitted on Titma's predictions on tomorrow's plenum in Moscow, this being the last chance for for the conservatives.]

Toome Addresses Tallinn Tartu Peace Treaty Rally

LD0202144490

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1000 GMT on 2 February carries a 30-minute live relay of festivities in Tallinn to mark the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty. Indrek Toome, chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Government, speaks at these festivities. Toome recalls the historic significance of the day and says: "Today is another time of change as we observe and foresee the accelerated passage of history, upon which we too want to cast our influence. Even now, here and there bloody conflicts are in progress."

Toome continues: "Fear imagines many things. The world fears explosions even from areas where—should things progress naturally—they could not arise under any circumstances. This is the background against which our idea of independence has acquired a new topicality. This is the background which we will have to take into account when choosing and explaining our next steps. Our path is the path of the lofty truth and in today's world this does not necessarily require somebody's blood. Our freedom does not endager any state nor any individual. And so, we will not give up our thoughts of freedom. Today we feel that these thoughts are not solely nostalgia and a longing for a one-time half-legendary Kungla [place in Estonian mythology]. Today we need independence even if we never before enjoyed it and we demand it not only because of the right for it in principle but also because of the basic need of it, because our country is being destroyed, the people are tiring and the younger generation is losing its clear sight and faith in a tomorrow which would be according to their own wishes and which would depend upon themselves." Toome concludes: Today 70 years ago, the following words were written: Proceeding from the freedom of all nations and their right to self-determination, Russia definitely recognizes the independence and self dependence of the Estonian state, relinquishing voluntarily and for forever all sovereign rights which Russia held in respect of the Estonian people and land. No obligations whatsoever in respect of Russia will follow for the Estonian people and land from the previous attachment to the Russian state.

"These words are from a treaty which was drawn up observing all requirements of international law. Neither side has ever annulled this treaty. All the required signatures and seals exist on it and it has never ever been lost or declared to be nonexistent like it sometimes has happened with some other paper. This treaty exists and is still valid in front of the whole world. Today Estonia asks again its partner in the treaty, within earshot of the whole world: How will things stand, gentlemen?

Neither those whom we ask nor we ourselves can give an unambiguous answer as to when and how, but the independence and selfdependence of the Estonian state is logical in the light of presentday developments."

Endel Lippmaa, deputy chairman of the Estonian Union of Work Collectives, spoke next. Referring to history, he says that Estonia never joined the USSR. "And for this reason the already existing or to-be-issued laws on secession will not be valid in respect of us. They will be valid in respect of all union republics but not in respect of the Baltic states whose status is quite, quite different.

Lipmaa continues: "We face the restoration of the status of the Republic of Estonia not only de jure—which indeed exists—but also de facto, which means, in actual fact." Lipmaa remarks how the Helsinki security conference act states there is to be no changes to frontiers by military means and goes on: "But, on the other hand, an earlier, well, preceding article notes down the mechanism for regulating borders via peaceful agreements. I stress: We do not even need peaceful agreements. What we need is sensible discussions of matters because no new borders are required; it is only necessary to recognize the old ones, and nothing else in this respect. When Gorbachev was in Lithuania, Lipmaa says, he was told what that republic wanted, now it is Estonia's turn, for which purpose people's deputies have assembled. According to Lipmaa, one precondition was the annulment of legal acts which half-legitimized the occupation of Estonia 50 years ago, which was done at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on 24 December. Lipmaa continues: "Apart from that, we now need to approach the USSR Government bodies with a request and proposal to start specific talks to clarify this issue. And we need to set up a corresponding commission. All preconditions for this almost exist, only the Estonian congress has not as yet been elected. It will evidently also be necessary to draw in its representatives. I think that by the end of February we will have created all the necessary preconditions."

Estonians Celebrate Treaty, Discuss Sovereignty

LD0302205990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Measures continued today in Estonia devoted to the 70th anniversary of the peace of Tartu. This is what the historians called the peace treaty concluded between Soviet Russia and the bourgeois Estonian republic in the city of Tartu on 2 February 1920.

[Correspondent Kh. Lenk, identified by screen caption] A meeting devoted to this date took place in (?Vyzhgorod) in Tallinn at the foot of Long Hermann Tower, on which the blue-black-white national flag of Estonia is hoisted every morning at sunrise. The speakers quoted the text of the peace treaty, which put an end to the military actions between the Red Army and the army of bourgeois Estonia during the civil war and the foreign intervention in 1920. In this treaty Soviet Russia recognized Estonia as an independent state.

A general meeting of people's deputies of local and republican soviets and of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place in Tallinn City Hall. The meeting adopted by a majority of votes a declaration on Estonian state independence. It says, in part, the meeting welcomes any measures of a democratic nature directed at restoring Estonian sovereignty and calls upon the republic's citizens to take an active part in the Estonian congress elections and the elections to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, which are to take place on 18 March.

Potential Multiparty System in Estonia Explored

LD0302164290 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Tallinn February 3—By ETA correspondent Aljeksandr Suits:

There is now hardly a politician in Estonia who doubts that the March elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet will lead to the creation of a multi-party parliament.

Second Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and Professor of Philosophy Mikk Titma shares this opinion.

Titma believes that the time of amorphous public organisations, like popular fronts, has passed. They have oriented the Estonian political development towards democracy, but they cannot solve specific economic and political tasks. Only parties, defending their programs in parliament, are capable of doing this.

Estonian Prime Minister Indrek Toomje has declared his readiness to create a coalition government. He was elected chairman of the democratic association "Vaba Eesti" (Free Estonia), whose members—politicians—are trying to consolidate democratic forces on the eve of the elections in order to jointly solve pressing social and economic problems.

The demarcation between various public movements has begun. Leader of the Estonian Popular Front Marue Lauristin decided to create a Social Democratic Party. A forum of Social Democrats two weeks ago proved that the party will have lots of supporters.

Leader of the 400,000 strong Council of Labor Collectives Uelo Nugis has declared his intention to establish a Liberal Party.

There are plenty of people who would like to establish a party. Although a one-party system officially exists in Estonia, the number of parties has topped two dozen and continues to grow.

None of them can be registered by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but, in case the law is changed, they are all ready to join the pre-election campaign. Deputies of the present Supreme Soviet believe that the law will be changed very soon.

Even the Royalist Party, which wants to restore the monarchy by inviting the younger brother of the Swedish king, will join the campaign.

Who will win the elections? No one in Estonia knows. Titma believes that none of the parties will gain a majority of voters as there are too many of them. However, the main force in the parliament may be a coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals from popular movements, Titma thinks.

New Conservative People's Party in Estonia

LD3001185590

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1200 GMT on 24 January, in the "Antenna" program presented by Tiit Sinissaar reports on a new party established in Estonia in a 45- minute interview with (Kalle Eller), one of the leaders of the new Estonian Conservative People's Party.

(Eller) says the party started from within the Preservation of the National Heritage and decided to call itself a people's party because it does not center on Tallinn or Tartu but all across Estonia, proceeding first and foremost from the ancient values of the Estonian peasantry. The constituent assembly was initially held in Tallinn on 6 January and then in Tartu on 21 January. A skeleton program and a constitution were adopted and a 5-member board elected.

(Eller) says that although they sent material about their constituent assembly to the republican papers nothing has appeared in print other than a small notice in the local Tartu paper.

Social Democrats Hold Congress in Tallinn

PM0102170890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 4, 28 Jan 90 p 7

[Grant Gukasov article: "Social-Democrats—Back Again After 73 years"]

[Text] Tallinn—Tallinn has been the scene of a Constituent Congress held by the Social-Democratic Association. A declaration it adopted put it on record: "Five years of perestroika have made it self-evident: The country has passed beyond the edge of an economic, political and moral crisis...."

"The superideologized model has reached a deadlock. It has supplanted the working people's interests with 'state' interests used to screen the bureaucracy clinging to power. The violence done to economic laws and the desire to rule by fiat have continued. The two ugly phenomena of the 20th century—national socialism and barracks socialism—have brought too many calamities in their wake. In contrast to them, Social-Democracy has nowhere entailed diktat, violence or one-party system. Dissociating ourselves from the ideology and practice of the existing system, we feel our responsibility for the country's future. The domination of the apparat estate threatens lawlessness and arbitrary rule and is pushing the country towards catastrophe."

"Who are we?" Nikolay Tutov, people's deputy of the USSR and one of the co-Chairmen of the Association's Executive Committee, repeated my question. "First and foremost, we favour political economic and social democracy. We want to take part in the search for a way out of the crisis as an organized political force. Together with other democratic movements, we advocate consistent and radical reforms, and oppose all and every form of violence, humiliation of human dignity, and attempts to monopolize the right to make a choice. Partnership is a salient feature of our Association. We favour compromises and mutual respect. After all, they alone can give an impulse to the country's return to civilization and to the creation of a society of freedom, solidarity and justice. For the time being we aren't numerous—the Association unites the Social-Democratic Parties of Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Here, at the Association's Constituent Congres, the Organizing Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Party has been set up. A parliamentary party of 72 deputies has been formed in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"The Constitutent Congress has adopted the Platform and Rules, and elected representative leading bodies.

"This is one more step towards the rise and formalization of a democratic minority," I was told by people's deputy of the USSR Aleksandr Obolenskiy, who was present at the Congress as an observer. "It mustn't be hoped that the new entities will be recognized by juridical persons—both baiting and persecution will be in store for them. But there is a need to build a competition for the CPSU. This alone can provide a genuine stimulus to improvement and development. Our official leadership does not at all intend to work now with the representatives of a democratic minority. As before, all fundamental decisions are adopted by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet is a working body of the Presidium which envelopes decisions in a legal coating. The part of an extra is allotted to the Congress as it was to the Supreme Soviet of the stagnation times. The democratic minority, however, is tolerated only insofar as it insures against obvious blunders and utterly misguided decisions. The so-called power syndrome which has taken shape presents a serious danger in the country today. The authorities begin to respond effectively only if people go beyond appeals, letters and petitions to concrete action. The people are acquiring the feeling, and becoming firmly convinced that anything can be achieved in our country only after exerting power pressure. This is a very dangerous syndrome.

MN requested Mikk Titma, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, to describe his attitude towards the recent Constituent Congress and the prospects of the Social-democratic movement.

"Talk about social-democracy must be conducted in real earnest," he said "Incidentally, the Communist movement had its roots in the latter. And a rupture occurred over a fundamental issue. classical Social-Democracy believed that the model of the future had to be built in a democratic way, on the basis of a civic society, whereas the Communist movement put forward a theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat - a theory which originally blessed any form of violence, from regicide to reducing vast stratums of people to dust, refuse or ashes. Stalin wasn't at all a simple villain as he is often portrayed. He was sure that history would justify all of his doings only because he had really created a new society. The illusion worked and reliably served as self-justification not only for him, but for the whole of his numerous entourage. And only now has this illusion suffered a complete fiasco. Social-Democracy has won the historical dispute with Communists. And this now has to be admitted by and large.

"Both Communists and Social-democrats underestimated the national forms in the development of civic societies, they equally failed to understand that universal human values and culture could only assume national forms. The underestimation of the national factor cries out in the slogan 'Workers of all countries, unite!'. Its destructive role varies from calls for world revolution to its export to separate countries. Today everyone who has lived under a totalitarian regime is faced not with a right- or left-wing alternative, but with the need to form a democratic political system. This is a difficult problem for a society which has not known a normal democratic political life for many generations. After all, there is neither experience nor traditions in open political life. It is impossible to compensate them with laws and institutions which are democratic in form. Key importance attaches to the new alignment of political forces and the shaping of effective political democracy.

"The traditions of Social-Democracy will have no small part to play in this respect. They used to be strongly pronounced in Russia. If Social-Democrats understood in their time that a mincing machine of terror would be used against them, they would have found something to counter it with. Out of naivety, they missed their chance and burned in the fire box of Stalin's steam engine which was supposed to 'stop only in the commune', to quote the words of a popular song of those times. The traditions of Social-democracy are also strong in Latvia and Georgia.

"In this sense the Soviet Union's social-democratic Association will not be able soon, I believe, to gain any optimal political leverage.

"As far as Estonia is concerned, at different times here Social-Democrats had up to a quarter of all seats in parliament. Estonian Social-Democrats have now submitted their platform to general discussion. What turn everything will take further on will be shown by the Conrgess. Today the political spectrum of a civic society is being shaped in Estonia. What it will be like will depend on the Republic's coming parliamentary elections. I believe that it has become possible to considerably lessen the main danger - the fragmentation of forces into a multitude of political movements and groups leading to an ineffective system of management. Both the leaders and the people have come to understand: don't praise those who cry out first, but those who will do the job!"

Estonian Election Campaign Discussed

PM0202140590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Special correspondents I. Teterin and V. Shirokov report "Road to Power. Reflections on Election Campaign in Estonia"]

[Text] Estonian Soviet Sociaist Republic [SSR]—It is often claimed on the pages of republican newspapers and in public speeches that power is only now passing into the hands of the people. Indeed, another intensive election marathon—the contest for seats in the Estonian parliament—lies ahead. The future of the entire republic will in practice depend on its outcome.

First Finishing Post

Since the end of December, Tallinn has had a new city leader. He is 40-year old Andres Kork, a doctor at the Pelgulinn hospital. Even before this happened, we were told by people who knew—Andres Kork is not just a doctor, he is a truly gifted surgeon. For the past 10 years he has worked in a hospital whose outward appearance and standard of equipment is the most graphic illustration of the crisis of our national health care. He has three children and has presented a candidate's dissertation. He is a nonparty person. That's about it. Now Andres Kork has become a professional politician.

This is a characteristic feature of life in Estonia today: The elections to local soviets have launched into political life many people who could not have dreamt about this before. This time everything at the elections was different. For instance, 9,192 candidates competed for the 4,256 seats. At the same time the total number of voters who took part in the elections was not that great—72.43 percent. In a number of electoral precincts the elections were deemed invalid or postponed, so that the contest for 34 seats in local soviets went on. Incidentally, the lowest election participation was registered in Tallinn. Here, as PRAVDA reported at the time, a number of public organizations had called for a boycott of the new republican election law, declaring it discriminatory.

However that may be, the first election passions are over now. The formation of the local organs of power has begun. Incidentally, these organs are new not just in composition but also in form. An administrative-territorial reform is under way in the republic. Volosts [smallest administrative unit in Tsarist Russia] and uyezds [administrative unit on a par with rayon] are again appearing. Tallinn deputies have decided to rename the city soviet the soviet of plenipotentiaries. Andres Kork is heading this soviet. The initiative to rename the soviets was swiftly taken up in other parts of the republic, too.

Naturally, there are many communists among the people elected to leading posts in local soviets. But here is a notable detail. Yuriy Raydla, first secretary of the Pyarnuskiy Estonian Communist Party Rayon Committee, announced in connection with his election to the post of uyezd soviet chairman that as of 1 February he is resigning from his former duties as first secretary. A number of other party officials have taken the same course of action. Why? In an interview with an ETA correspondent, Yu. Raydla said: "The Pyarnuskiy Rayon party conference decreed that it is impossible to combine the two aforementioned posts."

Well, a great many things are changing in Estonia today. New political forces are actively aspiring to power. Who are they?

Candidates

During the election campaign back in October and November of last year, new political groups, calling themselves parties, kept cropping up in the republic virtually every week. To tell the truth, prior to this we had not even heard of some of them holding their constituent congresses. But the spectrum of these parties was enough to excite anyone's imagination—christian democrats and democratic labor champions, "greens," and the party of national independence.... Social organizations such as the People's Front, Union of Labor Collectives, and Estonian Civic Committees also nominated their candidates. In Tallinn a coalition of social movements and political groups under the title of "Electoral Union" was even formed.

It is appropriate to ask: How were these parties, without having acquired legal status, able to participate in the election campaign? The answer is very simple. Under the new Law on Elections to Local Soviets in the Republic, a form of nomination of candidates, described as "civic initiative," has come into force. It is sufficient for a would-be candidate for a deputy seat to collect 50 signatures from voters of the relevant electoral okrug to be registered by the commission.

It must be said that the new political groupings actively availed themselves of this right. True, and this must also be said, the majority of these "parties" did not see care for people's day-to-day needs as their task, nor did they draw up serious economic programs or new principles for the perestroyka of local self-management. Instead, they were desperately vying with each other in the radicalism of their ideas to achieve Estonia's complete state independence. It seems that, carried on this wave of political euphoria, some of their representatives were "washed up" in deputies' seats....

So how can we assess the political alignment of forces now, after the elections to the local soviets? We asked G.V. Aleshin, second secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, to share his opinion on this account. This is what he told us:

"It seems to me that many political groups did not even count on such an easy success. It is a fact that the soviets now include people of the most diverse views and persuasions. But I have to say the following. The main battle was fought between personalities rather than political platforms. So that the vivd, independent personalities in the soviets are now our main hope....

Policy and Politicians

Here we shall make a small digression. Immediately after the New Year holiday, a most unpleasant surprise was in store for the republic inhabitants—the prices for vegetables went up sharply. The price for a kilogram of potatoes increased almost fivefold. Swedes, carrots, and cabbage—all types of vegetable have now begun to "pinch" consumers, especially those who are not well off. Incidentally, there were no warnings about the upcoming rise in prices for vegetables. Naturally, people started to grumble. Republic trade unions immediately lodged a resolute protest, demanding from the state that the old price tariffs be reinstated. This is what was done at a republic government session as early as 5 January. An incident was successfully avoided, as they say. However, the question remains—why did it become possible in the first place?

The point is that at the end of December the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet approved the republic budget for 1990. Among other measures to combat the budget deficit it included the following: "Ending compensation of price differences... paid to the the Estonian SSR State Agro-industrial Committee and the Estonian Republic Council of Consumer Cooperatives for potatoes and vegetables and also canned food and starch procured by them." It remains to be added that the same document made provision for raising prices for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes and, in the longer term, reviewing food retail prices.

It is no secret that we are mentioning all this because we want to stress that a reaction to any political decision sets in when it comes into force, when it bears fruit. The main quality which life itself demands from every politician is responsibility. Now is the time to ask whether the people who are seeking power and getting it possess this quality in sufficient measure?

We frequently have occasion to read the manifestos and political platforms of the new parties which are currently being formed in Estonia. Here is one of their characteristic features. They contain many lofty statements which we, too, share entirely—about freedom and humanism, about respect for the individual and social justice. But there is something else that is strange. For some reason everything hinges on the achievement of political independence by the republic. In other words, if only Estonia becomes independent and free, all the rest will come to pass. This is how, approximately at least, the politicians of the new wave explain their strategic objectives. This is no longer potatoes, so to speak.

The republic's sober-minded economists understand that the republican economy is extraordinarily deeply integrated in the economic mechanism of the Union, in its ramified national economic complex. The disruption of these ties is fraught with danger. The switch to equivalent exchanges with the country's other republics demands an unhurried, sensible transition and a coordination and review of prices for raw materials, materials, and finished products.

Incidentally, it is already possible to see with our own eyes where disruptions of equivalent commodity exchange lead. For instance, waiting lines for gasoline in Talinn have turned into real torment for thousands upon thousands of people. How much emotion can be witnessed, how much cursing of "this whole system," can be heard at gasoline stations! However, at the same time we have heard no complaints from people who have learned from newspapers that the republic has decided of its own accord to reduce meat deliveries to the union stock from 64,000 to 48,000 tonnes in 1990. Yet these two matters are interlinked, indirectly if not directly.

Yes, it is true that our country is in a difficult political and economic situation today. For this very reason hoping that we will be able to protect ourselves from the common difficulties by seceding from the USSR is nothing but naive political romanticism. But, alas, it is also frequently gaining the upper hand in the course of the election campaign. For instance, a plan put forward by the Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia already exists. Yulo Nugis, USSR people's deputy and leader of the Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia, has proposed that an All-Estonian congress of local soviet deputies be convened to discuss questions of Estonia's new statehood. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has backed this initiative.

So what political force is capable of countering the populist ambitions of certain of the new politicians today? You will agree, this is by no means a rhetorical question.

Communists' Concerns

This fact may appear incredible at first: Enn Pyldroos, candidate member of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, recently tendered his resignation from the party, citing as the reason—disagreement with the stance of a number of communists who carry the same party card in their pockets as artist E. Pyldroos. Following which he joined an action group which is setting up a new political party—the party of free democrats.

Facts of this kind are probably the best indication of the complex situation in which the Estonian Communist Party finds itself today. The party is rent by internal contradictions. The ideological differences between various groups in the party sometimes become irreconcilable. Despite appeals to communists to refrain from resigning from the ranks of the Estonian Communist Party, at least until the 20th Congress has been held (it is scheduled for the end of March), more and more party cards are being handed in at rayon committees. In 1989 some 4,100 people resigned from the party. True, a simple analysis shows that it is a question of ideological rather than ethnic contradictions. Estonians account for 51 percent of those who have resigned. A possible split in the party is currently discussed openly, from the rostrums of the highest-level forums.

This is particularly alarming since there is no other party in the republic which has political experience comparable with that of the Communist Party. And experience is of paramount importance in politics.

However, the Communist Party's political rivals are today persistently trying to get ahead of it in the election campaign. Some political scientists are claiming that if the split in the Estonian Communist Party occurs on the eve of or after the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, the role of communists in the future Estonian Government will not be significant.

At the latest Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum the party's current problems were frankly discussed. The report by V. Vyalyas, the Central Committee first secretary, included the following bitter remarks: "Impermissible methods are quite often used against the Estonian Communist Party and its members and, what is more, this is frequently done by precisely those people who at one time 'swore allegiance' in an effort to strengthen their own positions, while in difficult moments, of which we have had many, they did not dare to utter one word in defense of those very communists against whom they are now slinging mud. Now, when they have nothing to fear, they are vying with each other in presenting the Estonian Communist Party and its members as enemies of the Estonian people." Well, these critical times have vividly shown up the true face of those who joined the party for conformist reasons, for whom time-serving was an original form of earthly existence. The party needs to cleanse itself and there clearly is no need to regret the departure of those who are leaving it in times of difficulty.

But still, what will the communists' prospects be at the conclusion of the election campaign in the republic? A difficult question. But the party is trying to find the answer to this question right now. A political statement was adopted at the last Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. It says in part that the Estonian Communist Party will seek the adoption of a law on parties. Because this is in keeping with the communists' conviction that in the future society nobody must have a monopoly on power. However, the statement stressed at the same time that there are no serious differences between the communists and the ideological platforms of some of the political parties which are currently forming and that the Estonian Communist Party is prepared to cooperate with them as long as they prevent a division of the democratic forces.

We hope very much that the communists will be able to overcome their internal problems, refrain from splitting, find reliable political allies, and gain broad popular support for their strategic line. Whether this will happen or not will become known relatively soon—the final lap of the election campaign in the republic will take place 18 March.

Estonian Komsomol Secretariat Role Change

90UN0782A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with Kalle Izand and Vitaliy Zinichenko, secretaries of Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee, by T. Barmakova in Tallinn; date not given—first two paragraphs are MOLODEZH ESTONII introduction: "'....Bringing to Logical Conclusion'"]

[Text] Never before, perhaps, has the LKSME [Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee been in such an unusual situation. Whereas previously it was sufficient to adhere to the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] script rehearsed over decades, now both the situation and the goals are different.

As is known, the 21st LKSME Congress announced up to 1 March 1990 a transition period, in the course of which each member of the LKSME has to decide to which organization laying claim to the status of successor of the LKSME to give preference after the LKSME in its present form has ceased to exist. What now is the role of the LKSME Central Committee Secretariat, what problems is it tackling? This was the subject of our interview with Kalle Izand and Vitaliy Zinichenko, secretaries of the LKSME Central Committee.

[Barmakova] It was declared at the last congress that the main task of the current secretariat was to bring to a logical conclusion the activity of the current LKSME. How is this to be understood?

[Zinichenko] All should end very properly lest anyone subsequently have any complaints. Lest the LKSME members rebuke a rayon or city committee that has ceased to exist for the fact that they did not have an opportunity to get their bearings in respect to the current organizations and those which are emerging. And lest the released elective and staff officials and also business organizations with financial relations with the Komsomol have complaints also.

[Izand] It is necessary to determine the future of the youth centers and youth cooperatives which exist as yet under auspices of the gorkoms [city party committees], raykoms [rayon party committees], and the Central Committee. This is a most complex assignment. Much will depend here on what attitude the republic government adopts toward the successors of the LKSME. We may speak about the future of the youth centers and youth cooperatives if they transfer moneys only to their own youth organization. But what if they are accorded equal status with the rest of the cooperatives and are forced to pay in addition local or state taxes? It is hardly likely that any youth center will want to incur dual expenditure. It cannot be ruled out that, given a revision of the principles of financial and economic activity in a direction disadvantageous to the youth centers and youth cooperatives, they will regroup in the Komsomol Central Committee. This would be to the benefit neither of the republic nor the successor organizations, which would in this way lose financial support.

[Zinichenko] This question remains open as yet, just as, incidentally, the future of the Youth Organizations Committee, "Sputnik", and the youth mass media is uncertain. In any event, various alternatives are possible. Let us assume that "Sputnik" becomes an independent international youth tourism office and switches to contract relations with the Komsomol Central Committee "Sputnik" International Youth Tourism Office. What in this case would be the mechanism of the allocation of passes, and would all young people be able to lay claim to them or just the members of the successor organizations? A mass of questions, to each of which an answer has to be found. Incidentally, there will not in the first quarter of this year be a single tourism group, although there are many people wanting to travel.

[Barmakova] It is clear from your explanations that bringing everything to "a logical conclusion" will not be easy. However, having read through the decisions of the 21st LKSME Congress, many people perceived the transition period precisely as a method of eliminating the Komsomol in the republic. This can be picked up from the mailbag also. For the uninitiated the mere fact that a raykom is resigning is a sign of the disappearance of the Komsomol in the rayon. I refer as an example to the notice concerning the plenum of the LKSME Leninskiy Raykom published in the 13 January MOLODEZHKA inasmuch as it was not that long since you, Kalle, and you, Vitaliy, headed this rayon organization.

[Zinichenko] Eliminating the Komsomol is impossible either by decisions of the congress, the desires of the Central Committee, or the actions of the secretariat. The 21st congress spoke of a suspension of the activity of the current LKSME at the end of the transition period. This Komsomol suits nobody. This is, I believe, indisputable. As far as the resolution of the LKSME Leninskiy Raykom is concerned, it does not mean that the Komsomol has been wound up in this area of Tallinn: The provisional raykom has handed over its powers to the LKSME raykom bureau for the period up to 1 March, and as of 15 January only the members of the LKSME who have not reregistered, do not intend to do so in the immediate future, and who have not paid their membership dues through December will have been removed from the records. The remainder may reregister until 1 February. There are in the rayon those who wish to be members of the Komsomol and also candidates for organizations laying claim to the status of successors of the LKSME which have yet to be created.

[Barmakova] Have you re-registered?

[Izand] I voted for the Estonian Youth League.

[Zinichenko] Me, too. I would mention that reregistration is simply an expression of one's desire to be a member of this organization or the other, there are no successors as yet, after all. The claimants to this status have yet to hold their constituent assemblies or congresses, and LKSME members remain LKSME members.

[Barmakova] Had you ignored re-registration and failed to pay your dues through December, would you also have been automatically removed from the records?

[Zinichenko] No, we are in elective Komsomol jobs and are until 25 May, as long as the Central Committee exists, members of the LKSME.

[Barmakova] What is your attitude toward the fact that some people are calling the current secretariat a "burial party"?

[Zinichenko] One of amusement. Although there is a grain of truth in every joke.

[Izand] After 1 March, when the activity of the LKSME will have come to an end, the Central Committee will act the part of liquidating committee. And from the liquidating committee to the "burial party" is but half a step. However, it should not be thought that the secretariat has only "burial" concerns. Our task is to keep an eye on the precise observance of the decisions of the 21st LKSME Congress and contribute to the creation of the LKSME's successor organizations. Figuratively speaking, we must adopt the families of the new organizations before burying that which has outlived its time.

[Barmakova] Could it not be that the LKSME will have no successors?

[Zinichenko] No, this possibility can be ruled out because even now the Estonian Youth League and the Estonian Communist Youth League are laying claim to the status of successors. I would like to make one observation here. The secretariat believes that the name Organizing Committee for Reorganization of the LKSME on the basis of the program and statutory documents of the Estonian Communist Youth League, while not in conflict with the congress' decisions, is, nonetheless, confusing: One has the impression that the LKSME is being reorganized only on the basis of the Estonian Communist Youth League. In actual fact it is being reorganized on the basis of several organizations. We therefore believe that it would be more accurate to employ the name Organizing Committee for Creation of the Estonian Communist Youth League.

[Izand] The name should not convey a sense of pretension to monopoly. It is incomprehensible also why Estonian Communist Youth League documents have not been published in Estonian. One could get the impression that the Estonian Communist Youth League is not interested in representatives of Estonian youth joining it.

[Barmakova] We should not, I believe, rush to draw conclusions. Might it possibly be a question of organizational difficulties, with the transition, let us assume? Here also it is the right time for the secretariat to lend a hand, the more so in that this is one of its assignments..... Two months have elapsed since the 21st LKSME Congress. How do you view the situation locally?

[Zinichenko] To speak in familiar cliches, we "have our finger on the pulse". For example, in Tartu the rights of the gorkom were handed over to a provisional bureau immediately following a city conference. In Pyarnu the gorkom and raykom have terminated their activity, and, instead of the raykom, LKSME Central Committee representatives are working there. Komsomol members are showing an interest in successor organizations in Kokhtla-Yarve, Tartu, Valga, Narve, Sillamyae, Tallinn, and other cities. However, I do not think it is a good idea to discuss the state of affairs locally in the newspapers at this time with facts and figures: The situation is changing inasmuch as the transition period is not yet over. And I would be altogether reluctant to make an assessment: Any assessment would be a kind of recognition or nonrecognition. We, however, do not have the right to exert pressure. Everyone has to make a choice without prompting and pressure.

[Barmakova] I would like to know on what resources the LKSME Central Committee is living now, in the transition period. After all, membership dues have not been coming in for more than six months now. At the same time, on the other hand, the congress declared the independence of the LKSME....

[Izand] We have received from the Komsomol Central Committee R120,000. Initially it was intended for an increase in the wages of Komsomol officials, but since the situation in the republic Komsomol has changed, they have gone on the organization and implementation of the transition period. As far as independence is concerned, we sought it not in order to renounce any assistance but for the adoption at the congress of the ensuing decisions.

[Zinichenko] I would add that in this complex and unusual period benevolent mutual relations have taken shape between us and the Komsomol.

[Barmakova] And the final question. Unless it is a secret, what currently is the wage of LKSME Central Committee secretaries?

[Izand] Respectively, R400, R380, and R360.

Toome on Moscow's Criticism of Price Hikes

LD0402152890

[Editorial Report] Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian on 19 January, page one, carries an ETA-attributed article entitled: "News From Moscow" and subtitled "News Is Mediated by Prime Minister Indrek Toome". The article first considers the substance of the Moscow complaint regarding recent alcohol and tobacco price increases in Estonia which are said to adversely affect some neighboring areas.

About this state of Estonian affairs, Toome says: "It is somewhat surprising. Surprising because evidently the central power has not understood until now what self-management and deciding for oneself mean. So we will have to attempt to explain the essence of the matter to them again. But one thing is clear; one does not found a new federation in such a way." Toome says the Estonian government does not intend to go back on its resolutions. "We are ready to put forward arguments and defend our positions. We are ready to acknowledge our mistakes, too, if necessary. But we do not intend to comply obediently with arbitrary commands and prohibitions.

"We in the government will jointly discuss the document we have received and we will let our people, as well as Moscow, know of our decision. We will attempt to make it clear to them that our patience is not infinite. If the central power does not wish the partnership which has been promised and a union of true free states, we will have to decide differently, in a more abrupt way.

The government wants to defend firmly its independent and democratic lines both at home as well in Moscow.

Political Declaration of 4 Jan Estonian Plenum

90UN0745A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Political declaration issued by participants of 16th Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in Tallinn on 4 January]

[Text] On 25 December 1989, the Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was convened and examined matters related to decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev delivered his address, "The Fate of Perestroyka Lies in Party Unity." We, members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party [ECP], and members of the Auditing Commission of the ECP who have signed our names below, fully support the evaluation of the situation of the Lithuanian CP which is expressed in this address, and consider it our party duty to once again call upon the **Central Committee and all communists of Estonia** not to allow, during these deciding days for perestroyka, days of radical renewal of our entire life, a split in party ranks; to state our support for an independent ECP within the composition of a renewed CPSU; and to conduct active efforts in the party organizations of the republic in preparing for the 20th ECP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress.

We express our hope that the policy course developed by the 11th and 15th ECP Central Committee Plenums will remain unchanged: In support of a sovereign Estonia within the composition of a qualitatively renewed Soviet federation; in support of a new ECP status as an inalienable component part of the CPSU; in support of the intensification of socialist perestroyka and the development of democracy so as to radically improve the social and economic living standards of all inhabitants of Estonia, regardless of their nationality.

We draw the attention of participants at today's plenum to the fact that the main differences which are today troubling communists of the republic and all its residents—Estonians and non-Estonians alike—and which touch upon the interests of us all are concentrated around the question of full state sovereignty of the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic]. There are some who take this concept literally, interpreting it as the republic's departure from the composition of the USSR; others see in it a significant broadening of the sovereign rights of Estonia in close cooperation with all union republics in order to attain the overall aims of perestroyka.

We, participants of the 16th ECP Central Committee Plenum, declare that the idea of full independence for

Estonia outside the composition of the Soviet Union fails to take into account existing economic and political reality and is essentially a deception of the people of Estonia. We believe that the authors of these unrealistic ideas, being silent about the possible consequences of such a decision and failing to take into account the ability of the republic's producers of goods to compete on the world and European markets, either unknowingly or intentionally are steering the issue toward a collapse of the economy, with all the consequences here ensuing. Additionally, the poorly thought out attempt to achieve isolation from the USSR will lead one way or another to the exacerbation of interethnic relations and to revision of the Helsinki Accords.

No one is permitted, for the sake of temporary political gain, the struggle for power, or party-group interests, to enter into irreconcilable confrontation with the vital interests of Estonia and the USSR, of Estonians and non-Estonians in our socialist republic.

Following adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's government of resolutions extremely important to us concerning the economic independence of the ESSR, there has begun actual realization of the concept of sovereignty, implementation of Self-Managing Estonia (IME). In order for this process to develop successfully, we must create the conditions—not based on emotions, but in pensive, restrained, and constructive fashion—for all residents of Estonia to feel that they are the masters of their republic, city, rayon, settlement, enterprise, and farm. Political declarations and slogans about separation from the USSR can only halt this process and bring about undesirable consequences.

The striving of the main citizens' committee of Estonia to afford the right to decide Estonia's future only to former citizens of the bourgeois republic and their descendants is legally incompetent. Moreover, it may lead to still greater aggravation of the situation in the republic—up to the national- territorial division of Estonia. And such are the consequences to which the declaration of the meeting of the Estonian Union of Labor Collectives leads, advocating that the question of the republic leaving the composition of the USSR be discussed at a joint forum of people's deputies elected 10 December 1989.

Naturally, the deepening crisis in our society is reflected in the ECP, an organic component of it. Comprehending their responsibility to the people of Estonia, communists consciously took upon themselves the role of a stabilizing factor for the political contradictions which have appeared over the past two years among diverse movements and groupings in the sociopolitical life of Estonia, and which have brought about increased social and interethnic tension in our society. And it is this very role which at times dictated that decisions be made which were unpopular with one or another portion of the population. This could not help but have an effect on the authority of the ECP as well. However, we cannot fail to take as applying to ourselves the conclusion reached by M.S. Gorbachev at the plenum concerning the Lithuanian CP, that at some moment the ECP began to lose its leadership position. The condition of social stability was not fully utilized to develop a constructive program of action which might attract a large number of communists and the population of the country.

Certain communists have taken up mutually exclusive positions capable of destabilizing the political situation in the republic. Some dogmatically repudiate the need for any party reforms. Others subscribe to the platforms of the Estonian Social-Democratic Party of Independence, the Party of Free Democrats, and others. The views of certain party members are close to the program of the Party of National Independence of Estonia. Under these conditions, we consider it necessary to set ourselves apart ideologically from the adherents of other parties, so that the 20th ECP Congress does not turn into a joint forum of all parties and movements promulgating their own programs.

What we have stated in no way means that we are calling for a split in the party. On the contrary, we are appealing to all communists of the republic—today like never before we need unity on the basis of socialist perestroyka and mutual support. The interests of organic and stable development in the republic and the welfare of the people are tied in directly with the Communist Party, its goals and activities.

Under conditions in which the sovereign rights of our socialist republic are undergoing expansion, the ECP must have the right and the opportunity to express the vital interests of the people without any limitation whatsoever. These rights are realized in accordance with the processes of the development of intra-party democracy and renewal begun in the CPSU, which are expressed in structural and financial independence, freedom in cadre policies, and choosing our own path for attaining the overall goal, our own program of action. However, the striving to achieve a federated party structure will unavoidably lead to a change in its ideological basis and a repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, while the repudiation of the expression of common interests in favor of narrower, national ones means the end of perestroyka.

The unity of the Communist Party established by Lenin is guaranteed through a unified program and unified statutes. We are convinced of this.

Deformed socialism undergoes renewal by overcoming economic and social crisis. In spite of a broad pluralism of opinions and the existence of extreme, incompatible views, we believe we see a way out of this situation in uniting the aspirations of all inhabitants of the republic to the maximum extent possible—regardless of their political views—towards putting an end to negative trends in the Estonian economy, towards directing their personal initiative and enterprising abilities to provide a full volume of industrial and agricultural products on the market of the republic. Legal prerequisites must be established in order to effect this, and specific steps taken to implement them. We believe such an approach would satisfy the vital interests of all nationalities residing in Soviet Estonia.

We believe that improving the economy of the ESSR is the core around which all movements and parties can consolidate, even those which advocate diametrically opposed positions on certain issues.

We, participants to the 16th ECP Central Committee Plenum, call upon all communists and all inhabitants of our republic to lay aside national, group, and personal ambitions dividing Estonian society, and to concentrate their efforts on common interests: resolving problems of the ecology and the spiritual and moral sphere, of socioeconomic development first and foremost, i.e., improving the standard of living of workers and peasants, the creative and technical intelligentsia, Estonians and non-Estonians—of all the people of Estonia and each individual Estonian resident.

4 January 1990.

[Signed] Members and Candidate Members of the ECP Central Committee, Members of the Auditing Commission of the ECP:

P. Panfilov, V. Malkovskiy, Yu. Tolmachev, N. Zakharov, A. Gusev, L. Annus, G. Aleshin, A. Banasko, V. Boytsova, Ye. Doronin, V. Yefimova, V. Ilves, N. Ivanov, O. Klushin, A. Kroll, N. Levitskiy, V. Miroshnichenko, V. Mynzu, V. Mizhuy, E. Paap, I. Parshev, Ye. Popov, G. Rastegayev, K. Savko, G. Smirnov, S. Skorobogatova, S. Tarakanov, V. Chetvergov, V. Chistyakova, R. Sheremeta.

'Sajudis' Conference Opens 3 Feb in Vilnius

Agenda Detailed

LD0302090890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0840 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Feb (TASS)—A TASS correspondent reports:

A conference of the Lithuanian public movement "Sajudis" [Lithuanian movement for restructuring] opened in Vilnius today. As they prepare for elections to the republic's parliament (they will be held on 24 February), the conference participants will adopt a preelection program, the main aim of which is the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state.

The conference will also discuss other matters. The reports put forward for discussion include "The democratic processes in Eastern Europe and Lithuania," "Lithuanian emigres and Lithuania," and "Economic independence and the prospects for relations with the USSR and other states."

Landsbergis Speaks

LD0302113290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0820 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, Sajudis, at Sajudis electoral conference in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] From the point of view of political geography, we are simultaneously in three places: in the Soviet Union, East Europe, and near to Western democracies. We are in the Soviet Union because we are still governed, pressed, and intimidated by it. [passage omitted]

In the nuclear age, it seems, the whole world can suddenly become a hostage of some insane person, or, on the contrary, of an exceptionally clever terrorist. And this world agrees and pays in order not to be destroyed. [passage omitted]

It is possible to proclaim a state based on law which, most of all, thinks of how to deprive peoples of their rights; how to legally shoot and abuse its citizens standing on the streets in Baku or singing in the squares of Tbilisi. [passage omitted] Such is the web of political, psychological, and legal swindles, the inventor of which is a large country which already lost the third world war, that is, a grandiose plan of conquering the whole world, but still intends to gain victory from this defeat, or at least to keep part of the latest conquests.

"The only true gain for everyone in this situation would be the decolonization of this last empire. Leaders able to do this peacefully would be the conquerors of the evil, worthy of the respect of the whole world. But the world does not urge them to think about it. [passage omitted] The world which does not recognize the annexation of the Baltic states is reconciled with the lie of the map. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are painted in it with the same color as the Soviet Union. Let us publish in Lithuania a correct political map of the whole of Europe where the three Baltic states would be described as a territory temporarily and illegally governed by the Soviet Union. [applause] [passage omitted] It is our duty to help both the Soviet Union and the West to look at themselves from the forgotten and inconvenient moral side [passage indistinct].

[Passage omitted] There also exists a threat of a coup by the conservatives, or, frankly by Red Nazis in Russia. [passage omitted] Who will defend the citizens from this? [word indistinct] I have understood, together with my colleagues from Lativa and Estonia, the problems of the Caucasus and how they can be exploited if some force does not want a democratic system, does not want elections and wishes to destabilize the situation so that it becomes [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Let us not regard the elections as some kind of miracle. We are facing very great tasks. [passage omitted] These aims are achieved not only by the measures of authority. Sajudis outlined these aims on the day of its birth; these aims are the same now. I thank you for your attention. The Sajudis conference is open.

First Election Resolution

LD0302162890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1517 GMT 3 Feb 90

[First resolution on elections read by Albertas Zalatorius, not further identified, at electoral conference of Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, Sajudis, in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Lithuania's people, the electors! A very important and complicated moment is approaching. For the first time, we will elect the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in a more or less democratic manner. This Soviet will be elected in abnormal conditions, in an annexed Lithuania, but its task is by parliamentary means to eliminate this annexation and state publicly that Lithuania is an independent state and that it continues the Lithuanian republic's traditions of statehood. [applause] [passage omitted]

There is no doubt that in restoring independent Lithuania we will face complex negotiations with the Soviet Union's leaders, and these negotiations can be conducted only by principled and consistent people. Sajudis rejects the law on self-determination and the mechanism of secession proposed by Moscow, the aim of which is to legalize a crime committed 50 years ago, when the USSR, making use of blackmail, coercion, and military force, annexed Lithuania. No matter what these laws or mechanisms are, they cannot be applied to Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Therefore, let us vote for the Sajudis candidates, in whose attitude we have no doubt, for those who are resolute, competent, and devoted to Lithuania. Independence to the regenerated Luthuania, democracy for independent Lithuania, decent life for democratic Lithuania! Democracy, independence, and well-being are inseparable.

Vaitiekaunus Speaks

LD0302133190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0922 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Speech by Petras Vaitiekaunas, entitled "Democratic Processes in Lithuania and East Europe", at Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring electoral conference in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] "Both the socialist states, the Baltic states, and other republics in the Soviet Union are colonies of the USSR. These are colonies which have distinguishing features of 20th century colonialism as determined by the size of a specific country, geographical and political location, degree of economic development, and history. [passage omitted]

Rudiments of traditional opposition parties in socialist countries have been preserved. Because of this, new elections could be carried out in these countries without delay.

Meanwhile, here in Lithuania, events took a different turn. Sajudis failed to set up a strong political and structural oposition to the Communist Party structure. Unfortunately, it is only now that we realize that strengthening new political parties should have been one of the main objectives of Sajudis. As a result, Sajudis has done more toward bolstering the new spirit of the Lithuanian Communist Party. This is a reality, and we have to accept this in the future. This also affected membership of Sajudis. [passage omitted]

Due to Moscow's influence and because of constant threat, elections had to be postponed for a long time in Lithuania as well as in other Baltic countries. Without any space for development, the processes began to die out; this was a setback. The popularity of new political forces began to diminish, affecting the general spirit in the nation. We could not implement our ideas because for a long time we did not have the power to do so. [passage omitted]

Many processes in Lithuania got stuck; they have frozen as a result of fear of crisis or of the possibility of a crisis. It is not clear who will be able to persuade Moscow or when this might happen; this lack of knowledge has a negative influence on our entire movement. [passage omitted]

We can see already now that a step-by-step policy [preceding phrase in english] no longer yields results. We are skidding [applause] and issues like the question of the Soviet Armed forces as an occupation army get stuck. Yazov was right when he said: Make a political decision and then we can solve the problem. [passage omitted]

The deepening of constitutional conflict with the USSR no longer brings us new political possibilities so long as we remain under Moscow's jurisdiction.

Therefore, I am convinced that the new Supreme Soviet will have to make a political decision concerning the legal and political dissociation of Lithuania from the USSR, concerning the declaration of Lithuania's independence and concerning Lithuania's secession from the USSR—although in fact, we had never joined the USSR—naming the USSR as the aggressor. This is the only way to eliminate constitutional collisions between the USSR and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Unfortunately, the best moment to do this will soon be over: East Europe is stabilizing while Russia is losing its balance more and more and chaos begins. Therefore, we are running out of time and the end is near; the moment for self-determination is coming. Only when this step has been made can actions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet be on the same level with the processes taking place in East Europe. [passage omitted]

Deputy Addresses Meeting

LD0302140890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0924 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Speech by M.N. Romualdas Ozolas, USSR people's deputy, member of Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, Sajudis, Seimas Council, and editor in chief of Sajudis newspaper ATGIMIMAS, at Sajudis electoral conference in Vilnius; speech entitled "Necessity and Place of Sajudis in Political Life of Lithuania"—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The main goals of our political battles are independence and democracy. [passage omitted] Only Sajudis raises the question of independence as a question of freedom, and Sajudis alone is solving the question of independence as a question of freedom today. [passage omitted]

The path of real political freedom is the right of self-determination for political parties and the differentiation of a multi-party system. Political parties in Lithuania are growing under Sajudis guardianship. I agree that perhaps not enough attention was given to them. However, these parties today are developing under the protection of Sajudis. To tell the truth, we do not yet have a normal political party here in Lithuania: The Communist Party is too large and all the others are too small. [applause] All these parties are too sensitive, verbose and, I would even say, aggressive. However, these parties are also parties of goodwill. This feature was demonstrated when Sajudis urged them to take seats at the Provisional Political Consultation Council. [passage omitted]

Today Sajudis is the only forum for positive consolidation of political forces here in Lithuania. This is the second and most important point of the necessity of Sajudis. [passage omitted]

Prunskiene on Economic Independence

LD0302174490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1049 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Report titled, "Economic Independence and Prospects of Relations With USSR and Other Foreign Countries," by K. Prunskiene at Sajudis electoral conference in Vilnius; read by Lamia Andreikiene—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]. The law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the economic indepenence of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is not being implemented. The law is blocked by the union administration and this depends very little on the perfectness of the formulations. The governments' interpretation of the law reflects the interests of the government. [passage omitted]

Now briefly about the present state of negotiations with Moscow: The competence of foreign relations has been most favorably formulated and mutually agreed in the draft decision prepared by the USSR Council of Ministers, however, negotiations concerning it have been disrupted for political reasons. This involved independently granting licenses on the products manufactured in the republic, receiving foreign credits independently, subordination of customs houses to the republic.

However, we did not agree on the transition of all the enterprises and banks into the republican subbordination. The law was drastically violated when the Savings Bank was subordinated to the USSR State Bank by the order of the USSR Government. Operations with foreign banks in the republic have been cancelled. The impression is that the USSR Government will start an economic blocade with paralyzing the activity of banks. If order is given to the banks of other republics not to proceed with settling accounts with our banks and other clients of the economy then the flow of material supply would break down by itself. [passage omitted]

The threat of economic blocade first of all is this that supplies of fuel, metal goods, fodder, fertilizer, and equipment for agriculture. [passage omitted] We have to find out immediately what the most vital areas of supply are, to assess the main needs and to clarify who is supplying the main goods and who potentially could these goods be supplied by in the USSR and other states; relevant relations should be established, commercial offices should be set up on the territory of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Last year planned resourses worth R145 million were not delivered to Lithuania from the Soviet Union, fodder worth R26 million, equipment worth R40 million, consumer goods worth R64 million. [passage omitted]

The crisis of economic links with the union is growing; attempts to get out of this crisis while going back to the previous state of relationship is senseless. Equal partnership with other republics is possible while establishing links directly or through the Commission of the Union Market, which would be set up by the republics themselves. On more than one occasion we proposed to set up such a commision at the USSR parliament. [passage omitted]

Setting of the economic commission, which partly operates on the basis of unpaid public activity, as well as my appointment to the present post is used to demonstrate that the restructuring is under way. Meanwhile, attempts are made that all the positions in the main network of the apparatus remained untouched.

If no measures are taken at the upcoming session, some members of the economic reform commision, including me, will leave the network for the Council of Ministers. We will simply work for the new Supreme Soviet. [applause]

Following what I have just said I propose:

1. The negotiations about implementation of the law on economic independence should be taken back to the USSR Supreme Soviet; these should be linked with the

entity of motives for the restoration of the statehood of Lithuania. [passage omitted about other proposals]

Lithuania Rejects USSR Bank Decree

18200484 Vilnius SOVESTKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[Decree: "Decree of Supreme Soviet of Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] On the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 4 January 1990 "On the transfer of the USSR Savings Bank to the jurisdiction of the USSR State Bank."

In accordance with Article 70 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

Not to register the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 4 January 1990 Number 8 "On the transfer of the USSR Savings Bank to the jurisdiction of the USSR State Bank" and to consider it not to be in force on the territory of the republic.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet A. Brazauskas

Secretary of the Presidum of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet L. Sabutis

Prunskene Report

18200485 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 2

["Report by Kazimera Prunskene, USSR people's deputy and deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Lithuanian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) Council of Ministers proposes preventing the implementation in the republic of the USSR Council of Ministers decree of 4 January 1990 " on the transfer of the USSR Savings Bank to the jurisdiction of the USSR State Bank." This does not correspond to the Law on Economic Independence of the Baltic Republics, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. According to that law, the republics independently manage the financial system and the activities of the republic bank. The decree referred to contradicts Point 4, Article 1 of the Law on Economic Independence, since, according to it one of the main institutions [to be managed independently], the Savings Bank, is transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Bank.

In light of the amendment to Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, which gives us the opportunity either to adopt or not carry out all-union laws and decrees, we propose that this decree not be carried out. This would be well-timed, inasmuch as a new active stage of negotiations with the Soviet Government has just started. Last week the negotiations went on here, in the republic, with the participation of M.S. Gorbachev and other government representatives. On 17 January we were invited to the session of the USSR Council of Ministers, where negotiations will continue on implementing the decree. Thus, the act referred to would have been a declaration to the USSR Government, and the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet cannot agree with similar arbitrary decisions.

The USSR Government justifies its actions by saying that the Savings Bank is the sole guarantor of the population's deposits and that Savings Bank funds are an important credit resource, intended for financing all-union investments. Both motives are without basis. First of all, the safety of the deposits of inhabitants of Lithuania under the conditions of economic independence can and should be guaranteed by the republic's laws and its economic policies. Finally, it is obvious that each inhabitant of Lithuania would say that his deposits were intended not for all-union needs, but for satisfying the credit requirements of the republic in which he is a citizen. In addition, economic independence stipulates that investments and credit requirements are formed and covered by the republic's own abilities. I ask you to adopt the prepared draft decree which would be of significaint help during further negotiations in Moscow.

Answering deputies' questions, K. Prunskene noted that in November the republic had received a draft decree signed by the USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, according to which the center retained for itself only the institutions of the Foreign Economic Bank, but there was no mention of the Savings Bank. It is necessary quickly to adopt a Law on Lithuanian Banks so that the republic can receive the right to manage its own banking matters. Such a law has been prepared and it agrees with an analogous law adopted by Estonia. It was drawn up by a group of experts. In a few days the Estonians and Latvians will arrive and we will discuss this question again. We would like to present the draft law at the next session of the Supreme Soviet, since it is one of the most significant steps toward economic independence.

Lithuania's Algirdas Brazauskas Interviewed

LD0202191390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 2 February carries a 23-minute regular Friday interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party. The interview takes place in Kaisiadorys, Brazauskas' constituency.

Viewing last year's election campaign, Brazauskas says: "I arrived at the conclusion that during the past year the public of Lithuania, and the electors as the active part of it, have changed; they have become completely different. They have started to think in a more realistic way, they are calmer, their words are more thought out, they are less emotional, and people have gained more experience and assessment of the numerous events of 1989."

Brazauskas says that people want to have a clear picture of what is going to happen. This is understandable because there are many things that are not yet clear, not only to the electors, but to the people working in the administration of this republic.

Brazauskas goes on to say that democracy is taking root in Lithuania. The press and the radio, as well as the opinions voiced concerning the communist party and other parties or organizations, are becoming more tactful and properly expressed.

Answering a question about problems in agriculture, Brazauskas says that he will never support any distinction between agriculture and industry; it is necessary to take care of everyone. "But of course, agriculture will remain a priority in Lithuania."

Asked who will attend the CPSU plenum in Moscow, Brazauskas says: "All four secretaries are going to Moscow. Council of Ministers Chairman Vytautas Sakalauskas, as candidate member of the central committee, is going. Who is going from the other party I cannot tell; I do not know. I think that all the secretaries will go. Thus it is not a small group." He adds: "Maybe, Tuesday evening we will be able to return home and tell the Lithuanian public and the Lithuanian communist party that the conflict has finished, that we will remain, create, organize ourselves, carry out our program and continue to live".

Brazauskas gives his view that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session will end next week.

Paper Scarcity Blamed on Independents

PM0202170190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "No Paper, More and More Newspapers"]

[Text] Vilnius—Today as usual I joined the line outside the newspaper kiosk for SOVETSKAYA LITVA, but I did not have enough ready pennies. I had forgotten that as of 1 February newspaper prices in Lithuania have risen to 10 kopeks for an ordinary issue and 20 kopeks for a double.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee decided to raise prices, the explanation being as follows. Retail trade outlets are receiving so few republic newspapers that they are virtually impossible to buy. Retail trade is low because there is no paper. If paper is supplied "on the side" at contract prices, you have to pay a higher price. That is also why prices have "soared."

There is another piece of infomation regarding the supply of news: Newspapers, with the exception of the capital, are not delivered in the republic on Sunday. Barring central newspapers, newspapers are not now being published on Sundays either.

Of course, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee is entitled to adopt any decisions regarding its publications. It is citizens' right whether or not to buy news for 10 kopeks. Although national experience of raising prices for goods in heightened demand with the assurance that there will be an abundance of these goods has failed 100 times.

The fact of newspaper price increases could be regarded as an incident of local significance were it not for one fact. All my life I have heard about a paper famine. Suddenly there proved to be heaps of surplus paper in the country. Over the last year or two more than 100 so-called independent newspapers have begun to be published in Lithuania. I am not giving the words "so-called" any negative meaning because both freedom and independence of the press have their limits. Subscription prices for these publication are 2-3 times higher than those for central publications. Their circulation runs into tens of thousands. But now we have the following question: Given the paper famine, where has the paper for these 100 newspapers come from? Lithuania is no exception. Who is studying this phenomenon of the time of perestroyka and glasnost? The State Planning Committee? The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply? The Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department? Or are they pooling efforts?

In asking these questions I am not guided by idle interest. The central newspapers will not look like "rare birds" among their costlier "younger sisters" for long. There are now proposals to "even out" the retail prices.

So few "old prices" are left in our lives that citizens are entitled to expect the price of words not to rise. Incidentally, there are real reserves for increasing retail output. For this some "contract" paper must be channeled as specified.

TASS Reports Lithuanian Newspaper Shortage

LD0302134790 Moscow TASS in English 1143 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius February 3 TASS—By ELTA correspondent Arturas Mankiavicius:

It is now a usual morning sight—newspaper kiosks attract no buyers. Have people lost all interest in the news this year? Or have newspapers lost attraction? A short time ago long queues were the usual thing.

The answer is simple. Go up to a newspaper kiosk in the morning and you will see that its shelves are nearly bare. No popular newspapers are on sale.

Readers view the situation from different angles. "The hand of Moscow," some of them can be heard grumbling. "They do it on purpose in order to stifle the Lithuanian press."

A Visitor is likely to react differently. "What kind of order is this? People say the political life here is so interesting, how can one learn about it?"

The reason behind the strange situation is this: no paper. The republic has two paper mills, but none produces the sort of paper for printing the news. The required sort of paper is supplied from the federal resources. The federal planning bodies stamped the same supplies for this year as for the previous one—enough to print 535.3 million copies. Subscriptions have been taken out for 522.7 million. This is why only subscribers can be sure of getting their copy.

Is there a way out? Several. One is to cut publications. Republican newspapers are not printed on Mondays and Sundays and their Saturday issues have become leaner by half. Another—prices for popular newspapers sold in kiosks went up 3.5 times in February 1. True, lucky devils are allowed to return their copies to the newspaper man for reselling after they have read the issue...

People are on the look-out for other untapped resources, too. Publishers sent agents travelling across the country to sniff out and buy more paper, at contractual prices, of couse, and these are very high prices. Some have started barter exchanges—local products are traded for paper. But paper of the sort is in short supply across the entire Soviet Union. So glasnost is available mainly to subscribers.

Lithuanian Opposition To Hold Conference 10 Feb

LD0202161790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Summary] A consultative meeting of Lithuanian opposition political parties, organizations, and movements was held yesterday in Vilnius. the meeting decided to hold a conference on 10 February on the evolution of the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state. The place and time of the conference will be announced later.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Election of Chairman

LD0202172390 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Summary] It was proposed at yesterday's meeting of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium that the chairman of the new Supreme Soviet should be elected by direct popular ballot and a decision be made by means of a referendum. If the people decide that the chairman should be elected by direct universal ballot, this will require constitutional amendments. The parliament's chairman will then acquire a different status and could be even upgraded to president. Public opinion polls show that Algirdas Brazauskas, the present chairman of the Supreme Soviet presidium and leader of the independent communist party, is the most likely candidate for this post.

Belorussia Adopts Resolution on CPSU Plenum

90UN0733A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russia 31 Dec 89 p 2

[Resolution adopted by 16th BCP Central Committee Plenum in Minsk on 27 December: "About Republic's Party Organization Tasks in Compliance With Decrees of CPSU Central Committee Plenum 25-26 December 1989"]

[Text] 1. The BCP [Belorussian Communist Party] Central Committee Plenum fully supports and approves the propositions and conclusions contained in the report of M.S. Gorbachev, secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, having examined questions pertaining to the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

The communists of Belorussia express serious concern over the situation that has come about in the Lithuanian CP and consider that the decisions made by the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian CP are aimed at the breakup of solidarity of communists of the republic and undermining of the unity of the CPSU.

The 16th BCP Central Committee Plenum calls on communists of Lithuania to find internal strength and manliness to evaluate what has happened in principle, take the path of realism, and close their ranks along Leninist principles of CPSU unity.

2. It is to be considered indispensable that members and candidates for membership in the BCP Central Committee, members of the BCP Auditing Commission, obkoms [oblast party committees], gorkoms [city party committees], raykoms [rayon party committees], and primary party organizations join without delay in the work of clarifying evaluations and conclusions of the report by M.S. Gorbachev, and resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum to communists and wide masses of the workers of the republic. In the pursuit of these aims use the full variety of organizational and ideological forms of work, and mass information means. Propaganda of ideas set out in materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum is to be closely tied in to the preparations for elections of people's deputies of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and local soviets of the republic.

The 16th BCP Central Committee Plenum favors accelerating the renewal of the BCP. Party committees and organizations must strive for solidarity and unity of party ranks more insistently, based on the purposes of perestroyka, consolidation of society, intensifying the struggle using political means against all who conduct separatist activity and inflame national dissent.

The 16th BCP Central Committee Plenum calls on communists and all working people of the republic to further solidify their ranks around the BCP Central

Committee and to do everything to strengthen the USSR on a healthy and firm foundation, on mutual trust of all nations.

Belorussian Ukase on Elections Published

90UN0733B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 26 Dec 89 p 4

[Ukase issued by Presidium of Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet in Minsk on 25 December 1989]

[Text] To improve the republic's legislation and the protection of the electoral rights of citizens, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

To enter into the BSSR criminal code, confirmed by BSSR law of 29 December 1960 (S3 BSSR, 1961, No 1, Article 4; 1982, No 36, Article 671), the following changes and additions:

Articles 130 and 131 to read as follows:

Article 130. Obstructing exercise of electoral rights.

Obstructing by means of force, deceit, threats, or other means the free exercise by a citizen of the USSR of the right to elect and be elected a people's deputy and to conduct pre-election campaigning—will be punished by deprivation of freedom for up to two years or correctional labor for the same period, or a fine of up to R500.

Publication or spreading by other means intentionally false fabrications defaming a candidate for people's deputy—will be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years or correctional labor up to two years, or a fine of up to R500.

Actions dealt with in Part 2 of this article combined with accusation of commission of a crime—will be punished by deprivation of freedom for up to five years.

Article 131. Forgery of election documents, intentional miscount of votes, or violation of ballot secrecy.

Forgery of election documents or intentional miscount of votes, and also violation of ballot secrecy, committed by a member of an election commission or a functionary in a governmental or social institution—will be punished by deprivation of freedom of up to three years or correctional labor of up to two years, or a fine of up to R500.

[Signed] N. Dementey, chairman of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet;

[Signed] L. Syroegina, secretary of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet.

Minsk, 25 December 1989

Moldavian Presidium Official on Emergency Session

LD0302193390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] In Moldavia the sociopolitical situation has once more been aggravated, which has led to the emergency sitting of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium. Here is our correspondent Ivan Petkov:

[Petkov] To this sitting have also been invited all the leaders of registered public movements who are standing, as their practice demonstrates, on various platforms, and in the majority disposed to street democracy, to raucous meetings and, as happens, aggressive actions. For instance, the latest in Kishinev: A crowd has again attacked a police detachment with provocative appeals. It ended without casualites, but, nevertheless, the excited people provoked a confrontation with the city's inhabitants.

In Tiraspol and Rybnitsa people's referenda were held on the autonomy of their territories. It is not calm in the south where the 160,000 Gagauzy who inhabit several rayons there are also insisting on their own autonomy, which disturbs the general (?atmosphere) of territorially small Moldavia.

This is the situation being examined at the emergency sitting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Moreover, attention is drawn here to the fact that nearly every day new, quite agressive, movements and clubs are appearing. This is what Mircha Ivanovich Snegur, the chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium, began our conversation with.

[Begin Snegur recording] Proceeding from the discussion of the issue at today's session, you have realized these formations in the republic are already such forces which one must not fail to take into account, forces which reflect the interests of certain groups, certain strata of the population. Consequently, our task is to ensure the consolidation of these forces and their direction along the course of perestroyka.

At the same time, individual movements are permitting violations of legislation on the issues of carrying out all kinds of referenda and other unsanctioned measures, processions, and so forth. Therefore, that point of decision which we recorded on strengthening verification [kontrol] on the part of the Council of Ministers of the activity of registered public movements is quite legitimate. We have also laid the responsibility for unsanctioned actions on the leaders of these movements.

Unfortunately, not all our moves are effective. Nevertheless I believe we can and are obliged to ensure calm for the republic and to create conditions for fruitful work. [end recording]

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Presidium on Rallies

LD0302150190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1404 GMT 3 Feb 90

["Complex Political Situation in Moldavia"—TASS headline]

[Text] Kishinev, 3 Feb (ATEM-TASS)—The press in Soviet Moldavia today reports decisions by the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet. They are directed at easing the political tension that has been aggravated of late.

As we have already reported, the Presidium held an extraordinary meeting on Wednesday. It was noted at the meeting that despite the measures being taken by party and local soviet bodies, there has been no let-up of social tensions in the republic. In Kishinev unsanctioned rallies and processions are being held, mass disruptions of public order are being seen, and acts of violence are being perpetrated. The Presidium has condemned the irresponsible and unlawful actions of extremist and separatist groups.

The emergency session devoted considerable attention to an unofficial referendum held in Tiraspol, where mainly non-Moldavians live. The majority of participants in the referendum voted for the town and adjoining region [rayon] to be granted the status of an independent territory operating on the principles of self-government and self-financing, with the languages of all the people who live there functioning on equal footing. The referendum participants also favored the idea that this territory should become part of a Dniester region autonomous republic, should one be set up.

The Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet has deemed the holding of the referendum to be in breach of the requirements of the Constitution and considers its results to have no juridical force or legal consequence.

At the same session, the lengthy picketing of the rayon party committee in the town of Chadyr-Lunga by activists of the Gagauz autonomous republic was condemned. The decision of the Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet indicates that a commission of the republican Supreme Soviet is currently at work studying this problem.

The Presidium called on all inhabitants of the republic to distance themselves from everything that leads to confrontation, to the fomenting of social tension, and to interethnic conflicts.

Moldavian Communist Party Forms Analysis Group

LD0502094290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] A political analysis and operational information group has been formed in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia. The new subdivision, formed within the framework of the Central Committee's existing staff list, is primarily aimed at creating a modern and effective system for studying public opinion and increasing the extent to which the republic's inhabitants are informed.

Tbilisi Rally Calls for Georgia's Independence

LD0302103290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0940 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Tbilisi, 3 Feb (GRUZINFORM-TASS)—A rally was held on Friday in the Georgian capital outside Government House. According to one of its organizers, it was "anti-communist in character."

The rally is a link in a chain of political actions that have been held on several Fridays now. The correspondent of the Georgian News Agency [GRUZINFORM] was informed by Irakliy Tsereteli, who heads the "National Independence Party," one of the formations organizing the rally, that the main demand of those assembled was "restoration of Georgia's independence."

"The Society of Iliya the Righteous and the Monarchists' Party took part in organizing the rally," he said. "The rally was anti- communist and anti-Soviet in character. However, our actions are not directed against the Russian people. We are in favor of a union of Georgia and Russia on the basis of their sovereignty."

PRAVDA Reports on Georgian Party Plenum

PM0102160190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[GRUZINFORM-TASS report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 31 Jan—The sociopolitical situation in the republic and the tasks of its party organization were discussed at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum held yesterday.

The report by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, and the speeches noted that the political and organizational work of the Georgian Communist Party, its elected organs, and its structural subdivisions did not accord and does not accord today with the republic's dynamically developing sociopolitical processes. The work style of the party committees, their commissions, and the apparatus and the forms and methods of relations between party organs and soviet, state, and public organizations need to be seriously reexamined. It was stressed that the complex situation created in the republic dictates the urgent need to restructure its political, economic and social structures, the status of the party itself, and its role and place in the renewed democratic society.

The concept of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic's [SSR's] development, whose draft was approved by the plenum after nationwide discussion, is a reliable guide in this important work. This political document which was given a vote of confidence concisely and clearly expresses the position, desires, and vital interests of the republic's communists, working people, and public. It is regarded as the first serious step in the direction of strengthening the sovereignty of Georgia and its Communist Party. Aimed at maximum implementation of the republic's material and intellectual potential, the concept envisages improving the national-state structure and restructuring the economy and economic ties, the social sphere and social relations, the demographic and ecological situation, the system of public education, science and culture, interethnic relations, and internal party work.

The plenum approved a Georgian Communist Party Central Committee statement in connection with the forthcoming elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and to local soviets. It particularly stresses that vigorous and interested participation in the elections will be a significant step on the path of perestroyka, consolidation, cooperation and cohesion among all healthy forces, and the republic's national-state and socioeconomic progress.

The decision was made at the plenum to convene the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress ahead of schedule, in April 1990.

Georgian Party Adopts Alliance Proposal

LD0302050790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0100 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 2 (TANJUG)—A plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia has adopted a proposal that an alliance of independent Communist Parties of republics be formed within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it has been learned.

The Georgian party plenum proposed that the first secretaries of republican parties become members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It also urged that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in future be called the Central Committee of Communist Parties of the Soviet Union.

The Georgian party leadership agreed that the constitutional provision which guarantees the party a leading role in society be abolished since it believes that authority should be won through actions, not the Constitution.

The Georgian party leadership also believes that the only way towards democratization of society is through a multi-party system.

Georgian Academy Sends Condolences to Armenia

NC0102141490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1715 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Message from Presidium of Georgian Academy of Sciences to Presidium of Armenian Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian Republic, the members of the academy, and the entire scientific community of Georgia express their deep condolences on the tragedy which befell Armenian people and which resulted in great number of human casualties. We deeply lament the death of innocent people and express our condolences to the families and kin of the victims. We are sure that this incident will not subdue the noble spirit and steadfastness of the Armenian people, who will find the strength to face this misfortune, which we consider to be our tragedy as well. [Signed] Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian Republic

Gorbachev Holds Talk With Miners 2 Feb

PM0502123190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Boris Grishchenko report: "'Let's Put Our Shoulders to Wheel of Perestroyka!' M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With Miners"]

[Text] The wave of strikes that recently swept through a number of the country's mining regions, having now receded, has left in the public mind a rather unusual and, for us, untraditional idea of the modern miner—a kind of adamant campaigner for his own interests who is ready to go to extremes if his demands are not met. After all, it was no accident that a number of mass media reports, in assessing the miners' position, occasionally featured the hard words "professional egoism," reflecting—whatever you may say about it—a definite spectrum of public opinion.

However, M.S. Gorbachev's meeting at the CPSU Central Committee on the evening of 2 February with 100 miners representing labor collectives in the country's main coalfields—I say this as a direct eyewitness—shed light on largely different faces. Faces of people who are concerned far more about our common and main task—the progress of perestroyka across the board—than they are about their own personal affairs. It was typical that these faces—mostly young, energetic, and keen people—had come to the party Central Committee this evening.

The speech with which M.S. Gorbachev addressed the miners in opening the meeting could, in my view, be called a meditation aloud on the current situation. A meditation on a period which Mikhail Sergeyevich himself has called heated and crucial. On a period when each minute of the secretary general's time is vital. He actually said that the day before he had worked late into the night dictating the theses of his report at the forthcoming Central Committee plenum.

We will soon be able to familiarize ourselves with that report and the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the forthcoming party congress. Addressing the miners, M.S. Gorbachev confirmed: The Central Committee feels the impulses coming from party organizations and takes into account the moods of the whole of society.

People have plenty of accumulated problems. They also have some very serious opinions and appraisals, however, and they have things to say. This is why it is so important for the party now to find out and check the people's attitude to the policy of perestroyka. Opinion within society is virtually unanimous on this key question—the perestroyka processes must be continued, but they must be continued more powerfully and more decisively. For this purpose, it is necessary to create mechanisms for the management of these processes. The key link in all the planned work, its main element, is the future of the party and the need for its renewal.

This was how the range of problems suggested for examination at the meeting was outlined by the general secretary, who invited miners to an outspoken and constructive conversation.

Following this speech, a speech of reflection, the conversation was immediately totally frank, businesslike, and devoid of demonstration-type emotions and ambitions. Its central topic was not the progress made in implementing the well-known Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608, which in reality is proving hard to implement, nor even ruble wages, but people, communists, and their role in the process of the radical renewal of society's life.

Several hands were raised at once. The right to "choose" the speaker was vested in the meeting participants themselves. K.G. Fisenko, master blaster at "Kochegarka" Mine and chairman of "Artemugol" Association's labor collective council, right away took the bull by the horns.

"We," he said, addressing Mikhail Sergeyevich on behalf of the Donbass coalfield, "are under the impression that both the party leadership and we in the labor collectives are taking our time and are not anticipating people's demands and moods. Obviously, because we do not know them well enough."

The craftsman confirmed this view by means of personal observations: A year ago, when M.S. Gorbachev visited Donetsk during his tour of the Ukraine, "apparatchiks," as the miners put it, gave him no opportunity to chat with those whose opinion is heeded by the labor collective. The front lines were made up of people capable only of nodding in agreement and saying yes to everything. Hence the party leadership's incorrect information about miners' attitudes.

"We still have plenty of master builders putting up 'Potemkin villages!'"

As a matter of fact, M.S. Gorbachev did not overlook this remark. Later on, when he was already summing up the meeting's results and replying to numerous questions, he addressed the Donbass emissaries:

"Such tricks don't work with me either. I saw everything perfectly well. I heard people in the back rows saying: Come over here. I did, I talked to them, and I understood a lot...."

The author of these lines also had an opportunity to attend that meeting, with thousands of people wanting to chat with the party and state leader about the most pressing problems. Not all were successful, and not everything was said. That much more importance attaches to the conclusion drawn with hindsight by the master from "Kochegarka": Strikes in the coal industry could have been avoided despite, as he put it, all the depression in the sector. The miners did not present any demands that were at odds with perestroyka's ideas, he believes. It was to someone's advantage that the miners were not heard and understood in good time. Who was that someone?

Yes, the country needs coal. There is a shortage of it. But are miners the only ones to blame? The new prices for fuel, according to economists' promises, will not be set until next year. How does one take advantage of leasing in the prevailing circumstances? Enterprises' economic autonomy is nothing but fiction for as long as sector monopoly exists. If miners are not promptly supplied with railcars, they can do nothing but lose wages.

We already realize that the satisfaction of miners' demands and the solution of economic problems are impossible without the solution of political problems. In this context, we must have a more tangible sense of the Politburo's position, of your position, Mikhail Sergeyevich, the speaker went on.

In my view, the main problem in the party is the shortage of glasnost. There is scant information about individual leaders' stances, and this is wrong. And now about intraparty democracy. The party's misfortune is said to be not that it is being criticized but that it has taken a certain stance itself, that it has dug its heels in and is not moving. In actual fact, it is the apparatus that has dug its heels in, the middle link of the apparatus. This, in my view, is the main point.

The CPSU's leading role has degenerated into the leading role of the apparatus. Here I am, a party member since 1972. But what is my leading role in the mine section? Everything at local level remains exactly as it has always been. A democratic approach means that all leaders—from Politburo members to rayon party committee secretaries—should be elected directly by the primary organizations. Let them be accountable to the rank-and-file communists, and then feedback will develop. We need new cadres and a new mechanism for their promotion.

We would specifically like to hear your opinion, Mikhail Sergeyevich, about the incipient forms of the workers movement. There are many informal associations, and they need not be tarred with the same brush. It is necessary to realize where constructive forces are to be found and who the extremists are. For example, strikes cannot just be condemned unequivocally: First and foremost their causes must be clarified.

Generally speaking, the miner said, it is necessary to differentiate between where radicalism is necessary and where it is dangerous. For example, it must be welcomed in the sphere of glasnost and democratization, while in the economy it is not valuable to vacillate between one extreme and another. There we are, we've demolished the old way, discipline has collapsed, and we have still to create anything new. We simply have to set the economy right and, in parallel with this, to prepare the conditions for transferring to market relations.

Consolidation is needed, the speaker emphasized. If the forces which want to muddy the waters are rallying, then constructive forces must also rally! The soviets must be renewed in the coming elections, but the apparatus is trying to prevent this.

M.S. Gorbachev: Have you actually come forward as candidates?

K.G. Fisenko: Many have done so. But the apparatchiks manage to find loopholes. Thay is why you need to take a clearer stance and show whose side you are on in this struggle.

M.S. Gorbachev: Is it so unclear, then?

K.G. Fisenko: Mikhail Sergeyevich, we must have complete clarity. We must stand firm together.

M.S. Gorbachev: I agree, I'm in favor of that kind of union, too.

Obviously, the speaker's ideas were nothing new to many people in the audience, and his words prompted excited rejoinders. But it all lasted just a moment or two. Exclamations were heard right away from the audience, from the floor:

"Quiet, men! Let's get back to business!"

The businesslike atmosphere was quickly restored. People had come here, to the party Central Committee, with their own reflections and proposals. They want to make the main points. They could see that they were being listened to, that they were being understood, that there was a desire to understand them fully—this made the meeting unconstrained and democratic, but at the same time gave it a sharp, businesslike mood.

The lofty conscientiousness and self-discipline which distinguished miners even during the most bitter days of the strike automatically came to mind. Yes, these people are capable of containing themselves and taming their emotions, they are organized and persistent.

There are many questions, and the miners expect answers "at first hand," as it were. What is the attitude of the party's and the country's leadership to the idea of monetary reform? Why are people so liberal toward the "shadow economy," which is turning into a negative political factor before our very eyes? Why do prices continue to rise despite all the government promises? How does the pay rise for party and soviet officials look against this background? How is taxation policy being determined?

"What about perestroyka within the party!", someone in the audience prompted.

Right away, a whole package of questions. People believe that all party matters must be more widely open to society. There must be, miners believe, a mandatory political appraisal of the role and activity of all party leaders who, for various reasons, have still not taken their "well-earned rest." People working underground know well the value of the term "rest." It must be really earned!

"The question of a personal responsibility scale for members of the country's top leadership is today one of the fundamental political questions of perestroyka," N.M. Pastukhov, excavator operator at one of "Yakutugol" Association's open pits, believes. "Real power," he said, "is switching into the hands of those who distribute the public wealth. Meaning the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and other suchlike superstructures."

Neither they nor the middle-level party apparatus (which was the miner's description of officials from a series of oblast, city, and rayon party committees) will surrender power. Moreover, he warned, we workers sense that these forces are rallying and are preparing to fight those who are in favor of perestroyka.

N.M. Pastukhov went on to share his views regarding working class representation in the future Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. In Yakutsk, for example, 23 candidates have been nominated in No. 795 Electoral Okrug of whom only three are workers. So there is no guarantee that they will make it.

"I myself have been nominated, for example," he said. "But I have 22 rivals and, generally speaking, none of them is lower than trust manager. How can we compete for a deputy's mandate in such unequal conditions? My rivals have huge staffs, various services, transportation, and all the rest. How about me, an ordinary machine operator? And I am not alone in this; many workers are in an identical situation."

If the party is losing its prestige and, frankly, is in a state of crisis, this does not mean that it is no longer capable of doing anything. The speaker declared that he had no intention of leaving the CPSU. My duty, he said, is to help the healthy democratic forces which have been born in the party and society. N.M. Pastukhov advocated priority for universal human values, an interlinking of ideology and common sense:

"The repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution is pressing. A multiparty system? It actually already exists in principle, and this is perfectly obvious to many people. Only those who benefit from today's state of vegetation are either unwilling or unable to perceive and comprehend this."

The next idea put forward by the speaker generated a hubbub of approval:

"Why shouldn't we, gathered here, actually attend the forthcoming Central Committee plenum? Why shouldn't we, so to speak, get a feeling of its actual atmosphere, especially when the CPSU's political platform for the 28th Congress is discussed? Then we would be more confident about the plenum's outcome; otherwise there will be all sorts of rumors...."

M.S. Gorbachev asked how many communists were present among the miners. The overwhelming majority of meeting participants raised their hands.

M.S. Gorbachev: Discuss the matter then, nominate a delegation of about 10 persons. Let us have a practical check of how you would make use of democracy. As for attending the plenum, I believe that it would be useful for your representatives. They might even address it....

The general conversation was interrupted for several minutes. The general secretary's proposal did cause some embarrassment. The miners had not actually expected that their proposal would be accepted just like that. In actual fact, whenever someone tries nowadays to set the working class in opposition to the party, they primarily point to a certain exclusiveness, an isolation of the CPSU from the people and the masses. Suddenly—an invitation to the plenum. But are we not in general trying to break down an open door? An attempt was immediately made to nominate the delegation right there, in the hall. Mikhail Sergeyevich let the meeting take a short break. He wanted to know whether many of the participants had come forward as candidates in the forthcoming elections.

It appeared that the majority had done so.

"You are saying that the 'apparatus' is preventing you from having a say in politics," Mikhail Sergeyevich said smiling, "but, after all, you are a real political force."

It seemed to me that at that moment those present realized for the first time into whose hands the power in the country is passing. Into their hands, the workers' hands, or rather the hands of the people. This brief intermission provided a glimpse of the near future, as it were, a glimpse of the soviets into which new blood is already flooding.

A.V. Fomin, a mechanic at the "Sverdlovantratsit" association mine installation administration, asked to be given the floor.

"I would like our discussion to be frank, man to man," he said. "Saying that there is dissatisfaction in society with the progress of perestroyka is putting it mildly. People are at the end of their tether. They are sick to death of the hardships of daily life, and it is the working people who bear the main burden of it. Hence the anger and the striving of a section of the people to grab a little more for themselves."

Talking about reserves, the worker said in particular that our country must not betray the principles of internationalism but must give economic assistance to foreign friends, albeit making greater savings and without detriment to itself.

"What sort of conditions will our children live in?" the mine worker asked. "In crisis and chaos, as we do today, or in normal conditions as befits civilized people? There have been certain moves on the part of the leadership, a desire to change the course of events. However, we have run into opposition from the middle component, which is still peopled by a certain type of party lieutenant. More often than not they represent the most conservative component, which is also preventing you from changing the situation in the country. We are so powerless and helpless in the face of these comrades that the probability of our winning in the elections is very slight.

"There are many urgent problems here and they need to be resolved without delay. If you tackle them, Mikhail Sergeyevich, we will support you. However, if you do not, or if we cannot see a firm stance as regards the solution of these questions, then we will probably part company.

"Unfortunately, it is hardly possible today to claim that the necessary social protection exists. I repeat, people are angry about the lack of absolutely everything, and this is no longer a social issue—it is an ideological and even a moral issue.

"I am 30," A.V. Fomin said, "and I have lived honesty for all those years. What about the future? I know that it will be hard, too. I am willing to fight, I am willing to suffer. But on an equal footing; I want the same conditions for me as for the party city committee [gorkom] secretary. That above all. At the same time I must know, I must be able to be confident that my son will have a better life. If not, then I am not willing; in that case I have no aim, no prospects."

The worker submitted a proposal: The democratization of society is inconceivable without a rotation of leading cadres. Referendums are needed on key questions of society's life, together with regular reports by party and state leaders to the people about the state of affairs in the country. Once a month, or once a quarter, say, on Central Television.

S.A. Dubinin, chairman of the trade union committee at the "Neryungrinskiy" open cut mining and enriching facility, also agreed with his comrades.

"It so happens," he noted, "that the miners are the most harmonious and organized class in the country. But there is no need to explain that the same troubles and needs are being experienced by workers in other sectors.

"Why is the country's leadership not paying attention to the negative phenomena highlighted by the miners movement? After all, we were assisting the leadership: You proclaimed perestroyka from above, and we picked it up from below. Let's pool our efforts. You can rely on us. We will put our miners' shoulders to the wheel for perestroyka, and for you, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

"The decisions adopted in the wake of the strike have run into an impasse," the speaker noted. "There can be no question of any new management methods if there is no legal basis. We want to hear one thing: Is the leadership capable of leading the country out of the crisis, because the transitional period has dragged on for too long. We represent collectives which comprise a workforce of many thousands, and people are waiting to hear what you will tell them today. Our future joint work and our future life depends on this.

"It is necessary," the trade union official believes, "not merely to inform people about what is happening in our country, but to channel their efforts in the right direction. This also means the direction of consolidation, so urgently needed by all who sincerely favor perestroyka. To ensure that its processes are implemented more vigorously, a firm legal basis for the renewal of the country and of socialism is needed. In this case the need for the party's monopoly on power will fall away. The CPSU will lead the society's progressive forces from the front, not by virtue of rules but by virtue of its actions."

It has to be noted that the idea of consolidation, expressed in various ways, formed a kind of leitmotiv in all the miners' speeches. Those whom certain people have lately branded as "foundation-rockers" on this occasion spoke insistently about the need for constructive steps along the path of renewing society's life. This confirms yet again that the perestroyka processes have reached the deep strata of our social structure, that the young tree of perestroyka is expanding and deepening its root system.

"The first conclusion which I can draw from this discussion," M.S. Gorbachev said in closing the meeting, "on the whole coincides with my own conviction. We cannot go on living the way we have been. The transitional period is the most dangerous time, it needs to be shortened. The situation is complicated by the tension in the market—and in that respect, I must say, a considerable amount of the blame lies with us, with the center.

"The old mechanism has been removed, but the new mechanism is not working yet, and the growth in monetary income has greatly outstripped the growth in the supply of goods. This must be stated frankly," Mikhail Sergeyevich continued. "Previously we produced growth in commodity turnover of R10-12 billion, and somehow got out of the situation. In 1988 this growth amounted to almost R25 billion plus an almost 10-percent increase in services. But the situation in the stores is nonetheless failing to improve. In this situation some people say that we need to rush into market affairs at breakneck speed. The market, they claim, will regulate everything itself. But I would say—and I'm convinced about this—that rushing in like that would constitute desperation, not policy.

'No, we cannot solve the problem without the market—I am convinced of that. But we must approach it in a natural way and maintain it in such a way that it does not turn people's pockets inside out and set all the strata of society at odds. For this, too, is clear—no state, even with a private-sector economy, has wholly abandoned market regulation.

"Others advise that we abandon innovation, crack down and get a grip on everything, and return to our old ways. That again is not the way. Then we would just be left in the past.

'The subject of the need for radical change, the acceleration of perestroyka, and determination in its implementation will undoubtedly feature at the plenum," M.S. Gorbachev said. "That's the first point. The second point is the center and the working class. In the past all kinds of initiatives and reforms were stymied for a single reason: People—the people—were not included in them. Can anything really advance without support from below? No. But there wasn't this kind of support. Because the political environment in which society lived was not changing.

"That is why we launched the political reform and included the people's masses themselves in it. Otherwise nothing would have come of it. If we say that we need to include working people, then that means that the working class and, above all, a force such as the miners should be all the more to the fore. They have always been an organized force, and a very powerful, direct, and open force. Even in the time of stagnation. I know how trenchant the party conferences in Donetsk were. Miners are able to take a man's measure in a flash, look him in the eye, and tell him the truth. I know and value that openness. That is why it is politically important, and even necessary, for us to ensure that the working class in general is involved in a highly active way in all perestroyka processes.

"Somebody took umbrage," Mikhail Sergeyevich continued, "at the thesis: 'As we work, so shall we live.' But that's the way things actually are! And this isn't being said to imply that you work badly. No, it's about how everything is organized in our society, how our economic system functions, what incentives are embodied in it, and how people's personal interest and initiative operate. That's what it's about. For that's the way everything turns out: Our living standards will depend on how we manage the country. That's for sure.

"Who is more to blame? I think the center is. Because it formulates the ideology behind the economic mechanism, the system of incentives, and all approaches. But workers and peasants must take a different attitude to their work. A great deal will depend on cadres as regards the progress in assimilating new forms of economic management.

"Do you remember that the recent conference with representatives of the working class, peasantry, and our technical intelligentsia was addressed by an economist from Kaliningrad Oblast? She stated bluntly that we need to fundamentally change our work and introduce new forces. We need to do everything to ensure that people really have an opportunity through new mechanisms to influence the economy, politics, and party work.

"We have all grasped that very well. We are involving all forces in order to elaborate these approaches. That is why, first and foremost, laws will be adopted on ownership, the land, the tax system, the enterprise, and local soviets. After all, we can endlessly repeat: 'Power to the Soviets!' But if we give them no rights nothing will come of it. We very much want to provide strong and real reinforcement for the soviets so as to allow them to work."

Talk then turned to increasing the wages of party and soviet workers. But this process is under way throughout the country. It has long been held back in the party and soviet apparatus. That is why it often attracted people who were simply professional failures. The question arose: To whom should we give power? To incompetent people? We needed the wherewithal to attract into administration and leadership highly capable people who would be able to take on new concerns, a new style, and new obligations. Then we started analyzing and comparing the pay of various categories of specialist, including economic managers.

The first secretary of a rural party rayon committee [raykom] received pay equivalent to that of a department manager on a large state farm. Who'll want to take that post? After all, a raykom secretary must have authority and knowledge and be able to work with people. There are many requirements, but where will we get such workers from? So, three times we postponed the question of pay rises, but on the fourth occasion we made the decision. And again we are criticized.

But when we made this decision we simultaneously introduced staff cuts of 40 percent in party Central Committee departments and 27 percent at party oblast and kray committees. That is, we released money, using it to solve and remove the cadre question.

"Incidentally," M.S. Gorbachev said, addressing those present, "how much do the strike committee leaders get paid?"

Voice: According to the average....

M.S. Gorbachev: You see—another apparatus is being created. You can see for yourselves that an apparatus is necessary nonetheless.

We are struggling to reduce it, we have cut it in party and economic organs at the top, so to speak.

N.I. Ryzhkov: But the total number of managers has risen once again. And it has done so on the basis of the Law on the Enterprise, whereby each enterprise decides how many managers it needs. At union, republic, and oblast levels the apparatus has been reduced by 700,000 people. But, at the same time, an additional 700,000 managers have been added to enterprises. Still people say that it's not enough!

M.S. Gorbachev: Exactly! When we cut the apparatus at the center, we did so with a view to the new role to be played by the apparatus and party committees. We also took the new soviets into consideration—they, too, should attract the most capable people.

I think that through the elections the soviets should gain people like you—yes indeed. There must be proper remuneration for intensive, efficient work. We must create the following system, for instance: We reelect the soviet and then recertificate the entire apparatus and conclude a contract with it for a stated period.

"Now," Mikhail Sergeyevich continued, "there is a group of questions about the running of the country. The first group of problems concerns the creation of a legal basis for the economy, as I have already mentioned. The second problem that I think we have to solve, comrades, is the cadre problem. Where should we be headed in that respect? I think that as far as the soviets are concerned we should proceed via political reform, via elections and their second phase. You can see that when we elected a new Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies we were able to bring many mechanisms into action! This is just the start, although sometimes we cannot avoid certain costs. But there is no other way—after all, we are doing something which will determine the fate of the country for decades to come. Could it really come about of its own accord? After all, we need to get almost 300 million people moving! Once we start picking up this positive momentum, it will be hard to stop it. Currently we are breaking with the old, stagnant inertia—and we need to do so through elections and through those who can organize the people with authority.

"Certain people say that our electoral system is a bad one. I cannot agree with that."

Voice: Not a single apparatus staffer wants to run in okrugs where workers have been nominated. They avoid it.

M.S. Gorbachev: Well it's your right—you make the nominations! Nowadays there will always be various alternatives. This is a struggle. We need to learn its ins and outs among other things. I personally believe that those forces which have come to the fore in acute situations and which are capable at one and the same time of reflecting and containing a situation and of assuming responsibility are the kinds of forces that should be involved in the soviets, the party, and the trade unions.

Voice: Then there'll be a power struggle....

M.S. Gorbachev: So what? We're already in a struggle with the outgoing force, my friends. We have reached the stage where the grassroots are in motion—new people have appeared, fresh cadres from among the people. The people themselves are acting boldly. This means that we are only really starting perestroyka now.

Some people don't like the fact that movement has now begun everywhere. I personally believe that this is just what is needed and what will save perestroyka. Here's my answer to this question. Demagogues have always been around and will continue to be. We needn't fear them. The people will soon work out—and already are working out—those who just talk and those who do the work, even in the corps of deputies. Society now needs sound people—innovators, not loudmouths. That is why I invite you to join in this process.

This means that in order to change the mid-level and upper-level cadre situation we should work thorugh the mechanisms which we have initiated—through political reform and through the processes of democratization and election [vybornost]. In this regard, I am approaching the subject of the party. The first and most important thing that I want to tell you is that if the party does not renew itself it will be left behind. It must be renewed. And renewed, above all, through democratization—so that this should be sensed immediately by what Lenin called the "primary groups," every rank-and-file communist. How will we do this? Above all, we need the majority of communists to exert a direct influence on the formation of higher and middle-level party organs and on the election of leaders. We need the mass of communists—through the "primary groups" once again—to determine the composition of delegates, conferences, and the congress, and to nominate people they trust.

That is why in a few days' time we will be submitting and publishing new proposals on this. Although the old party statutes that still exist do not permit it, the Central Committee will nonetheless undertake this initiative.

The main thing is that we must find a mechanism for choosing delegates to rayon and oblast conferences, and to the congress. That is the crux of the matter.

Concerning questions of political pluralism, M.S. Gorbachev briefly acquainted the miners with certain ideas contained in the draft documents for the upcoming Central Committee plenum. As he put it, he took advantage of the opportunity to give them another "test run" in living contact with communists representing the working class. It has to be said that the workers understood and supported these ideas on the whole. He stressed that the democratization of our society is accompanied by the emergence of new sociopolitical associations of citizens. The procedure for their formation must be defined by law and appropriately reflected in the USSR Constitution. The CPSU does not lay claim to a monopoly and is prepared for political dialogue with all who advocate the renewal of the socialist society. In principle our viewpoint is that a multiparty system is not a panacea. What is of decisive importance is the level of democratization of society and the democratic nature of the formation of all its structures. The CPSU is in favor of conducting a dialogue with all political movements and organizations that really assist the perestroyka and renewal of our life.

Questions from the floor poured in, one after another. They were organically interwoven into the substance, the atmosphere of the meeting.

M.S. Gorbachev did not leave a single question unanswered.

You ask about the combination of posts, he said. The congress must decide this. I am quite sure it is necessary in a transitional period, so as not to have two centers. But, thereafter, I am in favor of separating them. Yes, I think that ultimately we must move toward the compulsory separation of these functions. Although you know that in all states the leader of the victorious party heads the state while continuing to be the party leader. That was also what Lenin did. He headed the government and chaired Politburo sessions. So the decision is up to the congress, and it is also for the congress to decide whom to elect. But combination of posts is now necessary in the interests of consolidation.

There was a question about the situation in the Politburo. It was not a crisis situation. But both the Central Committee and the Politburo needed renewal and an influx of fresh forces. The congress was also necessary from this viewpoint. I [Gorbachev] cannot say that anyone in the Politburo has tried to turn the clock back. Various viewpoints are expressed in the course of debate, but you can see from the decisions we adopt that the line that is pursued is one of developing perestroyka processes.

[Gorbachev] There were times—even I experienced them—when Politburo sessions would be all over in 30 or even 15 minutes—that is how "clear" everything was. Now the atmosphere is workmanlike in this sense. There is debate and everyone takes part in it. It is quite another matter that there are also differences of approach, there is concern and alarm, but everyone bluntly says what they think.

I am sure that your question is also connected with the fact that regularly, ahead of every plenum, someone spreads fantasies about some kind of "coup" being hatched. When I arrived for my meeting with the Brazilian president I was told that people were keenly discussing the "news from Moscow" that Gorbachev was resigning as general secretary. See how far the rumors spread!

Now about the next plenum. I think we will get support, although there will certainly be some criticism. And there will certainly be sharp discussion. But this, comrades, really reflects the complex situation in society. It is also making its mark on the debate. People are fretting that the situation is getting out of hand. This is causing everyone to move, some to the left, others to the right. But we must head for the main breakthrough salient and advance the policy of perestroyka. We have now arrived at the conclusion that progress must be resolutely accelerated. Workers sometimes say to me: We can see you're not losing your presence of mind, so tell us what you're relying on. I say: I rely on two things. First, the fact that we have made the correct choice since all attempts to propose anything else and to replace this policy are fruitless. The only alternative options relate to details: How to refine what, what pace to impart to the transformations, what to do and how. That is useful and should be welcomed. But as a direction the policy of perestroyka has been accepted in society. That is the first and main condition.

Second. I am relying nevertheless on two very valuable qualities. On our people's patriotism, which we have in abundance despite everything. People will try to do anything to support the country. And second—there is the people's great patience and endurance. But of course, it too cannot be exploited for long.

We are passing through the most crucial period. We must hold on to make sure that the country doesn't go off the rails. But this does not mean that movement should be suppressed and the oxygen should be turned off. It is simply that there is no time to lose. You and I have no disagreement on that point.

We are traveling the correct path. Maybe we will not be able to do everything the way we should. But everyone understands that we must, so to speak, ennoble both the country and our system, give society a second wind, renew the party, the soviets, and the federation, and improve the moral atmosphere.

Now I will answer the main question: Are we with you or not? I know that perestroyka will fail if the worker, the working person remains indifferent to it. So I state unequivocally—We need your support, we need it more than anything! Above all, your political support, but also, of course, we need the organization and development of perestroyka processes, Mikhail Sergeyevich said.

That was the answer to the main question that the miners put point-blank, so to speak. Are they the only ones to put it? The miners were merely expressing the alarm that, to be honest, a considerable proportion of working people feel today. Whatever attempts may be made "on the right" and "on the left" to disunite the party and the people at this crucial juncture in our history and in society's life, people, who have learned a lot and come to understand a lot in recent years, are firmly convinced: In large-scale ventures like perestroyka it is not disarray and the splitting of forces but their cohesion and consolidation that will ensure that the goals are achieved. That is why the general secretary's reply quite perceptibly relieved the emotional strain with which people had arrived for the meeting.

"I think our meeting has been held in a spirit of frankness," M.S. Gorbachev noted, summing up the results. "Believe me, the questions you have raised will help to deepen our understanding of what is happening. It has correctly been said here that not everything is working out in our country. We will ensure that things work out better. We have now reached a stage when we must haul the locomotive of perestroyka more strongly and give the green light to our whole train.

"Is there anything I've not talked to you about," he said to the meeting participants. "My attitude to the workers movement? You know, in general I am in favor of all movements that support perestroyka, I welcome them. Social movements, workers movements, and others. I think that the workers movement is called upon to enrich the perestroyka of the party, the restructuring of the soviets, and the restructuring of the economic apparatus. The best forces representing the workers movement must enter these spheres. This will enrich and inject life into the very mechanism of the functioning of the party, the state apparatus, the soviets, and other social organizations. That is, the working class must transfuse its worker blood, so to speak, into all management structures. Only on this condition will we be able to really transform the soviets, renew the party, and change the trade unions. Let us do this together. So that you are aware of our position and our understanding and we are aware of your support. I repeat: We need this. Both your understanding and your support.

"Yes," Mikhail Sergeyevich said with a smile, "I think our conversation has worked out, our talk has been mutually beneficial."

...The meeting had ended, but it was not over. Its participants were in no hurry to disperse, they formed groups and exchanged impressions. The miners had many topics on which to exchange a few words with N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, who had taken part in the discussion. The questions to Mikhail Sergeyevich and, vice versa, his questions to the miners seemed inexhaustible.

A young miner, embarrassed but unable to hold back, asked Mikhail Sergeyevich for an autograph. As a souvenir for the guys on his team, he explains. And a immediately a line for autographs forms. A lively and smiling line. Not a common sight....

However, it was business above all. Miners confronted Mikhail Sergeyevich with specific questions, and they formed circles around USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairmen L.D. Ryabev and I.S. Silayev. They also had plenty of questions for S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; A.Ya. Sukharev, USSR Prosecutor General; V.S. Pavlov, USSR minister of finance; and the leader of their "own" sector, M.I. Shchadov, minister of the country's coal industry....

The final minutes of this meeting, which ended without the applause customary on such occasions, have also stuck in my mind. A miner simply rose from his seet and, turning to M.S. Gorbachev, said calmly and with aplomb:

"Mikhail Sergeyevich, thank you for the discussion. Thank you, on behalf of all the country's miners. It seems to me that after this discussion you have become even closer to us, and we to you...."

This was the final note of the meeting. It really did reflect the mood that emerged and intensified among people during those three evening hours spent at the party Central Committee—a mood for action.

Tank Export Case Reveals Lack of Control

Committee Investigates

LD0302160290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] In accordance with instructions of the CPSU Cenral Committee, the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, together with the Defense Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military and Industrial Issues, the USSR Procuracy and KGB, and the People's Control Committee of the country, has examined the circumstances connected with the attempt to sell military tanks illegally abroad. It has been established that some communists, leaders of ministries, of the USSR aviation industry, the USSR defense industry, and the USSR radio industry have permitted a lack of control which led to a gross violation of the rules on state regulation of foreign economic activity. In accordance with a proposal by the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, an inter-branch state cooperative concern, ANT [Avtomatisatsiya, Nauka i Tekhnologiya], was set up which was granted groundlessly wide-ranging rights and privileges.

On the situation of lack of control by a number of communists leaders of ministries and departments: Dozens of organizations and enterprises, including defense ones, turned out to be inolved in the concern's commercial interests. The concern's activity inflicted serious political and economic damage on our country. As a disciplinary action, the USSR Concil of Ministers punished a number of guilty officils. The USSR Procuracy started and together with the USSR KGB, will investigate the criminal cases on the incidents of abuses committed during the conclusion of trade deals. The CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee has dismissed a number guilty officials from the party ranks and has also announced severe reprimands with entries on their personal files [s zaneseniyem v uchetnuyu kartochku] and has taken out other party proceedings.

Comrade Baklanov, secretary of the party Central Committee, took part in the session of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee. The session was conducted by Comrade Pugo, chairman of the CPSU Party Control Committee.

Officials Disciplined

LD0202212790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Feb 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Many of you probably know, comrades, about the attempt by the state cooperative concern ANT [Avtomatisatsiya, Nauka i Tekhnologiya] to unlawfully sell combat tanks abroad via the port of Novorossiysk. This is something we also reported in our program.

A meeting of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee today considered the issue of the irresponsible attitude of a number of communist leaders toward their official duties.

The following have been expelled from the party:

(?Dolgin), general director of the Vzlet Scientific Production Association;

Pekshev, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commmission of the USSR Council of Ministers;

(Grinev), first deputy department head of the above commission;

(Babayev), former senior worker of the apparatus of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Severe reprimands with entries in their registration cards have been pronounced against:

Systsov, minister of the aviation industry;

Zakharov, deputy minister of the defense industry;

(Serikov), general director of the Uralvagonzavod Production Association;

(Guryanov), deputy head of the main State Customs Control Directorate.

A severe reprimand has been pronounced against Kamentsev, former deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Party penalties have also been passed against:

Gusev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers;

Belousov, minister of the defense industry;

(Yakovlev), head of a main directorate of the Ministry of the Radio Industry.

TU-154 Makes Emergency Landing in Magadan

LD0202131390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] On a flight from Magadan to Alma Ata on a Tu-154 aircraft, 95 passengers had to endure a worrying 2 and ½ hours in the northern skies. Immediately after take-off at a height of little more than 300 meters an alarm lit up on the control panel. One of the three engines was malfunctioning. It was a clearcut decision: A landing had to be made at the airport from where it had taken off. But it was impossible to commence the descent straight away, for the landingweight of aircraft of this type under emergency conditions is equal to 80 tonnes, whereas immediately after take-off it is considerably in excess of that figure. having gained a certain height in order not to hit the crests of the hills it had to circle for more than 2 and ½ hours in the airport's waiting zone. Only after several tonnes of fuel had been used could they start their descent. The aircraft landed successfully at its home airport using two engines. A shaving was discovered in the engine. A special commission is to establish how it turned up there.

Paper's 'Stinging Attack' Against Ligachev

PM0202144990 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 2 Feb 90 p11

[Report by Trevor Fishlock in Moscow]

[Text] The reformist newspaper MOSCOW NEWS published a stinging attack yesterday on the Soviet Communist Party's leading conservative, Mr. Yegor Ligachev. Unprecedented in its frankness, it was telling evidence of the serious rift between hard-liners and President Gorbachev's reform-minded supporters.

The article's timing was significant. Characterising Mr Ligachev and the conservatives as political dinosaurs, it was published only four days before next Monday's party Central Committee plenum.

Mr Gorbachev is expected to emphasise at the meeting the urgent need for the changes that people such as Mr. Ligachev vehemently oppose.

The article accused Mr. Ligachev of backing the most unhealthy elements of socialism. "He seeks to draw for support on what has become outdated, having demonstrated its fantastic inefficiency: the one-party system, a command-based economy and ideological unanimity."

He had clung to principles which had brought Soviet society "to the point of imminent collapse", it said.

"What mostly dooms Ligachev and his political future is that willingly, or at the party's behest, he has become a hostage of the myth of the unity of the party and the Soviet Union. No such unity existed, even under Stalin's criminally repressive rule. Nor does it exist today. A policy of tightening the screws would not take long to prove its inefficacy.

Mr. Ligachev, 69, a Politburo member and former Kremlin ideology chief, may have been surprised by the sharpness of the attack, written by the political commentator Vitaly Tretyakov. But he would not have been surprised that it was published in Moscow News. He and the paper are old enemies. He has sternly criticised its reformist stance.

"Although I understand the conservatives' right to delude and to propagandise their delusions, they more often than not engage deliberately in lies and half-truths," wrote Mr. Tretyakov.

He said that, in December, Mr. Ligachev had talked of the solidity of the Soviet Communist party. Soon afterwards, the Lithuanian party seceded from it. On another occasion returning from East Germany when it was still run by Erich Honecker, "Ligachev assured us everything was normal with socialism there".

The article accused the hardliners of having no consideration for people. "The people are immaterial, as are questions of democracy. This is typical of a certain brand of Soviet conservatism. This is the issue on which Ligachev differs from the spirit of the day."

The writer said darkly: "As a staunch supporter of socialism in its most traditional and orthodox form, Ligachev is helping to test its compatiblity or interchangability with all sorts of 'patriotic' and populist sentiments, including primitive chauvinism." He added: "If the country's leadership, including Ligachev, is prepared to give up the imperial mind-set forthwith, democracy may still have a chance of winning."

Ligachev Remarks on Union Developments

LD0202120190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1130 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Prominent Soviet official Yegor Ligachev announced that developments in the Soviet Union are becoming uncontrollable. In an interview granted to Italian daily LA REPUBBLICA, he also noted that the Soviet population is beginning to lose faith in the future. According to Ligachev, it is necessary to renew order in the country. He sees the main value as being unity between the Soviet Union and all communists.

The Italian newspaper said Ligachev is a representative of conservative forces in the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin Supports 'Left-Wing Gorbachev'

LD0402204390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From "Seven Days" program presented by Eduard Sakalayev; video report from the Urals by correspondent E. Erkomayshvili, including remarks by and interview with Boris Yeltsin and interview with people on street]

[Excerpts] [Erkomayshvili] These days it's no miracle to meet a public figure of any rank just on the street or in a shop, especially during an election campaign. However, the people of the Urals know not only that Yeltsin behaves that way when it wasn't accepted to do so, but that this was even regarded by some people as almost eccentricity on the part of an obkom first secretary. [passage omitted]

[Erkomayshvili] Yes, it can only be a joke now to describe our shops as supermarkets.

Nor are things happy on the building sites. The annual task for the housing program has not been fulfilled. [passage omitted]

[Erkomayshvili] The criticism is quite characteristic of Yeltsin in its form, in my opinion. However, the problem is evident. We don't have enough materials for ourselves, yet we sell them on the side. Take a look at this room. No matter how much the fire warden called for the corridors to be freed so that people could get out if there were an accident, it made no difference. [video shows crowded auditorium, Yeltsin on podium]

Here are some of the points of the program which Yeltsin put forward:

[Yeltsin] An independent Russian party should be formed within the framework of a multiparty system on the basis of the apparatus-free structure. [applause] It should be constitutionally established that, for the duration of his term of office, the president should suspend his membership of any political parties or political organizations. All national autonomous entities should be granted independence and the right and opportunity to come to the republican Supreme Soviet with proposals on the establishment of new national territorial formations. The USSR should have professional armed forces and Russia should have a territorial home guard. The period of service should be 10 months and it should be served in the republic of conscription. A treaty should be signed with all the republics on their reciprocal obligations. It is essential to establish a number of free economic zones which will be extended in the future and transferred to a socialist market economy. By 1993, housing construction should be increased by one and a half times, for foreign firms should be involved, and the housing built by foreign firms should subsequently be sold to the population.

[Erkomayshvili] Then the notes came in. For example: What is the main thing for a communist?

[Yeltsin] The main thing is to take up a principled position.

[Erkomayshvili] And the main quality for a leader?

[Yeltsin] Competence and honesty. [applause, followed by indistinct heckling]

[Erkomayshvili] That was the reaction to anonymous notes to the effect that he had sold himself to various -ists. There will evidently be a struggle. Fourteen candidates have been registered in the constituency. One would only wish for there to be discussion and not the new variant of playing to the gallery.

[video shows Erkomayshvili speaking to Yeltsin] Do you support Gorbachev?

[Yeltsin] Yes, I support Gorbachev, but only the more radically inclined Gorbachev, the more left-wing Gorbachev.

[Erkomayshvili] After one of the meetings, I asked people who wished to stay behind and express their opinion on the candidates program.

[First man] I am most impressed by his idea of recognizing the sovereignty of Russia and of singling out economic areas.

[Second man] For the most part I liked the program, but there are controversial points.

[Erkomayshvili] Which ones, may I ask?

[Second man] I was concerned by his housing construction program most of all. I don't think that it's realistic by 1993 to build housing, to ensure the whole....

[Erkomayshvili interrupting] By one and a half times?

[Second man] To increase it by one and a half times. That somehow gives rise to doubt. We must take a realistic attitude to this.

[Third man] I don't understand how any organizations, including parties, can be set up and can function on an apparatus-free basis. I simply don't know what that is.

[S.L.Kotov, candidate people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, lawyer] On the whole, the program is a very radical one. On the whole, it is a very liberal one. On the whole, I like it.

[Erkomayshvili] But you are one of Boris Nikolayevich's rivals in the campaign for the deputy's mandate.

[Kotov] Yes, and a very resolute rival. At meetings with the electorate; I state directly that I don't believe Boris Nikolayevich. If I believed him I would withdraw my candidacy.

[Fourth man] I believe that he is a placeman of the apparatus and that he is trying to occupy the main commanding heights on perestroyka in order to conduct the same policy that he conducts during the years of stagnation when he was first secretary.

[Yeltsin] In some respects, judging by people's reactions, the program will undoubtedly undergo changes. I shall not say that it will undergo fundamental changes, but on some issues there will be changes.

[Erkomayshvili] There are many leaders in the history of the Urals about whom people have argued and continue to argue. But I still think it's a good thing that the Urals produce such leaders.

Yeltsin Election Visit to Sverdlovsk Reported

LD0202115990 Moscow TASS in English 1138 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Sverdlovsk February 2 TASS—By TASS special correspondent:

Boris Yeltsin, who is running for a seat in the Russian Federation Parliament, completed a week-long trip to the Urals where the electorate pledged full support for him at elections, due to be held on March 4.

Yeltsin was nominated in the 74th National-Territorial District which comprises two industrial cities, Sverdlovsk with a population of nearly 1.5 million and 300,000-strong Pervouralsk.

It was in Sverdlovsk that Yeltsin started his career 35 years ago, before being elected to the post of first secretary of the CPSU regional committee.

Until yesterday there were 13 other candidates in the same constituency, but one of them dropped out on behalf of the people's deputy of the USSR. Yeltsin's programme, which espouses the democratic, spiritual and national revival of Russia, is vindicated by scientists' calculations.

Russia has enough wealth, talent and able people, Yeltsin believes. What is lacking is the effective organisation for a new life. Transformations should be based on a new constitution of the Russian Federation, which will provide for the separation of power, and the observance of democratic rights and freedoms.

The Russian Federation, Yeltsin says, must become a presidential republic with a permanent parliament, legislation in compliance with international agreements, a constitutional court, its own parties, scientific and cultural establishments, the press and a volunteer corps, based on a territorial principle, instead of the regular army.

The economic section of the programme calls for stabilising the situation through new laws on property, land, tax and local autonomy. It also envisages employee ownership schemes, a reform of the credit and financial system, as well as the investment policy, the establishment of free economic zones, the de-ideologisation of the economy and the elimination of enterprises in the red.

Yeltsin insists on making radical cuts in management and distribution bodies, including the KGB State Security Committee, repealing the privileges of leaders at all levels. He proposes holding a referendum to change the national-state system of Russia in order to enhance regional autonomy.

During his week-long stay Yeltsin held several three to four-hour meetings with the electorate every day. He always drew capacity crowds.

"I am satisfied with my first trip to the Urals as a candidate," Yeltsin told TASS. "Not only because I was supported by my fellow citizens but also because they helped me specify and even reconsider some of the nuances of the pre-election programme."

'Problems, Solutions' Program on Property

LD0901231990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1830 GMT on 9 January carries a 75-minute edition of the "Problems and Solutions" program, devoted to the Draft Property Law, with the participation of Leonid Aleksandrovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Veniamin Fedeorovich Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice; and Yuriy Khamzatovich Kalmykov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. The program is presented by Lev Aleksandrovich Voznesenskiy, political observer of central television

The participants reply to viewers' questions largely by quoting from the draft law on ownership as published in PRAVDA on 18 November. The participants explain the meaning of various sections of the proposed law.

Abalkin says: "The Draft Law on Ownership in the USSR is a fundamental law, on the basis of which the whole logic of the development of economic reform in the country must be built." He goes on: "First of all the law proceeds from the premise that the whole of perestroyka, all the richness of its contents, is not possible without a radical and fundamental renewal of the attitude to ownership. Without this it is unthinkable to bring the reform to its conclusion and, I would like to stress this, to make it irreversible." Viewers' questions express opinions for and against private ownership. The panel explains exactly what forms of ownership are envisaged by the law. They say that intellectual property is not covered by this law but will be covered by others now in preparation. In reply to a viewer who says that each union republic should be free to decide this matter for itself, Yakovlev says they will be free to do so, within the overall framework of this law.

Other questions cover private ownership of land, ways of protecting property, corporate ownership property, how to sell cooperative apartments.

Asked by a viewer why German workers are choosing to move from the GDR to the FRG and not vice versa, Abalkin replies: "It must be said honestly and directly: socialist ownership, deformed and in those forms which are alien to socialism—where everything is run by the state, with bureaucratism, alienation of the worker from production and from management authority—is incapable of competing with capitalist ownership if it does not acquire a new character, if it does not acquire its second wind. This is a major question which has been asked, a question of historical choice."

At the end of the program Abalkin reads out two viewers' letters. "Now, two short notes and short answers. The council of ministers announces a step by step transfer to a new economy but in fact is making a turn toward the command style. If this opinion has been created, then this is a very serious misunderstanding of the essence of the government's program and perhaps we should talk about this in a special broadcast, for such questions arise even though they are very far from the truth.

"The final note comes from (Zarifa Fominishna Sabbeyeva) from Ordzhonikidze. Abalkin promised humane living conditions in 14 months; Ryzhkov, in his report, in 5 or 6 years. Could Abalkin please explain where the truth lies.

"I have said that it is the government's united view that we have 1 year left, this year, a year—no special words are needed here—a year in which we must show, yes or no, are we or are we not capable of stopping the exacerbation of the negative processes in the economy, of stabilizing the economy, of preventing any further deterioration. People cannot, and we do not have the right to make them, live worse tomorrow than they do today. This must be done. This is the first breakthrough and the first perception of a possible improvement. But for a real improvement, for a serious improvement, 5 or 6 years work is the minimum in order to ascend to a higher level and not simply to stabilize the situation, and achieve the first considerable changes."

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Committee Discusses CEMA

LD0102235890 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Andrey Orlov:

In relations with countries on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Soviet Union intends to prioritise economic criteria and to enhance the efficiency of foreign economic ties, said participants at today's meeting of the Committee for International Affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The meeting discussed Soviet cooperation with CMEA and the Economic Community (EC). It was attended by heads of foreign economic agencies and ministries and by economists.

Speakers noted the imperfection of CMEA's economic mechanism—the USSR is actually a creditor for its partners.

Using world prices to settle accounts with Czechoslovakia, for instance, would enable the Soviet side to spend ten billion roubles less on the import of equipment and to receive much larger sums for oil and gas.

This applies also to trade with other East European countries. (Under the current system, prices for raw materials are fixed prices averaged from the past five years. There are contractual prices for equipment).

If the USSR was an empire, this would be the only case in history when the metropolis was trading with the hinterlands at its own disadvantage, said chief of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Valentin Falin.

It should be established how each member country profits from CMEA activity.

The present attempt to reform CMEA is not the first. It is important to understand the reasons for the past failures.

This information should be considered by a special commission on CMEA reform, which will soon convene its first meeting in Moscow.

At the latest CMEA session in sofia it was deemed necessary to preserve CMEA, while radically reforming its mechanism and applying market principles, said Stepan Sitaryan, chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers.

He said the need to preserve CMEA stems above all from the economic situation. CMEA accounts for the lion's share of trade for each of its members. Economic ties among them, however imperfect, are so close that their sharp rupture would cause upheavals.

CMEA reform will require changing its governing agreements, above all the regulations. It will require change in the role of state regulation, the transfer from the coordination of plans to the coordination of economic policy. There will be a need to decide the destiny of the transferrable rouble, which never became the joint currency of CMEA.

Supreme Soviet Body Discusses Ownership Law

LD0202105990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] The commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet dealing with labor, prices, and social policy, today considered the important draft law on ownership. In essence, the commission proposed an alternative variant to Article 1 in the first section of the draft law. In the view of speakers, the role of the state is not to own property but merely to promote increased ownership and to provide equal conditions for the development of land in all types and forms. One of the clauses in the document is formulated thus: In the USSR an owner can be an individual or any multitude of citizens. Will these proposals be adopted in other commissions and committees, and at the regular session of the country's Supreme Soviet? Time will tell.

Supreme Soviet Commission Considers Land Law

LD3101164890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] A routine session has taken place of the commission set up by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to publicize views on the draft foundations of the legislation on land. It was announced today that by the end of the first 10 days of February, an amplified document should be submitted to parliament to be prepared for the second reading. As a result of discussion by all the people, it is also intended to examine the draft law on land at a joint session of two committees, that on agrarian issues and food and that on legislation, legality and law and order.

KGB Reports to Committee on Rehabilitation

LD3001210790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1840 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports:

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security has advocated speeding up the process of rehabilitating people who suffered in the years of Stalin's personality cult. This standing parliamentary body today heard the report from the USSR State Security Committee on that organization's work to restore justice with regard to citizens illegally repressed in the 1930s, 1940s, and the start of the 1950s.

Addressing the deputies, Vladimir Pirozhkov, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, called the events of those years "the most tragic in the history of the establishment and development of the Soviet state, causing serious damage to society and it moral foundations." He reported that in the period of the 1930s, 1940s, and the start of the 1950s, 3,778,000 people had been repressed, including almost 22,000 officials of the state security bodies.

Rehabilitation of these people, which was slowed down in the mid-sixties, resumed in September 1987 after the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission was formed for the additional study of materials connected with repressions, in the work of which the USSR KGB is actively participating. For example, during this time charges were fully withdrawn from such well-known leaders of the party and the state as Nikolay Bukharin, Aleksey Rykov, and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy. In total, during the period of 1988-89 more than 591,000 criminal cases were reexamined and about 845,000 people were rehabilitated, Vladimir Pirozhkov reported. This work is continuing.

After discussing the report of the USSR KGB representative the deputies came to the conclusion that the examination procedure in court for the cases involving the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist repressions needs to be simplified. In addition, members of the parliamentary committee on issues of defense and state security intend to speed up preparation of the USSR law on archives, which in their opinion will make it possible to solve many questions about use of the documents kept in archive departments, including those in the KGB's central archive.

USSR Supreme Soviet's Nishanov Interviewed

90UN0672B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 p 14

[Interview with Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by SOYUZ special correspondent Aleksandra Lugovskaya: "We Are All in the Same Boat"; place and date not given—first three paragraphs are SOYUZ introduction]

[Text] The office of the chairman of the chamber—Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov. On his desk—files of documents and selected reports on events in the country and abroad, a stack of official telegrams. He must rapidly read through dozens of pages, grasp their substance, interpret ideas, arrive at conclusions, and make pressing decisions.

What do we know about him? During the days when congresses or meetings of parliament are in session we see him on the television screen—calm, self-possessed, capable of "extinguishing" a conflict.

He came suddenly into our social life. What about his past? R.N. Nishanov is a man with an intricate history. He started out serving in the Army, then attended military school. But he was not to pursue an officer's career. He went through all phases of party work, served as chairman of the Tashkent gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] and secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party for ideology. And again he made an unexpected sharp turn—to the diplomatic field. He returned to Uzbekistan only following the death of Rashidov. Over a short time he was the republic's minister of foreign affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. And now a new post.

[Lugovskaya] The chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet is always in the public eye. All the same, we don't know very much about your job. What does your authority comprise?

[Nishanov] Indeed, at first glance my job appears light and honorary—just preside and that's it. But this is a superficial impression. It is necessary first of all to organize the work of the chamber. We have established four major commissions which are presently in operation: on ethnic policy and international relations; on matters of the social and economic development of the union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs; on consumer products, trade, community and everyday services for the population; and on matters concerning the development of culture, language, ethnic and international traditions, and the safeguarding of historical legacy. In addition, the chamber functions in close contact with committees of the Supreme Soviet.

My responsibility involves the organization of their plans, providing specific work content, and facilitating proper decisionmaking so as to take into account the interests of all republics and autonomous formations. Coordinating chamber activities requires an extremely great degree of responsibility and intense work on my part.

[Lugovskaya] At one time, Rafik Nishanovich, you headed the legislative proposals commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the previous USSR Supreme Soviet, so now you have the opportunity to compare. Have there been noticeable changes in the work of the chamber?

[Nishanov] I served as chairman of this commission from 1966 through 1970 and, of course, the difference between the previous and current chamber is a tremendous one—especially in the work of drafting legislation concerning the life of peoples and nationalities. For the sake of fairness, I must emphasize that at that time deputies were working and drawing up legislation with the help of scholars; contentious meetings took place. But on the commission level there was no intensity—a universal equanimity reigned in the Supreme Soviet when adopting laws and legal acts, a 100 percent vote "in favor" was guaranteed. No one raised any objections. No one even so much as criticized!

I recall one instance when we were drawing up the Law on Universal Military Obligation and decided to invite Marshal Grechko, minister of defense, to our meeting. When I called him up, he failed to understand who was talking with him or where he was being asked to go—"Well, why should I report to a commission, and not to the Supreme Soviet?" Just compare. Could a minister today ask such a question?

[Lugovskaya] And what in the Soviet of Nationalities depends personally on you?

[Nishanov] In the deciding sense—not much. But I assist the Soviet of Nationalities in developing its strategy. On the one hand, I accomplish this relying on the experience of the deputies, their knowledge of the situation in the country; on the other hand, I independently study the particulars of the national-state, economic, and social structure in the various regions, the peculiarities in development of population groups. Deformation of ethnic policy over many years has led to monstrous distortions.

We all now know how the demographic face of the Baltic republics has changed. Departments built plants there in which the local population had no desire to work—therefore they brought in a labor force from other regions. Today we are reaping the benefit of such "internationalism."

And everybody knows, for example, the tremendous scale that has come to characterize the resettlement of peoples of other nationalities to Uzbekistan. Armenians, Koreans, Germans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Greeks, Kurds —over several decades they arrived in the hundreds of thousands. Additionally, during the war years Uzbekistan accepted a million evacuees, including 200,000 orphaned children.

This shows the great soul of the Uzbek people, themselves in a disastrous state during these years. The cotton monoculture literally crushed the peasants. At the age of 40 our women were exhausted with work and burdened with many children. Rapid growth of population in the republic has taken place in the background of a stunted, undeveloped economy and neglected social sphere. The insufficient number of job positions has caused about a million young people 18 to 20 years of age to have practically no work whatsoever. Thus, conflict has ripened.

[Lugovskaya] When the Fergana tragedy broke out, you cited purely social lifestyle reasons as comprising the origin of the conflict. What was the source of your information at that time? The apparatus? Would you realistically have been able to influence the course of events had you been in Uzbekistan then?

[Nishanov] To a greater or lesser degree, of course I would. But at that moment I was in the Congress of People's Deputies, fulfilling my obligations. You asked about the apparatus... Initial information came from a group of Central Committee personnel of the Uzbek Communist Party who had been urgently dispatched to Fergana Oblast. They reported a fight in the Kuvasay market. Later on it became clear that local authorities did not react at all to information they were receiving on the threatening situation, and in a number of instances simply connived with the hooligans.

The fateful confluence of circumstances was used by those removed from their posts for dishonesty and accepting bribes—almost two billion "cotton" rubles had settled in their pockets, stolen from the people. Deprived of power, these "leaders" started to unite, instigate others, and inflame nationalist sentiment. As you can see, they had sufficient funds to organize such a conflict.

Yes, I bear moral responsibility for the events in Fergana. And I spoke about this at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, although I had worked as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party for just one year, and prior to this was chairman of the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet for just over one year.

[Lugovskaya] Rafik Nishanovich, is the Soviet of Nationalities capable of exerting a real influence on interethnic relations in the country, in such an unusual situation as that which has come about today?

[Nishanov] "Hot spots" are just one aspect of the chamber's work. Events taking place in the various regions dictate to us hundreds of problems—urgent, emergency, extraordinary issues. And we must react immediately. The problems range from economic and social development of republics and autonomous formations to defending the rights of specific citizens. Currently, we are forced to operate "on the march." At a certain moment, for example, a flow of telegrams came in from Estonia, so a deputies' commission was formed and dispatched to this region. A similar commission was sent to Moldavia, when the Law on Language was adopted, at the insistence not only of representatives of the Gagauz-and Russian-speaking population, but of the republic leadership as well.

[Lugovskaya] But is such an "arbitration tribunal" at all necessary? What are the methods according to which your parliamentarians work? What is their power, their authority? How are they received?

[Nishanov] I sense some uncertainty in your questions. Most likely there will not be any such need in the future. We will reach that point when we perfect the USSR Constitution and the law. But currently we must resort to such measures for influencing events. There are numerous examples to show that the people believe in their deputies. This gives them the power to appear in the name of the USSR Supreme Soviet as champions of justice.

[Lugovskaya] In this regard I would like to know your opinion on two functions which belong to the parliament—the legislative and monitoring functions.

[Nishanov] The Supreme Soviet is working intensely on drawing up legislation, although we are being forced to master this "on the move." Regarding the mechanism for monitoring compliance with adopted laws, here we are clearly lagging behind, and this includes the sphere of international relations. We see errors and defects and attempt to prevent them from turning into incidents. We hope that the Constitutional Oversight Committee will become engaged in developing a system for monitoring observance of the laws and bringing specific articles of union republic legislation into conformance with the USSR Constitution.

A general level of legal culture—among both citizens of the country and the representatives of executive authority—is a very important condition for effecting successful implementation of the law. And legal discipline as well, I would say.

The Law on the Judicial System was recently adopted, on the rights of judges and the courts. Punitive measures were determined for those who attempt to encroach upon their independence and honor. This is a very serious matter. And if we, the citizens of the country, treat the court system with respect, the law will triumph.

[Lugovskaya] How does the law take into account people's national interests which comprise the spiritual aspect of life? How is preparation of such laws proceeding? How are they being received?

[Nishanov] Law is not engendered in the mind of a scholar—the necessity for its adoption is dictated by reality. The draft law was recently adopted at the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Free Ethnic Development of USSR Citizens Residing Beyond the Boundaries of Their Ethnic-State Formations or Not Having Such Formations in the Territory of the USSR." It proceeded from the appeals of citizens of our country. Here at the Soviet of Nationalities we received thousands of letters and telegrams from various republics in which the population—primarily Russian-speaking—complained that their rights were being infringed upon.

Generalizing the information we received, we realized that territorial interests and cultural traditions of nationalities and national formations in the union republics and autonomies needed to be defended. Laws and normative acts are necessary in order to guarantee everyone conditions for development with equal rights. It was also evident that the focus of this set of measures should be individual rights and protection of the interests of each specific ethnic group and nationality. The document which was drawn up conforms completely to international legal provisions for protecting the rights of the individual and to the provisions of the Vienna Convention.

[Lugovskaya] Which tasks facing the Soviet of Nationalities do you consider of immediate priority?

[Nishanov] We need renewed legislative acts providing the republics with real sovereign rights. This question is currently under development. A provision on the status of the union republics will possibly be inserted into the new constitution. This will protect them from the arbitrariness of central departments. Problems arise with respect to the autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs. We have a great deal of unfinished work here —various forms of autonomy give rise to inequality, a "qualitative ranking" of ethnic groups, as if to say—this is a union republic, it has such-and-such rights and so many representatives in the Supreme Soviet; an autonomous oblast has fewer, and an okrug fewer still. And here no one recalls the minor nationalities which have no autonomous formation of their own at all. This is abnormal.

[Lugovskaya] How can their actual status be raised? What proposals exist in this regard?

[Nishanov] It is difficult to answer this at present but solutions are being sought in commissions. Possibly they will be endowed with the rights of union republics in questions of economic and social development, preservation of natural resources, language, etc.

Today we are working energetically on legislation regarding the economic independence of the republics. I am convinced that, having achieved this, they will freely select economic forms of development and home in on the final result. People will labor on their own land as masters of that land.

[Lugovskaya] What do you think, has the Soviet of Nationalities succeeded in developing a proper rhythm in its work?

[Nishanov] It is still premature to be talking about this. Ways and means are being sought, chamber activity is intensifying, a mechanism is being developed for interaction among committees and commissions. We have created an additional four temporary commissions on questions that are troubling people—the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the fate of the German population, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks. But these issues are so complicated that it would be impossible to resolve them right away. This will take time.

[Lugovskaya] The Declaration recently adopted "On the Acknowledgment as Unlawful and Criminal of Repressive Acts Against People Subjected to Forced Resettlement and on Guaranteeing Their Rights" has been enthusiastically received by society. But how in fact can justice be restored? What can you say to those people who today "have their bags packed," who are anxiously awaiting an opportunity to return to their land?

[Nishanov] The declaration is a political document. In order for it to become a part of people's lives, it is necessary to draw up an entire set of laws regulating its application. The government has already begun working on this.

I would like to urge everyone to action which makes good sense. Let us take, for example, the return of Crimean Tatars. Desiring to create certain conditions for some, we cannot encroach upon the rights of those who already live there. They are not at fault here. I know that the Ukrainian government and Crimean oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] are working energetically on this problem. It will be necessary to construct housing, schools, and children's facilities, to create work places and an infrastructure—after all, this is a long-term program. And gradually it will help the Crimean Tatars to move. Without a doubt, this is possible. But there is no need to whip the horse onward—we might drive him into the ground. The problems awaiting Soviet Germans and the inhabitants of the Volga region are no less complex—these people must all show judgment, patience, and good will.

[Lugovskaya] Like all deputies in the parliament, you have your personal voting device. Does your position always coincide with that of the majority?

[Nishanov] Not always, of course, but this is a matter of my personal conscience. When my view is not that of the majority, I begin to look into the reasons, to find out where I may have gone wrong.

[Lugovskaya] How did you vote with respect to the famous issue of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution?

[Nishanov] Against including it in the agenda of the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies. I believe we must change the old formula and find another, one that is adequate for our time. The vanguard role of the party should be maintained for generalization and the development of theoretical provisions for social development. There are those who compare, saying—"Well, the East European countries have excluded such articles from their constitutions." But I do not think we are obliged to crank out precedents. We have our own mature society, and we should make decisions which take into account our internal development. I am convinced that a new wording will be found for Article 6—the Constitutional Commission is working on this now.

[Lugovskaya] Please forgive me in advance for posing a not-too-tactful question—with all your outward sociability, you remain a "private" individual, somewhat of a riddle. During television broadcasts you seem to be too serene. What do you actually feel when you are presiding over sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies?

[Nishanov] Very often I want right away to get personally involved in a discussion. But at the same time a certain internal responsibility dictates—"Restrain yourself. You do not have the right to act that way now." Emotions during these times become strained to the limit; people confront one another with sharp criticism and intransigence. And one drop of my zealous fervor will be enough to create another massive jumble and result in a negative outcome, instead of bringing about a compromise. But I try not to allow deputies to commit errors and engage in coarse attacks without calling them to account, so as to prevent this from becoming the "standard" of behavior. After all, this is the parliament of the country, its personification, and we must remember this during discussions here. Maintaining composure and self-possession has evidently been imbued in me from my work in diplomacy.

[Lugovskaya] Rafik Nishanovich, your diplomatic career began somewhat unexpectedly for you, did it not?

[Nishanov] By that time I had already served seven years as Central Committee secretary for ideology of the Uzbek Communist Party. On the whole, the situation in the republic then was healthy, although Rashidovism was already gathering strength. There were some strange things which took place—the minister of procurement died under mysterious circumstances, M. Abdurazakov, former first secretary of the Tashkent obkom [oblast party committee], who was not in agreement with the depraved, family clan-cadre politics of Rashidov. Victimized for a long time was K. Murtazayev, a spotlessly clean individual well-known throughout Uzbekistan, former first secretary of the Bukhara obkom. And Rashidov and I had strained relations—I had a reputation for being obstinate and uncompromising, especially regarding the investigation of personal matters concerning corrupt individuals whom he liked. At the same time, there was an ongoing ideological struggle between us. Nationalist motives prompted Rashidov to extol bloody conquerors of the past, such as Timur. I recall some very serious quarrels heating up between us. I tried to argue my point of view before the Central Committee Bureau and decided to inform the CPSU Central Committee of Rashidov's dubious activities—to tell Suslov, Ponomarev, Demichev, and Kapitonov. They listened to what I had to say and understood, even agreed with my evaluation of the situation. The matter came to a completely unexpected conclusion—I was invited to the foreign service department of the CPSU Central Committee and offered the post of USSR ambassador to Sri Lanka. This happened in 1970.

[Lugovskaya] How did you react to this?

[Nishanov] In normal fashion, although I knew what was going on, of course. I had no experience in diplomatic work and I knew no foreign languages—at times it was very difficult for me. I worked at maximum performance, of course, but in my heart I felt an injustice. I had to live and work under the most difficult physical conditions—the heat of the tropics, the humidity, disease. I spent eight years there, unlike any other Soviet ambassador. But even after this time Rashidov did not want me to return. I was transferred to the post of ambassador to Jordan. I spent 15 years abroad in all.

[Lugovskaya] Didn't your principled approach have an effect on your family?

[Nishanov] When I lived with my family in Jordan, an attempt was made on my son's life in Tashkent. This took place at night—a bandit crept into the house and slit his throat with a knife. My aged father and my sister jumped up at his cry and were able to summon a first-aid team. My son was just barely saved, by seconds. But he remains maimed. Responding to a telegram, I flew home with my wife and went to see Minister of Internal Affairs Yakhyayev—"Is there Soviet rule in Uzbekistan? At least let me work abroad in peace!" He replied: "We will do everything we can to find the criminal." But no one was about to go looking. This had their signatures on it—Rashidov's and Yakhyayev's.

[Lugovskaya] How is your relationship with USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M.S. Gorbachev? What is your view of him as head of the party and chief of state?

[Nishanov] Our relationship is quite normal, comradely in good party fashion. When I render reports to M.S. Gorbachev based on my analysis of events in progress, I receive his support in the absolute majority of cases. He is an on-the-job chairman, striving to fulfill his complex mission in the best possible way, sparing neither time nor effort. He works with integrity.

I would like to add that, like every individual, he has his pluses and minuses, but I consider him a strong personality. First of all, he has an ideological conviction in the rightness of what he is undertaking. He also knows just how difficult it is. On the one hand, we see the consolidation of conservative forces in society which are screaming: "The country is on the edge of an abyss—we must return to the old method of leadership..." And on the other, we see ultra-left extremists in operation: "Let us resolve everything in one fell swoop!" But it doesn't happen that way. It is in this environment of a real confrontation of forces that Gorbachev has not lost sight of the main policy and strives to direct these currents into a single, true stream—the stream of perestroyka. There is no way back. You ask—who is he? I would say he is a diplomat, a political expert, an organizer, an ideologist, a psychologist, and a legal expert—all rolled into one. Most importantly, he is a political expert who can foresee how events may develop.

[Lugovskaya] What do you think—is it an accident he appeared on the political scene at a crucial moment in our history?

[Nishanov] It is absolutely natural. I believe thoughts on restructuring our system were conceived in him long before he became general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This is how it seems to me personally, although I have not spoken with him on this subject. He was already able to see the pernicious effect of the stagnation phenomena on the development of society while serving within the Politburo, working in the CPSU Central Committee. And he comprehended these processes—as simply a situation which obstructed action. I say this because many of us—you included—personally felt the years of stagnation. We discussed with bitterness where the country was going. The inactivity of the Politburo and government during the Brezhnev years led to despair.

I myself have experienced these feelings on many occasions. While in Jordan, I associated with an authoritative political figure of the East, King Husayn, a wise and influential man. Many times he presented to me, the USSR ambassador, the matter of the necessity of his traveling to Moscow to consult with Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev on current policy problems. But such an opportunity did not always present itself, or appeared when the necessity for a meeting was fading away.

We diplomats reflected—was it possible our state had no one who would represent a great country in worthy fashion and operate productively? The era of perestroyka has appreciably altered the appearance of our society. I believe the ideas being implemented today by M.S. Gorbachev are mature, balanced, and well thought out.

[Lugovskaya] The view is often expressed—including by high state and party officials—that the press coverage of interethnic conflicts gives rise to new conflicts. At the same time, people express their indignation at the absence of this kind of information. What do you think about this?

[Nishanov] My position in principle is that no sphere should be closed to the press. The press is the main channel for propagating glasnost and its involvement in all aspects of life assists perestroyka. Those who call upon the press to be circumspect in their coverage of interethnic conflicts have in mind, in my opinion, press responsibility for their own statements. There are examples of the skillful use of press coverage by various forces to inflame passions. It seems to me personally that it is better to refrain from making judgments in areas where passions are raging, because these inevitably turn out to be one-sided.

Of course, incidents fall under the purview of the law—let it be the judge of who is right and who is to blame. I am convinced that problems of interethnic relations are perhaps the most delicate, and today the most unstable—we must explore them not on the everyday level, but in the highest spiritual spheres.

[Lugovskaya] Do you feel this is a fortunate time for you or not?

[Nishanov] I consider my time to be difficult, because I share responsibility for the country's future and the destiny of perestroyka. But I am lucky in that, in this difficult period, I am helping the interethnic Soviet people, the party, and the state to take genuine, not artificial, steps towards achieving progress.